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The economic environment in which a firm operates is constantly changing. This thesis
contains three essays to examine how firms adapt their innovation and international
activities to a variety of external changes.
The first paper, “Information Frictions and the Law of One Price: ‘When the States
and the Kingdom became United’”, shows how information frictions affect the export-
ing behavior of merchants, exploiting a unique historical experiment: the transatlantic
telegraph, established in 1866. Using a newly collected data set on cotton trade based
on historical newspapers, I find that information frictions result in large and volatile
deviations from the Law of One Price. There are also real effects, because exports
respond to information about foreign demand shocks, and average exports increase
after the telegraph and become more volatile. I provide a model in which exporters
use the latest news about a foreign market to forecast expected selling prices when
their exports arrive at the destination. Their forecast error is smaller and less volatile
the more recent the available information. The welfare gains from the telegraph are
estimated to be around 8% of annual export value.
The second paper, “Survive another day: Using changes in the composition of
investments to measure the cost of credit constraints” is joint work with Luis Garicano.
We introduce a novel empirical strategy to measure the credit shocks that were triggered
by the recent financial crisis: Theoretically, we show that credit shocks affect long term
investments by more than short term ones. Credit shocks can then be measured within
firms by the relative drop of long run relative to short run investments; using firm-
times-year fixed effects to absorb idiosyncratic demand shocks. Using data on Spanish
manufacturing firms we find that credit constraints are equivalent to an additional tax
rate of around 11% on the longest lived investment.
While the trade literature has established a positive impact of globalization on the
productivity of firms, there is lacking consensus about the underlying mechanism at
work: Trade theory focuses on a market access mechanism, but empirical papers point
out that import competition matters as well. The third paper, “The roles of import
competition and export opportunities for technical change”, conducts a “horse race”
between the two mechanisms. Using Spanish firm level data, I find robust evidence
that access to export markets leads to productivity increases, but only for firms that
were already highly productive before. The evidence on import competition is weaker
and very heterogeneous, pointing towards an omitted variable bias in earlier papers.
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Chapter 1
Information Frictions and the Law
of One Price: ‘When the States and
the Kingdom became United’1
How do information frictions distort international trade? This paper exploits a unique
historical experiment to estimate the magnitude of these distortions: the establishment
of the transatlantic telegraph connection in 1866. I use a newly collected data set based
on historical newspaper records that provides daily data on information flows across
the Atlantic together with detailed, daily information on prices and trade flows of
cotton. Information frictions result in large and volatile deviations from the Law of One
Price. What is more, the elimination of information frictions has real effects: Exports
respond to information about foreign demand shocks. Average trade flows increase
after the telegraph and become more volatile, providing a more efficient response to
demand shocks. I build a model of international trade that can explain the empirical
evidence. In the model, exporters use the latest news about a foreign market to forecast
expected selling prices when their exports arrive at the destination. Their forecast
error is smaller and less volatile the more recent the available information. I estimate
the welfare gains from information transmission through the telegraph to be roughly
equivalent to those from abolishing a 6% ad valorem tariff.
1The title of this paper is borrowed from a Citigroup advertisement in a campaign to celebrate its 200
year anniversary, as the bank provided capital for the laying of the telegraph cable (advertisement seen in
the journal “City A.M.” on 15 June 2012).
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1.1 Introduction
The “Law of One Price” (LOP) states that if goods are efficiently allocated across mar-
kets, the price for identical goods in different locations should not differ by more
than their transport costs. However, empirical studies document frequent and large
deviations from the LOP (for example, Froot et al. 1995). Understanding the nature
of the frictions that inhibit arbitrage across markets is one of the central objectives in
international trade. Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) and Head and Mayer (2013)
summarize the literature by observing that direct barriers to trade (for example trans-
port costs and trade tariffs) have been found to be of minor importance. Therefore the
recent emphasis of researchers has shifted to the search for more indirect barriers.
This paper focuses on information frictions as a potential explanation for “missing
trade” (Trefler 1995) and deviations from the LOP. Information is essential for the
efficient functioning of markets, but in reality often limited or costly (Jensen 2007;
Stigler 1961). For example, exporting firms have to spend considerable time and money
to learn about preferences of consumers in foreign countries and often fail while trying
(Albornoz et al. 2010), especially if preferences are changing over time and production
and export decisions have to be made in advance (Hummels and Schaur 2010; Evans
and Harrigan 2005; Collard-Wexler 2013). The distortions from information frictions
are hard to measure, as information flows are usually unobserved and also notoriously
endogenous.
I use a historical experiment to circumvent these empirical issues: the construction
of the transatlantic telegraph connection in the 19th century. First, the telegraph
connection provides an exogenous and large reduction in information frictions. Before
28 July 1866, mail steam ships took between seven and 15 days to transmit information
between the United States and Great Britain. The transatlantic cable reduced this
information delay to a single day. The timing of the establishment of the connection
was exogenous and not anticipated, because due to a series of technological setbacks
over the course of ten years it remained unclear until the very end whether this new
technology could ever work. It came as a big surprise when it not only worked, but also
reliably and fast. Second, this paper is to my knowledge the first in the trade literature
to observe information flows, which are based on news about foreign prices reported
in historical newspapers.2 The information flows are used to measure the impact
of information on prices and exports, and to derive micro foundations for exporters’
behavior under information frictions which I use to estimate welfare effects.
The empirical part of this paper focuses on cotton, the most important traded good
between Great Britain and the United States in the mid-19th-century. The dominance
of “King Cotton” in trade provides a unique setting to study information frictions,
because historical newspapers published detailed and meticulous market reports on
2Previous papers using exogenous variation in information frictions used the presence of mobile
phone coverage (Jensen 2007; Aker 2010), internet kiosks (Goyal 2010) or even the transatlantic telegraph
connection (Ejrnaes and Persson 2010), but none of these papers observed information flows directly.
Observing information (“news”) and relating them to prices is much more common in the finance literature
(for example Cutler et al. 1989, Koudijs 2013).
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cotton. No other good was reported at a daily frequency and to such a degree of detail.
Surprisingly, these rich data have never been systematically digitized. I use market
reports from newspapers on both sides of the Atlantic – The New York Times and the
Liverpool Mercury – to construct a new, daily data set that includes cotton prices in New
York and Liverpool, export flows and freight cost between the two ports, stock levels
in both markets and detailed information flows for the period of one year before and
one year after the telegraph connection. The use of this data set has several advantages:
First, using export as well as price data makes it possible to understand whether
information has a real effect, as opposed to only distributing profits across agents.
Second, it is possible to study the impact of information frictions on a durable good.
Jensen (2007) provides evidence that information reduces spoilage of fish, a highly
perishable good, but it is not clear whether the same is true for a storable commodity.
Third, shipping time makes imports predetermined, which allows me to identify the
supply and demand functions that are needed for the welfare estimation.
Using this detailed data, I am able to document six “Stylized Facts”: (1) The tele-
graph caused a better adherence to the Law of One Price, as the mean and volatility of
the price difference fell. (2) Within the pre-telegraph period, faster steam ships had a
similar effect and reduced deviations from the Law of One Price. In contrast, within the
post-telegraph period, temporary technical failures of the connection led to increased
deviations from the Law of One Price. (3) New York prices respond to news from
Liverpool. Before the telegraph, only Liverpool prices lagged by ten or more days
are relevant in determining New York prices. After the telegraph, the transmission
of shocks across prices is reduced to almost real-time.3 (4) Market participants base
their search for arbitrage opportunities on the latest news from Liverpool. (5) Informa-
tion frictions have real effects and are not just a reallocation of profits across market
participants, because exports respond to news about Liverpool prices.4 (6) After the
telegraph, exports are on average higher, and more volatile.
In order to establish a causal relationship between these findings and the telegraph,
I use two complementary strategies. First, the findings are robust to a number of
alternative explanations (for example transport cost variations, supply irregularities in
the aftermath of the American Civil War, fluctuations within bounds given by trade cost
in no trade periods, change in the market structure of merchants, futures or forward
trading, and anticipation effects). Second, to rule out any confounding trends that
happened over time, I use another source of exogenous variation in information flows
within the period before the telegraph was established: the irregular passage times of
steam ships across the Atlantic, which were driven by weather conditions.
I present a partial equilibrium model of trade under information frictions that
3A related paper by Ejrnaes and Persson (2010) estimates faster shock transmission after the telegraph
using weekly wheat prices. However, their price series exhibits a gap of 15 years around the time of
the establishment of the telegraph connection, which makes it difficult to distinguish the effect of the
telegraph from other confounding trends such as the introduction of futures trading in the 1870s.
4To my knowledge, my paper is the first to provide evidence that the telegraph had real effects on
exports. An earlier paper by Ejrnaes and Persson (2010) does not observe trade flows, takes real effects
as given and estimates the welfare gains from the transatlantic telegraph using estimated demand and
supply elasticities from other studies that are based over yearly rather than weekly time horizons.
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provides a micro foundation for the empirical findings and can be used to study
the welfare effects of information frictions. In the model, as in 19th century trade,
intermediaries act as arbitrageurs across geographic markets. They buy cotton from
suppliers at a centralized exchange in New York and ship it to Liverpool where they
sell it to cotton millers, again at a centralized market place. Aggregate demand from
cotton millers follows a stochastic, autocorrelated process. Shipping takes time, so
merchants have to make their export decision before they know the realization of the
demand shock,5 and will base it on the prices they expect to generate in Liverpool
upon arrival of their shipment. Information frictions affect the information available to
merchants when they build these conditional expectations: If frictions are low, market
conditions in Liverpool are observed up to the current date. If frictions are high,
lagged information about market conditions in Liverpool have to be used to predict
future selling prices. In this model, merchants optimally choose exports taking their
information as given.6
In the model I allow the commodity to be storable and study its consequences for
information frictions. Storage softens the impact of information frictions. If exports
are inefficiently high based on wrong expectations, cotton can be stored until demand
is higher. However, the smoothing effect of storage is asymmetric, because negative
amounts cannot be stored (Williams and Wright 1991; Deaton and Laroque 1996). If
exports are inefficiently low based on wrong expectations, there might not be enough
stock available to smooth prices. There is always a positive probability that long periods
of especially high demand will run down inventories, and a finite stock can never fully
insure against aggregate demand shocks.
I calibrate the model to match the historical data after the telegraph was introduced.
Then I conduct a counterfactual analysis by increasing information frictions to simulate
the effect of the telegraph. The resulting predictions are consistent with the reduced
form evidence: The volatility of trade flows increases after the telegraph connection,
because exports follow expected demand shocks in Liverpool.7 With better information,
expected demand shocks are more volatile. Average exports are lower before the tele-
graph connection, because periods of high demand are systematically underestimated
with information frictions. An asymmetry arises from restricting exports to be positive:8
While periods of low demand are also systematically overestimated with information
frictions, in these periods it is never profitable to export. As a result, average exports
increase after the telegraph, because in periods of high demand exports are higher. The
distorted export flows are reflected in distorted price equalization: After the telegraph,
5Aggregate demand shocks cannot be fully insured away, as borrowing cotton from future harvests is
impossible. Furthermore, since futures trading had not yet been established, the risk could also not be
reallocated across market participants, for example from merchants to “speculators”, so merchants had to
bear the full market risk of their ex-ante export decision.
6This is different from Allen (2012), who models information frictions as a costly search across markets,
and merchants optimally decide on how much information to acquire.
7To my knowledge, this is the first paper in this literature to model information directly as the way
how conditional expectations are formed.
8In models without time lag due to shipping, negative exports can be interpreted as imports. However,
with time-consuming shipping, negative exports are “imports from a future period”, an unrealistic
assumption.
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the average and the volatility of the price difference falls.
The model provides an analytical solution for the lower bound of the deadweight
loss arising from distorted trade flows under information frictions based on Harberger
Triangles: The deadweight loss from information frictions is a function of the squared
observed price difference between New York and Liverpool (taking into account the
shipping lag) as well as the slopes of the demand and supply curves. The reduction in
the absolute observed price difference after the construction of the telegraph connection
correspond to the abolishment of an ad valorem tariff of around 6%. To see how this
translates into welfare gains, the slopes of the supply and demand functions need to be
estimated. This estimation is usually difficult due to the simultaneous determination of
quantity and prices, and a valid instrument cannot always be found. I propose a novel
identification strategy that exploits the fact that exports are predetermined once they
arrive in Liverpool, since shipping takes time for transatlantic cotton trade. This breaks
the simultaneity problem for the case of i.i.d. shocks. For the case of autocorrelated
shocks and positive storage the model can be used to control appropriately for the
endogenous part of the shocks, yielding identified regression equations. Combining
the evidence I estimate the welfare gain from the telegraph to be equal to 8% of the
annual export value of American cotton.
What are the implications of this paper for today’s modern world, when optical
glass fiber cables have long since replaced the copper wires of the telegraph? The
historical example of the transatlantic telegraph provides a micro foundation for how
exporters (or equivalently producers) use information about demand shocks to forecast
demand and decide ex-ante on export (or production) quantities. Exporters and firms
still face this problem today, and new emerging technologies such as the real-time
analysis of “Big Data” have the potential to provide firms with immediate information
about consumer behavior (McAfee and Brynjolfsson 2012). My model can be used to
assess the welfare effects from these technologies.9
This paper contributes to an emerging literature on information frictions in trade.
Information frictions can take different forms: One branch of the literature focuses
on the information frictions in the search and matching process of buyers and sellers
across international markets. Rauch and Trindade (2002) show that social networks
help to overcome these frictions and increase trade.10 Other papers focus on the role of
information technology to overcome these frictions. For example, Jensen (2007) and
Aker (2010) use mobile phone coverage, while Goyal (2010) and Brown and Goolsbee
(2002) use internet based price comparisons. This paper contributes to this strand of
the literature in several ways: It observes also data on information flows and can relate
this to outcomes; it demonstrates that information has real effects by observing exports
and not only price differences; it provides a novel identification strategy to estimate the
welfare effects; and, compared to Jensen (2007), it shows that information frictions are
9Technologies that reduce the time lag between the production decision and consumption, such as
faster transport and supply chain management, have a similar effect, see also Hummels and Schaur (2010,
2012); Evans and Harrigan (2005); Aizenman (2004); Harrigan (2010).
10Similarly, Head and Ries (1998); Rauch (1999, 2001).
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also relevant for the case of a storable good in the context of international trade. Instead
of studying how technological innovations can overcome information frictions, Allen
(2012) models the optimal behavior of agents when search is costly, and characterizes
the resulting trade pattern. Another branch of the literature interprets information cost
as fixed cost for entering an export market and shows how technology can reduce it
(Freund and Weinhold 2004).
These interpretations differ from the mechanism in this paper which interprets
information frictions as a source for making forecast errors when predicting foreign
market conditions. This view is related to the finance literature’s focus on the effect
of news on capital prices (Cutler et al. 1989; Koudijs 2013) and on how information
technologies can increase the efficient functioning of capital markets (Portes and Rey
2005, Garbade and Silber 197811, Field 1998).
My paper focuses exclusively on the information effects of the telegraph. However,
in the long run there might be other, additional effects: For example, Lew and Cater
(2006) argue that the telegraph reduced transport costs by increasing the capacity
utilization of shipping, which increased trade flows (however, using only data from
after 1870). Clark and Feenstra (2003) argue that the telegraph enabled international
transfer of other production technologies. These and other additional, long-run effects
would increase the welfare gains brought about by the telegraph beyond the ones
estimated in this paper.
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 1.2 describes the historical setting,
and Section 1.3 describes the collected data set. Section 1.4 provides reduced form
evidence on the effect of the telegraph. Section 1.5 develops a theoretical model of
information frictions and intermediaries in international trade that is consistent with
the empirical findings. Section 1.6 estimates the welfare effects of information frictions.
I conclude in Section 1.7.
1.2 Historical Setting
Transatlantic cotton trade was the world’s most important single trade linkage in mid
19th century. For the United States, half of exports to the world was in “King Cotton”.12
For Great Britain, a third of world imports (36% in 1866) was in cotton (The Economist
1866).
In the mid 19th century, cotton was grown primarily in the South of the United
States (over 55% of world production, Ellison 1886). The second largest producing
country was India (29%), followed by Egypt (9%) and Brazil (5%). The dominance
of the United States in cotton production is mainly explained by the superior quality
of “American cotton”, whose longer and stronger fibers were preferred by spinners
11Garbade and Silber (1978) show that the transatlantic telegraph connection reduced average spatial
price difference and volatility of stock prices.
12Bruchey (1967). The term “King Cotton” was coined before the American Civil War and reflected its
tremendous importance for 19th century economies (Surdam 1998). This dominance did not stop after the
war: American cotton “was not toppled from his throne” and “resumed his former position of power”, as
Woodman (1968) phrases it.
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(Irwin 2003). Other advantages of American cotton were lower production cost, lower
transport costs and faster shipping time.
Cotton millers spun the raw cotton into yarn, which was then woven into fabrics,
and sewn into a wide variety of apparel and accessories. The industrial revolution
in Great Britain had led to several inventions in cotton manufacturing such as spin-
ning machines, the spinning jenny, or the spinning frame, making the country the
world’s leading textile manufacturer: Great Britain produced 85% of worldwide cotton
manufactures, and consumed half of the world’s cotton production (Ellison 1886).
Textile manufacturing was geographically highly concentrated and took mainly place
in Lancashire, the hinterland of “Cottonopolis” Manchester.
Virtually all the cotton destined for Great Britain arrived at Liverpool, Lancashire’s
closest port. On the other side of the Atlantic, New York was the major port exporting
to Great Britain: In 1866, 33% of cotton exported to Great Britain arrived from New
York, followed by New Orleans (28%) and Mobile (18%).13
A thriving mercantile community was responsible for bringing cotton from source
to destination.14 Most merchants were generalists: In the 1860s, only 11-13% specialized
in a specific commodity, and 13-14% specialized in certain trade routes (Milne 2000).
Merchants were early multinationals. They usually set up a subsidiary in important
foreign port cities, mostly run by family members (Ellison 1886; Milne 2000; Chapman
1984). Merchant trade was associated with relatively low entry cost, leading to fierce
competition.15 In fact, historical trade directories reveal that around 100–200 merchants
were active in cotton trade from New York to Liverpool in 1866.16 Merchants were
usually not credit constrained, as there was a well developed and functioning banking
sector that provided trade financing (Chapman 1984; Brown 1909).
Organized exchanges for cotton existed in both New York and Liverpool. Merchants
bought cotton at the New York exchange from cotton farmers, shipped it to Liverpool,
and sold it at the Liverpool exchange to cotton millers. Due to the dominance of Great
Britain in textile manufacturing, Liverpool essentially constituted the world price for
cotton. Cotton futures trading had not yet been established.17 At each exchange there
were also so called “speculators”, who bought cotton when they thought prices would
go up, stored it, and sold it at a later time. About 80% of the cotton stock was stored
in warehouses near the ports by speculators, while spinners held only some widely
13Shipping and Commercial List, printed on 11 October 1866 in The New York Times
14Direct exporting by cotton farmers consisted of <1% of imports (own estimation based on a sample of
the Bills of Entry generously provided by Graeme Milne and data from historical trade directories).
15Milne (2000) notes that in the 1850’s and 1860’s many people entered the trading profession and
competition was so large that some traders were willing to work on a no-profit, no-commission basis.
16Own calculations based on the Bills of Entry.
17Futures trading involves the trading of a highly standardized contract based on a clearly defined
quality of the underlying good, that can be enforced; and the possibility to short sell. Institutions are
needed for objective assessment of the quality of the commodity, for drawing up standardized contracts,
and for legal enforcement of the contract. These institutions were set in place only by the 1870s (Ellison
1886, Hammond 1897). There is some limited evidence of forward trading (“on arrival” business, the
selling of a specific cotton lot that the seller possesses for delivery at a later date), but this was done only
when a sample of the cotton in question could be inspected (again, because there was not yet a procedure
for enforcement of a promised quality of cotton). In summary, no short selling of cotton was possible.
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scattered stocks. Traders assumed the storage cost, while manufacturers stored only as
much cotton as they needed to supply their mills in the short run (Milne 2000).
When merchants bought their cotton at the New York exchange, they had to forecast
demand conditions in Liverpool upon arrival of their shipment. Demand for cotton
at the exchange in Liverpool originated from cotton millers, whose customers were
domestic but also foreign; mainly from Continental Europe. Market reports in historical
newspapers describe how export demand for cotton textiles fluctuated frequently
depending on the course of wars and peace negotiations on the continent, which could
take quick surprising and unexpected turns. When a country on the continent was
in war or in threat of war, its demand for cotton textiles dropped considerably, as
the country shifted its funds towards war expenditures such as arms and munition.
The Austro-Prussian and the threat of the Franco-Prussian war fall into my sample
period, and historical newspapers frequently identified a change in the war conditions
as source for increasing or falling demand from cotton millers.
Information was therefore important at the cotton exchanges. The 19th-century-
equivalent to computer screens with price tickers was a large billboard with the latest
price information and news, together with circulars that summarized market devel-
opments, provided in the Exchange Newsroom. The news agency Reuters provided a
subscription service with the most important news from all over the world. The compi-
lation of news included the cotton prices from New York and Liverpool and was called
Reuter’s Telegram – even before the transatlantic cable was established, because the news
traveled the overland part of the way via telegraph. Contemporaneous newspapers as
well as the cotton exchanges were subscribers. Since these news were posted publicly
at the exchange, the cost for individual merchants to obtain them was zero.
The first successful transatlantic telegraph connection between Great Britain and
United States was established on 28 July 1866 and caused a dramatic reduction in
the delay of information across the Atlantic. Before the telegraph connection, the
only means of communication across the Atlantic was sending letters and messages
(including a print of Reuter’s Telegram) via steam ships. The so called “mail steam ships”
were the fastest ships of those times, specialized in speedy transmission of information
items such as letters, newspapers and other documents. There was fierce competition
among mail steam ships to win the unofficial “Blue Riband” for record speeds, and
by 1866 the fastest ship had crossed the Atlantic in little over eight days (Gibbs 1957).
However, these speed records could only be achieved under the best possible weather
conditions, which resulted in daily variation in communication times. If conditions
were very bad, ships could take as long as three weeks to cross the Atlantic. Important
commercial information was transmitted between the commercial hubs in the United
States and Great Britain using a combination of existing land based telegraph cables
and mail steam ships.18
18For example, the Liverpool price of cotton was telegraphed from Liverpool via the submarine
Ireland/Great Britain connection on to a steam ship passing the coast of Ireland on its way to the
United States. As soon as this ship reached the first telegraph post on the US coast, this information was
further telegraphed to New York by land line, arriving faster at its destination than the steam ship.
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The transatlantic telegraph connection changed communication flows dramatically
and immediately. For the first time in history, information traveled faster than goods
across the Atlantic (Lew and Cater 2006). From one day to the next, communication
between the United States and Great Britain was possible within only one day.19 There
were occasional technical break downs of the telegraph connection, but these were
usually repaired within a couple of days and communication was restored.
The timing of the successful telegraph connection was unforeseen and exogenous
to economic conditions, because the process of establishing a telegraph connection was
characterized by a series of failures and setbacks over the course of around ten years,
resulting in little confidence in the feasibility of a transatlantic telegraph connection.
These technical difficulties arose because the transatlantic cable was the first undersea
cable connecting two continents, which required to cover a greater distance (3,000
km) at a larger submarine depth (3,000 m) than any previous telegraph connection.20
Consequently, it took 5 attempts over the course of almost 10 years until a lasting
connection was established on 28 July 1866.21 The first attempt in 1857 had resulted
in a snapped cable, whose ends were lost in the deep sea. The second attempt in
1858 produced a working connection; however with an extremely slow transmission
speed that could not be used for commercial purposes,22 and the connection lasted only
briefly. After three weeks the insulation of the cable was damaged, and the connection
broke down permanently. After this failure the public lost faith in the telegraph project,
and another attempt in the same year was delayed indefinitely. In fact, the faith in
the technology had become so poor that the media suspected the working connection
had been a “hoax” altogether. The Boston Courier asked: “Was the Atlantic Cable a
Humbug?”
Although technical understanding of undersea electrical signal transmission had
progressed, the fourth attempt in 1865 resulted again in a broken cable with ends
that got lost in the ocean. By 1866 there was little confidence left. Even if people had
expected this fifth attempt to work, the precise timing could not have been foreseen, as
weather conditions determined the progress of the cable laying steam ship. Nonetheless,
to everybody’s surprise and excitement, on 28 July 1866 the first telegraph message,
a congratulation message from the Queen of England to the President of the United
States, was transmitted. From then on, the telegraph worked surprisingly reliably and
fast. The newspapers of the next working day already reported cotton prices from the
other side of the Atlantic in their commercial sections. By early September the 1865
cable was fished out of the sea and repaired. The two working transatlantic connections
19Messages sent from Great Britain to New York passed several telegraph posts along the route, and
had to be retransmitted at each of the posts (Lew and Cater 2006). Therefore effective communication
time between Liverpool and New York was around one day.
20The previous submarine cables connected Great Britain to Ireland and France; they were much shorter
and at a much shallower depth.
21Clarke (1992) provides a detailed and entertaining history of the cumbersome way towards a transat-
lantic connection.
22The first message took 17 hours to transmit. Overall, the average transmission speed was 0.1 words
per minute. The messages being sent were concerned with how to increase speed and trying to resolve
misunderstandings (Clarke 1992).
19
provided reliable and fast transatlantic communication. The transatlantic cable was
subsequently referred to as the “Eighth Wonder of the World”, reflecting people’s
amazement about this technological milestone.
Once completed, the contemporary press had high hopes for the impact of the
transatlantic telegraph: “The Atlantic Cable will tend to equalize prices and will elimi-
nate from the transactions in bonds, in merchandise and in commodities, an element
of uncertainty which has had the effect of [...] seriously damaging the commercial
relations between this country and Europe.”23 This paper uses empirical and theoretical
evidence to assess whether this prediction came true.
1.3 Description of Data
For establishing a causal relationship between delayed information, market integration
and trade flows data requirements are substantial. First of all, I need price and export
data on an identical good from at least two different market places. Many observed
“violations” of the Law of One Price can be blamed on a lax interpretation of this
requirement (Pippenger and Phillips 2008). For example, wheat grown in the United
States and wheat grown in Great Britain are not identical, and even different varieties
of wheat grown in the United States are not identical. This is a severe restriction on the
data, as many local newspapers – the primary source of historical market information –
report prices of the local variety and not foreign varieties. Sometimes, for example for
wheat, they report prices on foreign varieties, but then not for the same variety over
a consistent period of time.24 Another pitfall when studying the Law of One Price is
using retail instead of wholesale prices (Pippenger and Phillips 2008), so it would be
ideal to have data on a good that is traded on organized exchanges rather than local
farmers’ markets.
Second, these prices and export flows should be reported at a daily frequency, to
correspond to the actual adjustment horizon of prices to information in the real world.
I can then relate price changes on a certain day to news arriving on that day. Using
weekly data decreases the power of tests relating prices to news, and observed time
periods for consistent varieties (e.g. for wheat) are not long enough to compensate for
that (usually after 2–3 years the reported varieties change).
Third, I need data on information flows across the Atlantic. Newspapers report
the arrival of some type of news, but often these reports consist of political news and
information about stock prices and exchange rates rather than specific commodity
markets.
23New York Evening Post, 30 July 1866, as cited in Garbade and Silber (1978).
24For example, the Aberdeen Journal reported weekly American winter and American spring prices
for the London market, but stopped in July 1866 for no apparent reason, similarly the Economist and
The Daily Courier for American and Canadian Red Wheat. In contrast, the Daily Courier started to
report Chicago wheat prices only in August 1866. Some newspapers report weekly wheat prices for some
American varieties over longer time series, but the prices do not have any variation, which means there
was no underlying trade based on the commodity, and prices were just copied forward at the same level
for months. Ejrnaes and Persson (2010), who also fail to find grain price data that cover the years around
1866, explain that these years were a period when the export of US grain ceased temporarily.
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The importance of “King Cotton” in mid-19th-century allowed me to locate news-
papers at important ports on either side of the Atlantic that provided detailed, daily
information on cotton markets and trade flows. Furthermore, newspapers also reported
news about foreign cotton prices, which makes it possible to reconstruct information
flows. The richness of cotton data is extraordinary. No other good is consistently re-
ported at such a high frequency in two different countries for the same variety around
the mid 19th century.25
The resulting data set combines four types of data: market information from the
Liverpool exchange, market information from the New York exchange, trade flows
between New York and Liverpool, and information flows between New York and
Liverpool (and vice versa).
Market information from the Liverpool exchange was reported in the Liverpool
Mercury, which had a daily section called “Commercial” that provided a detailed
market report on cotton. The Liverpool Mercury published the daily price for “Middling
American”, where “middling” indicates a specific quality of American cotton (other
qualities that existed, but were not reported consistently, were “fair”, “middling fair”,
“ordinary”). In addition, the Liverpool Mercury provided weekly estimates of the stock
of American cotton in the warehouses of Liverpool.
Market information from the New York was reported in The New York Times, which
also published a daily commercial section with detailed information on cotton. Again,
the prices reported there are for “middling” American cotton.26 The New York Times
reported also a weekly and later bi-weekly estimate of the stock of cotton in the
warehouses, as well as the daily “receipts” of cotton from the hinterland that arrived at
the exchange on that day. I convert the prices at the New York exchange from US dollars
to Pound Sterling using daily exchange rates from the historical time series provided
by Global Financial Data.Great Britain had adopted the gold standard in those times.
Overall, the fluctuations in exchange rates were very small.27 Figure 1.B.1 illustrates
the resulting time series of daily New York and Liverpool cotton prices. The Liverpool
price for cotton exceeded the New York price almost always, except for a short period
in May 1866. The price series seem to follow each other by and large.
The New York Times also had a separate “Freights” section, which reported daily the
bales of cotton that were shipped to Liverpool, as well as the freight cost paid for that
shipment.28
I can also reconstruct the data on information flows from the historical newspapers,
as both newspapers reported the latest mail ship and telegraph arrivals on any given
day and printed the main commercial indicators from the other country that these
25Wheat data are often used for market integration studies. However, these are available at most at
weekly frequency, and qualities of wheat are often not comparable as there exist so many local varieties.
Furthermore wheat exports from the United States to Great Britain ceased for several years around 1866
(Ejrnaes and Persson 2010).
26Several market reports pointed out that New York used the same classification scheme as Liverpool,
as this was the most important destination for cotton.
27Using the average exchange rate for the whole period as opposed to the daily exchange rates does not
affect the results in this paper.
28Very few shipments are reported to go to other ports in Europe.
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shipped or telegraphed messages included. The relevant sections were headed “Latest
and Telegraphic News” and “News from Europe”, respectively. These indicators
included certain bond and stock prices and the price of cotton. The newspapers also
reported the origination date of these business indicators in the other market and the
arrival date of the information. The difference in these dates yields the information
transmission time across the Atlantic for any given day, which I call “information
delay l”. The measure of transmission times in my data corresponds to the fastest
possible way of communicating between Liverpool and New York, and not to the
corresponding steam ship travel times.29 Sometimes steam ships were overtaken by
other, faster steam ships, and its news were “old”. In that case the newspapers reported
“news were anticipated”.
My final database comprises 605 observations, one for every work day between 29
July 1865 and 27 July 1867. The cotton exchange was open every week Monday through
Saturday, except on holidays and a few other special occasions (for example, during a
“visit of the Prince and Princess of Wales”). I discarded days which were holidays only
in the UK or only in the US. The resulting time period comprises one calendar year
before (301 work days) and one calendar year after the telegraph connection (304 work
days).
The American Civil War between April 1861 and April 1865 severely disrupted
cotton exports from the United States, restricting the period of analysis.30 In addition,
historical newspapers did not report cotton prices before that. While it is possible to
extend the period of analysis to years after 1867, I kept symmetry between the before
and after telegraph periods.
1.4 Reduced Form Evidence
The telegraph changed information frictions dramatically and suddenly: Figure 1.B.3
plots the time delay for information from Liverpool reaching New York for each day
in the data set. This series shows a sharp drop on 28 July 1866, when the transatlantic
telegraph was established. Before that, information from New York was around 10 days
old when it reached Liverpool. After the telegraph, information from New York was
usually from just the day before. Figure 1.B.4 shows the distribution of information lags
before and after the telegraph: Before the telegraph, information lags varied between 7
and 15 days, caused by wind conditions that affected the speed of mail steam ships.
After the telegraph information lags varied between 1 and 6 days, with lags over 1 day
due to temporary technical breakdowns of the connection in the first few months of
operation. However, these failures were usually quickly resolved. Table 1.C.1 confirms
that the drop in average information transmission speed after the establishment of the
telegraph connection was statistically significant.
29The difference arises because steam ships often got the latest commercial news from England via
telegraph while passing the last part of the Irish Coast, and upon arrival on the Newfoundland Coast the
news were again transmitted via telegraph to New York, arriving faster than the steam ship.
30I discuss potential implications of the American Civil War for my analysis in the empirical section.
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How did this drop in information frictions affect the integration of the Liverpool
and New York cotton markets? In this section I carefully develop six “Stylized Facts”
that describe what happened to cotton prices and trade.
(1) The telegraph caused a better adherence to the Law of One Price, as the mean
and volatility of the price difference fell.
Following the literature on the Law of One Price (LOP), I use the price difference
between the two markets as a measure of market integration (Dybvig and Ross 1987;
Froot and Rogoff 1995). When markets are perfectly integrated, the price difference
should be zero, as any positive price difference has been arbitraged away. The telegraph
reduced information frictions which are likely to have constituted a barrier to arbitrage,
so we should expect to see the price difference go to zero.31
Figure 1.B.5 plots the difference between Liverpool and New York cotton prices.
The vertical line indicates 28 July 1866, the date when the telegraph connection was
established. The change in the behavior of the price difference due to the telegraph is
striking: The volatility of the price difference falls sharply, and there are fewer very
large and very small values. The average price difference falls as well. Table 1.C.1
shows that the average price difference was 2.56 pence/pound in the pre-telegraph
period (16% of New York price), and fell to 1.65 pence/pound. This reduction is
statistically significant, and corresponds to a fall of 35%. The variance of the price
difference falls by even more, by 93%, and the coefficient of variation falls by more than
half.32
Are these drops causally related to the transatlantic telegraph? The troublesome
history of the transatlantic telegraph connection is in favor of this interpretation: The
timing of the successful establishment was driven by technical “luck” and the weather,
and therefore exogenous to market conditions.33 The date of the connection could not
have been deliberately timed by market participants to coincide with other market
events or developments, and anticipation effects can also safely be excluded.34
In Table 1.C.2 I show that the observed deviations from the LOP are robust to a
number of alternative explanations. For example, one alternative hypothesis is that
the observed pattern in the price difference is caused by variation in transport costs
rather than information frictions. In fact, the Law of One Price can only be expected
to hold after taking into account transport costs. In empirical trade papers, transport
cost is rarely observed and often derived from the price difference. However, in my
case The New York Times listed the daily freight cost of cotton for shipment from New
York to Liverpool. Cotton could be shipped either using the slow sailing ships (taking
1–2 months) or the faster steam ships (taking 2–4 weeks). Figure 1.B.5 plots the freight
31Garbade and Silber (1978) perform this check for stock prices
32Note that usual explanations for a fall in volatility like exchange rates or sticky prices are not relevant
in this setting (Froot et al. 1995).
33Weather conditions affected the advancement of the cable laying steam ship, and its ability to locate
and repair problems in the cable.
34For example, by withholding cotton trade in the weeks before the telegraph until the telegraph gets
established.
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rates for both transport types. Freight costs are lower in the post-telegraph period (see
Table 1.C.1), but the reduction is very small compared to the drop in the price difference.
In columns (2) to (4) of Table 1.C.2 I subtract the freight cost – by sail ship, steam ship,
or an average of both – from the price difference. However, the fall in freight cost is too
small to explain the drop in the price difference after the telegraph connection.35
While freight cost accounted for the major part of total transport costs, there were
other transport costs such as fire and marine insurance, wharfage, handling at the
port etc. Boyle (1934) provides a detailed account of all other transport costs, using
historical bookkeeping figures of merchants.36 The majority of transport costs, 83.1%,
are charged based on weight, so they were unit cost.37 Freight cost are the most
important component of unit transport costs, comprising 65% of total transport costs.
The remaining unit transport costs are paid for handling at the ports (including bagging,
marking, wharfage, cartage, dock dues, weighing, storage at the port). Ad valorem
transport costs constitute 16.9% of total transport costs and include fire and marine
insurance, Liverpool town dues, and brokerage.38 Based on these numbers I plot
total transport costs in Figure 1.B.5. Column (5) in Table 1.C.2 shows that even after
accounting for total transport costs we observe a large drop in the average price
difference.
The Law of One Price does not hold in periods when there is no trade between two
markets. In these periods, transport costs are too high, and the price difference will
fluctuate freely between the bounds given by the transport costs (called commodity
points): |pLIVt  p
NY
t |   τ. If there were some periods before the telegraph when
the price difference was not large enough to induce trade, this might explain why I
observe high volatility before the telegraph. In fact, in my data exports occurred in
every week in the sample except for a period of about four weeks during May 1866
(before the telegraph), when the threat of a war between Austria and Prussia depressed
demand for cotton in Liverpool and lowered prices so much that exporting became
unprofitable.39 Column (6) of Table 1.C.2 excludes this period, but the results are again
robust to this check.
Another concern might be that my observations begin in July 1865, three months
after the end of the American Civil War. During the Civil War, the Northern states
(the “Union”) established a blockade of Southern ports (“Confederates”) that stopped
cotton exports almost completely. After the war, cotton production and trade were
immediately taken up again: Woodman (1968) describes how the reopening of trade
35Lew and Cater (2006) argue that the telegraph reduced freight rates, so the observed drop in freight
cost could also be attributed to the telegraph. However, at least in the short run this is not the major
contribution of the telegraph.
36See online appendix for a detailed breakdown of total transport costs.
37This is also why I do not use a log specification of the Law of One Price, this is only helpful with
multiplicative transport costs.
38No export tariff or import tariff was imposed during the period under consideration.
39Only if the price difference becomes “negative enough” to cover transport costs, should we expect
cotton re-exports to New York (and for those periods the LOP should hold again in absolute values).
While the price difference was not large enough, there is no indication from the historical newspapers that
this happened in that period.
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with the South immediately induced a “scramble among cotton merchants”. However,
it took five to 10 years before the pre-war levels of cotton production were restored.
Reasons for the slow recovery included the destruction of cotton during the war, the
substitution of cotton production for food production, bankruptcy of many cotton
planters, and the abolishment of slavery (Woodman 1968). Cotton production fell
by three quarters from four to one million bales during the years of the Civil War,
and reached 2 million bales, half of the pre-war production, again in the first harvest
after the Civil War (cotton year 1865/1866).40 The return to pre-war levels took until
1870.41 The first year of observations in my data coincides with the first year of cotton
production after the Civil War. It is possible that cotton supply is still disrupted during
that year. If there are no barriers to arbitrage, a larger volatility of production affects
only price levels and not the price difference, as shocks are transmitted to the other
country. To account for the possibility that there were some barriers to arbitrage, and
to investigate whether supply irregularities therefore had an effect on the adherence
to the LOP I use data on the quantity of cotton that arrived at the New York cotton
exchange from the cotton farms on any given day, the so called “cotton receipts”. Figure
1.B.6 illustrates the time pattern of cotton supply over the course of a harvest year.
The cotton year starts in September, when the new harvest starts to come in. The
winter months October to February are the months with the largest receipts of cotton,
whereas the summer months June to August are the months with the smallest receipts.
However, due to the time consuming cotton picking process and the long distances
from the cotton fields in the interior to New York, the supply of cotton is positive on
every single day in the sample. The visual evidence in Figure 1.B.6 does not suggest
that the variation in cotton supplies differs very much before and after the telegraph.42
Column (7) of Table 1.C.2 controls for cotton supply, but again this is unable to explain
the fall in the price difference after the telegraph.
Column (8) of Table 1.C.2 controls for shipping time by using the price in Liverpool
at the time of the arrival of the shipment instead of the contemporaneous Liverpool
price to construct the time difference. I use the steam ship travel times (around 10 days)
for all shipments, because even if the cotton shipment was transported by the slower
sail ship, samples of the cotton lot were usually shipped by a faster mail steam ship.
The lot was then sold on the spot market in Liverpool upon inspection of the sample,
while still on sea, which is called “forward trading” (Milne 2000). Again, correction for
shipping time does not affect the results. Finally, column (9) shows the difference in
log prices instead of price levels. Again, this does not affect the findings.
Contemporary observers describe that the transatlantic telegraph contributed to
40The detailed time series is provided in the online appendix.
41During the Civil War American cotton was only partly substituted with Indian and Egyptian cotton.
Irwin (2003) argues that the low supply elasticity of other countries was due to the fact that planters
expected the war to be temporary and were therefore unwilling to make long-term investments in cotton
cultivation. The advantages of American cotton (longer fibers, lower production and transport costs) still
prevailed after the Civil War, which is why cotton millers returned to American cotton after the Civil War,
as long as prices were not too high.
42There is just one outlier in the pre telegraph area that is due to the closure of the New York cotton
exchange over two Christmas holidays, when arrivals had piled up.
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the development of futures trading in cotton across the Atlantic, as for the first time
information traveled faster than goods (Hammond 1897; Ellison 1886). If the change
in the pattern of the price difference is due to the introduction of futures trading, it
is indirectly caused by the telegraph (rather than directly by changing information
frictions). However, the development of futures trading was not immediate. The
necessary institutions for futures trading were set in place only by the 1870s. Forward
trading, as described earlier, was still limited and based on a sample of cotton made
available for inspection. The telegraph did not change the speed at which cotton
samples could be shipped, as they had to be transported physically, it only changed the
speed of the transmission of information. An introduction of futures or forward trading
due to the telegraph can therefore not explain the observed findings.
Finally, it is interesting to check whether the observed change in the price difference
is the result of a change in the markups of merchants, maybe because of increased com-
petition among merchants. The Bills of Trade record the shipment of every merchant
arriving in Liverpool and allow for the computation of a Herfindahl Index. The Bills of
Trade have been digitized for 3 months (February, June, October) of four years around
the time of the introduction of the telegraph (1855, 1863, 1866, and 1870).43 Figure 1.B.2
shows the development of the Herfindahl Index for cotton merchants, separately for
shipments from the US and shipments from Egypt and the East Indies. In 1863 the
American Civil War disrupted cotton trade, only few cotton shipments came from the
US to Great Britain, and the Herfindahl Index shows high concentration. However,
after the Civil War the Herfindahl Index immediately returned to a very small number
(around 0.05), indicating a very competitive market structure, and stayed like this until
the 1870s. The market structure of merchants shipping from the East has a similar
Herfindahl Index, though without the disruption of the Civil War. Overall, the analysis
shows that merchants were very competitive, and this was unchanged by the telegraph.
Therefore it does not seem plausible that a change in markups could be responsible for
the observed change in the price difference after the telegraph.
In Table 1.C.3 I conduct the same robustness checks for the variance of the price
difference. I use the squared deviation of the price difference from the mean before and
after the telegraph, respectively, as dependent variable and regress them on a dummy
that indicates the period after the telegraph.44 Column (1) shows that the variance
of the price difference falls significantly after the telegraph; the drop is around 90%.
Excluding no trade periods explains one third of the drop, but the remaining fall is
large and robust to all other robustness checks.
43The digitized sample of the Bills of Trade has been generously provided by Graeme Milne for the
years 1855, 1863 and 1870. I digitized the three months for 1866 to check for any change around the
introduction of the telegraph.
44In the online appendix I normalize the dependent variable by the average price difference before and
after the telegraph connection. The findings are unchanged.
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(2) Faster steam ships had a similar effect to that of the telegraph in the pre-telegraph
period: They also reduced deviations from the Law of One Price. Similarly, in the
post-telegraph period, temporary technical failures of the connection led to devia-
tions from the Law of One Price.
The analysis so far has only used the one-time change in information frictions brought
about by the telegraph to explain the deviations from the Law of One Price. However,
the data provide much richer exogenous daily variation in information delays. In
the pre-telegraph period, weather and wind accelerated or delayed mail steam ships,
and in the post-telegraph period a few occasional technical breakdowns stopped the
transatlantic communication temporarily. Figure 1.B.3 illustrates this variation. It shows
how old the latest information from Liverpool is on a given day in New York (or in other
words, how many days the last passage across the Atlantic took). Table 1.C.4 relates this
variation in information delay to the variance of the price difference. Column (1) shows
that deviations from the Law of One Price dropped significantly after the telegraph was
established. Column (2) uses the exogenous variation in information delays. For each
additional day that information takes to get from Liverpool to New York, the deviation
from the Law of One Price increases by 24%. Column (3) only uses the within period
variation by conditioning on the telegraph dummy, with similar results.
(3) New York prices respond to news from Liverpool.
The response of New York to news from Liverpool is best illustrated by an example that
explains the large upwards spike in the price difference in Figure 1.B.5. Figure 1.B.7
zooms into this period and explains what happened in detail: On 29 and 30 September
1865 the market in Liverpool experienced increased demand for cotton from cotton
spinners and millers. The Liverpool Mercury from that day writes that the market was
“stimulated by the increasing firmness of the Manchester [yarn] market”. At the same
time a mistake in the estimation of cotton stock in Lancashire was detected, leading
to a downwards correction. As a result, the Liverpool cotton price jumped up by 20%
within two days, from 20 to 24 pence/pound. However, due to the delayed information
transmission by mail ships, market participants in New York were not aware of this
demand shock. The next steam ship, arriving in New York on 2 October, still carried the
outdated price information from 23 September, a week before the demand shock. Only
on 9 October the news of the demand shock arrived, causing a jump in the New York
cotton price, as export demand increased. The New York Times reports an “unusually
large quantity” of exports “under the favorable advices from England” on that day.
To study more systematically whether news from Liverpool drive New York prices,
column (1) in Table 1.C.5 starts with a parsimonious specification and regresses the New
York price on a given day on the latest known price from Liverpool using only data
from the pre-telegraph period. This latest known Liverpool price was transmitted by
steam ship, on average 10 days old and is denoted as “steam shipped” Liverpool price
in the table. In order to account for autocorrelation in prices, a maximum likelihood
estimation including three lags of the dependent variable is implemented.
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The coefficient on this latest known Liverpool price is positive, indicating a system-
atic reaction of the New York price to news from Liverpool. Since prices are serially
correlated, it is possible that this coefficient picks up something other than the “news”
about Liverpool. Therefore column (2) includes a “counterfactual” price, the Liverpool
price from the previous day that was unknown to New Yorkers before the telegraph con-
nection was established. Reassuringly, this unknown price has no impact on New York
prices, while the coefficient on the steam-shipped price remains the same. Columns
(3) and (4) perform the corresponding analysis for the period after the telegraph was
established. The “telegraphed” Liverpool price, on average one day old, now is the
major driving force of the New York price, and the outdated price information that the
steam ship would have brought, had the telegraph not been in place, does not matter
anymore.
This parsimonious specification is the most efficient regression to demonstrate
the changing relevance of Liverpool’s prices on the New York market, as it uses the
timing of information arrivals explicitly. As an alternative specification I run a vector
autoregression using both prices, separately before and after the telegraph. Figure 1.B.8
shows that before the telegraph, only lags on the Liverpool price larger than 10 days are
relevant for the New York price. After the telegraph, lags between 1-5 days are most
relevant, in line with the distribution of information lags in Figure 1.B.4. Interestingly,
the lags around 14 days are significant after the telegraph, because steam ships were
used to ship longer market reports such as circulars.45
(4) Market participants base their search for arbitrage opportunities on the latest
news from Liverpool.
Figure 1.B.9 plots the difference of the New York price and the latest known Liverpool
price (with the light gray line repeating the contemporaneous price difference from
Figure 1.B.5). Interestingly, most of the largest price deviations disappear (except for
the period of no trade in July 1865, which is shaded in the figure). Column (10) of Table
1.C.2 shows that the average price difference to the latest known Liverpool price falls
after the telegraph connection were established. In contrast, column (10) of Table 1.C.3
shows that the variance of the price difference using the latest known Liverpool price
shows only a small drop. This evidence indicates that market participants seem to
arbitrage away the price difference between the current New York and the latest known,
delayed Liverpool price, probably using it as a proxy for the price they expect for their
exports.
(5) Exports respond to news about Liverpool prices.
The analysis so far has only considered prices as outcomes. But does information
have real effects? In order for prices to equalize across marketplaces, goods must be
moved. The detailed daily data on export flows can be used to understand whether the
45Full VAR estimation results are available in the online appendix.
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observed changes in the price difference are driven by equivalent changes in exports.
Table 1.C.6 uses a similar specification as Table 1.C.5 with exports as outcome and
tests whether news about Liverpool prices affects exports. Column (1) uses only data
from the year before the telegraph was in place and shows that news about an increase
in the Liverpool price leads to increased exports in the pre-telegraph period. This news
was brought by steam ship and was on average 10 days old. Column (2) conducts a
placebo test and includes the unknown Liverpool price from the previous day, called
“telegraphed” price. This counterfactual “news” does not have a significant impact
on exports, as we would expect. Column (3) adds a linear time trend to control for a
potential build up of supply after the American Civil War. Columns (4) to (6) conduct
a similar analysis for the period after the telegraph. The news via telegraph about
the Liverpool market again has a positive effect on exports, but the coefficient is not
significant due to large standard errors. Column (5) includes the Liverpool price that
market participants would have known had there been no telegraph. The news from
the steam ship does not have a positive impact on exports, but the results are only
suggestive as standard errors are large.46 Column (6) allows for a linear time trend;
the results remain unchanged. While the coefficient on the known Liverpool price is
smaller, equality of the coefficients before and after the telegraph cannot be rejected.
(6) After the telegraph, exports are on average higher, and more volatile.
Row (1) in Table 1.C.7 shows that average daily exports from New York to Liverpool
increased substantially after the telegraph cable was established: Average daily exports
amount to 460 bales before the telegraph and increase by 170 bales after the telegraph,
which is an increase of 37%. Row (1) in Table 1.C.8 shows that the variance of exports in-
creases by even more. The increase in the variance after the telegraph of 0.33 represents
an increase of 114% compared to the variance of 0.29 before the telegraph.
The remaining columns in Table 1.C.7 perform similar robustness checks for average
exports to the ones implemented for the price difference. The increase in average
exports after the telegraph connection cannot be explained by a fall in transport costs
or fewer no trade periods. Can it be explained by an expanding cotton production
after the American Civil War? Column (7) includes the cotton receipts at the New York
exchange from the fields as a control, which does not affect the result.47 In case this
46One might be concerned that the regression in Table 1.C.6 is invalid because prices are endogenously
determined. However, the regression uses lagged Liverpool prices which are predetermined as far
as current exports are concerned. However, if the underlying supply shocks are autocorrelated, the
coefficients on Liverpool prices might be biased downwards because current supply shocks – which both
increase current exports and are negatively correlated (via lagged supply shocks) with past Liverpool
prices – are omitted. This downward bias might be stronger for the more recent “telegraphed” Liverpool
price, explaining why the coefficient on the “telegraphed” Liverpool price in column (2) is smaller than
the coefficient on the “steam shipped” Liverpool price. In columns (3) and (6) I include a linear time trend
to control for buildup of cotton supply after the American Civil War. Coefficients in column (3) are larger
than in column (2), indicating that a small downward bias was corrected. In any case, a larger downward
bias for the telegraphed Liverpool price cannot explain why the relationship between the coefficients after
the telegraph switches around, as the downward bias should still be stronger for the telegraphed than for
the steam shipped Liverpool price.
47Cotton production can only be adjusted with a time lag, that is when a new harvest cycle starts.
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variable is not picking up the full increase in production column (8) adds harvest year
dummies to control for a potential gradual increase in cotton production across years.
Again, the increase in exports after the telegraph connection remains significant.
The remaining columns in Table 1.C.8 conduct the same robustness checks for
the variance of exports. Again, the increase in variance after the successful telegraph
connection cannot be explained by these alternative hypotheses.
The following section provides an intuitive model about how information influences
the behavior of exporters which yields predictions that are consistent with the presented
“Stylized Facts”.
1.5 Model of Information Frictions in International Trade
I add information frictions to a basic two-country trade model with storage (based on
Coleman 2009; Williams and Wright 1991) by changing the information set of market
participants and studying the impact of information frictions on trade flows, prices
and welfare. The model is a partial equilibrium model that focuses on the role of
intermediaries, who arbitrage away price differences across markets, and take producer
supply and consumer demand as given.
The model mimics cotton trade in the 19th century. There is a centralized market in
the supplying country, market NY, where producers sell their homogeneous good to
intermediaries (merchants). The merchants export the good to another country, where
they sell it to consumers in another centralized market, market LIV. Shipping goods
from the supplying to the consuming country takes one period,48 and shipping cost τ
per unit shipped are incurred.49 Profit maximizing merchants are perfectly competitive,
therefore price takers, and risk neutral.50
In country LIV there is a competitive storage industry.51 Profit maximizing storers
can buy a certain quantity of the good, store it for one period, and sell it in the next
period.52 Storage cost is θ per unit stored.53
The good is elastically supplied by producers in country NY, as given by the linear
The increase in cotton exports is instead reflected in a reduction of New York stock levels. Only in the
following harvest season can production adjust to increased exports, and this is what can be observed in
the data.
48The predictions of the model are also true with immediate shipment, k  0. However, it is not very
realistic to add information frictions to such a model, as it would assume that goods can be shipped
instantaneously, while information cannot.
49Transport costs of cotton consisted predominantly of unit cost (based on weight not value), as
mentioned earlier. The numerical predictions are robust to allowing for ad valorem instead of unit trade
cost.
50Assuming risk averse instead of risk neutral merchants would only reinforce the predictions of the
model. With better information, the “risk” of exporting is reduced as the variance of expected profits falls,
which will lead to an increase in average exports.
51In the estimation of the welfare effect I will also allow for a storage industry in NY.
52Holding the good for more than one period is equivalent to storers selling their stored quantity and
buying it immediately back, to store it for another period and so on.
53Storage cost of cotton was also based on weight rather than value. However, the behaviour of storage
does not depend on whether one assumes additive or proportional storage cost (Williams and Wright
1991).
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aggregate inverse supply function pSpqtq  a¯S   bSqt.54 Aggregate consumer demand
in LIV is stochastic and given by a linear inverse demand function with a stochastic,
autocorrelated intercept aDt: pDt pqtq  aDt  bDqt.
55 Representative merchants act as












where pNYt and p
LIV
t are the market prices in period t in markets NY and LIV, re-
spectively. Representative storers act as arbitrageurs across time and choose storage











A particular feature of commodity storage models is that it is not possible for
the market as a whole to store negative quantities. Each individual stock holder can
in principle store a “negative amount” (that is, selling “short”) by borrowing the
commodity from other storers, selling it on the spot market, buying the same amount
of stock in the next period and returning it to the lender. However, this is not true for
the market as a whole (Williams and Wright 1991).
Equilibrium conditions
Equilibrium conditions are given by the market clearing conditions in both markets and
the first order conditions of merchants as well as storers. In market NY, supply is given
by the supply function, while demand is given by the export demand of merchants.
The market clearing condition in NY equalizes supply and demand:
pNYt  a¯S   bSxt (1.5.1)
In market LIV supply is given by imports (which are equal to the amount of goods
exported from NY in the previous period) plus storage from the previous period, while
demand consists of demand by consumers and storers. The market clearing condition
in LIV is therefore:
pLIVt  aDt  bD pxt1   st1  stq (1.5.2)
Since negative exports are not possible, the first order condition of merchants is
54Later I allow for stochastic supply. This adds another layer of information frictions that affect the
information storers in LIV have about supply shocks in NY, and another source of welfare gain from the
telegraph.
55The demand function is similar to Evans and Harrigan (2005), however, with an autocorrelated
demand process. For welfare estimation it is not necessary to assume a specific time process for the
demand shocks. In the numerical solution I assume demand shocks follow a AR(1) process around mean
a¯D.
56A detailed discussion of the storer’s maximization problem and solution is provided by Williams and
Wright (1991).
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¤ pNYt   τ K xt ¥ 0 (1.5.3)
Merchants choose the export quantity that equalizes the difference between ex-
pected prices in LIV in the next period and current prices in NY, subject to transport
cost, except if expected prices in LIV are smaller than current prices in NY plus trans-
port cost. In this case it is not optimal to export at all. In either case, expected profits of
merchants are zero.
Storers face a similar mixed complementarity problem with respect to expected






¤ pLIVt   θ K st ¥ 0 (1.5.4)
Storers increase storage until expected prices in Liverpool in the next period are
equal to today’s prices in Liverpool plus storage cost, except if expected prices are too
low to make profits from storage. Also the expected profits of storers is zero.
The equilibrium storage and export quantities in the model are determined by the
market clearing conditions 1.5.1 and 1.5.2 together with the mixed complementarity
conditions of merchants 1.5.3 and storers 1.5.4.
Information frictions
Decisions about storage and exports are based on expected prices in LIV. Agents
form their price expectations based on the information available to them at the time
when they make their purchasing decision at the market.58 There are three different
information regimes:
• Delayed information (DI). Assume merchants are based in NY where they make
their exporting decision by buying from suppliers.59 In the delayed information









 pNYt ¤ τ and xt  0. These conditions result form the maximiza-
tion problem of the representative merchants. Note that the profit of representative merchants is linear in




 pNYt ¡ τ merchants would like to export an infinite




 pNYt   τ merchants would choose zero exports, which




 pNYt  τ, individual merchants are indifferent
about which quantity to export. However, in equilibrium aggregate exports are determined by plugging
in the supply and demand functions into the first order condition.
58Ex-ante decisions of exporters are also modeled in Hummels and Schaur (2010, 2012). A reduction of
shipping time in these papers is equivalent to a reduction in the forecast horizon. A reduction of shipping
time is complementary to a reduction in information frictions as modeled in this paper; it is equivalent to
a reduction in information delay only if there are no supply shocks.
59In practice, merchants had representatives (usually family members) in both New York and Liverpool.
If a merchant would have been based in Liverpool, he would have had to travel to New York (or
communicate with New York) in order to export cotton from Liverpool to New York, and therefore have
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regime they possess information about all shocks in LIV up to the previous period
t-1 and have to forecast LIV prices in the following period t+1, the time when
their exports can be sold in LIV. Similarly, storers are based in LIV where they
make their storage decision. They therefore have information about demand
shocks in LIV up to the current period t when forecasting LIV prices for period
t+1.
• Instantaneous information (II). All market participants are informed about demand
shocks in LIV up to the current period t when forecasting expected prices in the
following period t+1.
• Perfect foresight (PF). Merchants and storers can foresee demand shocks in future
periods.
The delayed information regime mimics the information frictions that were in place before
the telegraph was established. One period can be interpreted as around 10 days, the
time it takes for a steam ship to ship cotton (or at least samples of a cotton shipment)
and information. Merchants have only delayed information from Liverpool which is on
average 10 days old at the time when they make their exporting decision. At the time
of exporting they need to forecast Liverpool prices 10 days into the future, which is
when their shipment can be sold in Liverpool. On the other hand, storers in Liverpool
know current market conditions in Liverpool when they make their storage decision.
How much they know about New York is only relevant if supply is stochastic, a case
which will be addressed later.
The instantaneous information regime mimics the situation after the transatlantic tele-
graph was established. Merchants have roughly real-time information from Liverpool
when making their exporting decision. Due to the time delay in shipping, they still
have to forecast Liverpool prices 10 days in the future.
The perfect foresight regime is unrealistic, but serves as a useful benchmark for
intuition and the welfare analysis, as it maximizes aggregate welfare.
In the following I refer to both DI and II regimes as having “information fric-
tions” compared to the PF regime. However, information frictions in the II regime are
smaller than those in the DI regime. Therefore the introduction of the telegraph can be
interpreted as a reduction in information frictions.
Characterization of the solution
The first order condition for merchants, equation 1.5.3, together with market clearing
conditions given by equations 1.5.1 and 1.5.2 yield the following expression for exports:
xt  max
"





the same information as a merchant already based in New York. Therefore we can assume that merchants
are based in New York only.
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This expression is not yet a solution, as it depends on endogenous storage. Exports
depend on expected demand shocks and expected storage change in period t+1, when
the shipment arrives in LIV. In order to understand how exports should change after the
telegraph connection, we need to compare exports across different information regimes.
In the PF case, expectations are equal to realizations. However, under information
frictions, a difference between expected and realized values arises, which is equal to
the forecast error of demand and storage. While we are able to say something about the
forecast error of demand, it is difficult to understand what happens to storage. Optimal
storage is endogenous and a different function across the information regimes. Due to
the non-linearity constraints in the no-arbitrage conditions, it is not possible to derive
an analytical solution for the storage function (Deaton and Laroque 1996; Williams and
Wright 1991).
Before proceeding to the numerical solutions of the model, the special case with-
out storage (for example, when storage is prohibitively costly, or when the good is
perishable) provides some intuition about the impact of information frictions.
Lemma. Suppose there is no possibility of storage and demand follows a stationary AR(1)




. Suppose a¯Da¯SτbS bD ¡ 0, which means
that there are positive exports at the average demand shock. Then, when switching from delayed
to instantaneous information:60





































The intuition for this result is as follows: From equation 1.5.5 (ignoring storage) we see
that exports are a function of expected demand shocks. Depending on the information
regime, expected demand shocks are based on more (in the II regime) or less (in the DI
regime) information. The variance of any conditional expectation is larger, the more
information it is based on. The extreme cases are the PF regime, in which the variance
60In case of a white noise process, information is irrelevant, and the predictions hold with equality.
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of exports is a function of the variance of the underlying demand shock; and “no
information”, when exports are a function of the unconditional mean of demand which
has a zero variance, so exports are always the same. In between these two extreme
cases, the variance of exports follows the variance of the expected demand shocks,
which increases the more information is available. This gives the intuition for why the
variance of exports increases when switching from the DI to the II regime, which is
point 2 of the Lemma.
Given that the variance of expected demand shocks and therefore exports is larger
the more information is known, this means that merchants underestimate high demand
shocks and overestimate low demand shocks in the DI regime compared to the II
regime. When they underestimate states of high demand, they export less in the DI
compared to the II regime. When they overestimate low demand, there is no difference
across information regimes as with low demand it is not profitable to export at all. This
is why the first effect dominates and average exports are larger in the II compared to
the DI regime. Average exports are higher in the II regime, because periods of high
demand lead to appropriately high exports, point 1 of the Lemma.
Merchants equalize expected prices across the countries, and the resulting price
difference equals the forecast error of merchants. If merchants were not making any
forecast error, which would happen under the PF regime, the spatial price difference
would be zero, and the no arbitrage condition would hold. With information frictions,
the no arbitrage condition holds only in conditional expectations, and merchants make
a forecast error depending on the information they have. The volatility of forecast
errors falls when more information becomes available (a result well established in the
finance literature), which explains why the price difference falls when switching from
the DI to the II regime; which is point 4 of the Lemma.61
Point 3 of the Lemma states that the average price difference falls after switching to
the II regime. This holds for the same reason that average exports increase: Under the
DI regime, positive demand shocks are systematically underestimated, leading to high
prices in Liverpool and a large price difference as exports are restricted. These positive
price differences are eliminated under the II regime, as exports are high enough. Note
that this does not mean that merchants were making profits under the DI regime, as
high ex-post profits in cases when demand was higher than expected were offset by
equivalently high losses in cases when demand was smaller than expected. Neither
does this mean that merchants make losses under the II regime, as they avoid negative
price differences by not exporting at all (when they would have exported under the DI
regime).
As we shall see below, the predictions from the Lemma also hold for the case with
storage. Storage is able to dampen the inefficiencies from information frictions: When
merchants overestimate demand and ship too much, part of the imports can be stored
for the future and consumed in cases when merchants underestimate demand and ship
too little. As a result, in a model with storage, prices will fluctuate less than in a model
61Point 4 of the Lemma also holds if the demand shock is a random walk.
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without storage. However, storage is not sufficient to fully eliminate the inefficiencies
from information frictions. Perfect smoothing of prices over time cannot be achieved:
First, storage is costly. Second, storage cannot be negative, and there is always a positive
probability that long periods of particularly high demand will run down inventories. A
finite stock can never fully insure against stock outs and its accompanying price spikes
(Townsend 1977). As Williams and Wright (1991, p. 159) state: “Storage is asymmetric -
able to support a glut but not alleviate every shortage”.62
Numerical solution
The commodity storage literature has provided numerical solution approaches for
instantaneous information regimes (Coleman 2009; Williams and Wright 1991; Deaton
and Laroque 1996). This paper adds information frictions in the form of delayed
information to the model to obtain predictions for the effect of the telegraph.
The central task of the problem is the numerical solution of the control functions for
storage and exports as a function of state variables. In the instantaneous information
case, there are two types of state variables: “Stock on hand” mt is the stock available
at the beginning of each period, which consists of the sum of quantities stored in the
previous period and arriving imports (equal to NY’s exports from the previous period),
mt  st1   xt1; and the current realization of the demand shock, aDt. I approximate
xt paDt, mtq and st paDt, mtq simultaneously over a grid of state variables by checking the
first order condition of merchants and storers for a guess for the control functions, and
by updating the guess in every step. The approximation algorithm has converged when
all the first order conditions in all grid points are satisfied up to a certain precision.
Then I add information frictions to the model. The delayed information regime
requires a different set up of the problem, as storage and exports depend on different
state variables because expectations are formed differently. In the delayed information
regime merchants know only lagged demand shocks, so exports are a function of
lagged demand and contemporaneous stock on hand (because this itself is a function
of lagged storage and exports): xt paD,t1, mtq. On the other hand, storage in Liverpool
continues to be a function of contemporaneous demand, st paDt, mtq.
In the instantaneous information regime I approximate two control functions as a
function of two state vectors: aDt and mt. In the delayed information regime the number
of state variables increases to three: aDt, aD,t1 and mt. For a more realistic model that
matches NY prices more closely, I extend the model to allow for stochastic supply
shocks. Then the export decision also depends on the supply shocks: xt paSt, aDt, mtq in
the II regime, and xt paSt, aD,t1, mtq in the DI regime. Storage in LIV depends on the
62It is interesting to note that a problem with speculators engaging in futures trading leads to the same
market-level equilibrium conditions as a model with explicit modeling of storage, as long as at least
some speculators have rational expectations and are risk neutral. If there were a mix of stock holders
and speculators, and stock holders were not risk neutral, as long as some speculators are risk neutral and
have rational expectations, these equilibrium conditions for the market still hold. Expected prices in the
equilibrium conditions 1.5.3 and 1.5.4 are equivalent to the prices of futures. While futures trading might
lead to a different allocation of risk across market participants (from risk averse to less risk averse or risk
neutral), the aggregate properties of a model with storage and one with futures trading are the same.
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information about supply shocks: st paSt, aDt, mtq in the II regime, and st paS,t1, aDt, mtq
in the DI regime. In total the number of state variables in the DI regime increases to
five: aDt, aD,t1, aSt, aS,t1 and mt.63
What are the characteristics of the optimal storage functions? Because of the non-
negativity constraint, the storage function is zero until a “kink line” given by a combi-
nation of critical values for demand shocks and stock on hand. Beyond the kink line
storage is increasing in stock on hand and decreasing in demand shocks. The slope
of the storage function (the propensity to store) is everywhere less than one, and the
behavior is non-linear.64 The export function has a similar non-linear behavior, because
it depends on storage: It is also zero up to a certain “kink line”, beyond which it is
increasing in demand shocks and decreasing in stock on hand. With supply shocks, the
non-linear behavior extends to a third dimension: Exports and storage increase in the
supply shock, again after a certain “kink plane”. The behavior of the control functions
with delayed information is qualitatively similar as a function of lagged instead of
contemporaneous shocks. However, the slopes are different as they reflect different
expectation forming about the future.
Estimation of parameters
The model depends on ten parameters that need to be estimated: mean a¯D, variance
σ2D and autocorrelation ρD of the stochastic demand process; mean a¯S, variance σ
2
S and
autocorrelation ρS of the stochastic supply process; the slope of the demand function
bD, the slope of the supply function bS; transport cost τ and storage cost θ.
First I focus on estimating the slopes of the demand and supply curves. These
parameters will also be used for the estimation of welfare further below. Given these
slopes, the underlying demand and supply shock processes can be backed out using
data on prices, trade and storage. The mean, variance and autocorrelation coefficient of
the shock processes are then estimates of the corresponding parameters. The remaining
parameters of the model are transport cost, which is based on the data on freight cost
as described earlier, and storage cost of cotton, which are obtained from the historical
accounting statements of a merchant in Boyle (1934).
Estimation of the demand curve
Estimating the supply and demand functions is usually tricky, as quantities and prices
are determined contemporaneously and finding a valid instrument is difficult. I propose
a new identification strategy: Since shipping takes time, exports are predetermined
once they arrive in Liverpool, breaking the simultaneity problem for the case of i.i.d.
shocks. For the case of autocorrelated shocks and positive storage I use the model
63As the number of calculations needed increase exponentially with the number of state variables
(Williams and Wright 1991, p. 57), it is not possible to numerically solve a daily representation of the
model. In this case the information lag would be around 10 days and I would need to keep track of 20
state variables (for a two-way trip; per market), which is computationally not feasible.
64Further discussion is provided in Williams and Wright (1991).
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to control appropriately for the endogenous part of the shocks, yielding identified
regression equations.
The demand curve in Liverpool on a specific day t  k, where k indicates the time
(in days) a shipment takes to get from New York to Liverpool, is determined by the
realization of the demand shock on that day, aD,t k, the imports arriving in Liverpool
on that day which are equivalent to exports from New York k days earlier, xt, and net
take-up or release of stock from storage on that day,4st k:
pLIVt k  aD,t k  bD pxt 4st kq
Daily prices in Liverpool as well as daily imports can be observed. The main iden-
tification problem is the unobserved demand shock that is positively correlated with
change in stock and exports. Note that exports are actually a function of lagged demand
shocks, which are correlated with demand shocks at t+k only via the autocorrelation of
the demand shock. My identification strategy will exploit this fact by modeling this
dependence explicitly.
Assuming demand follows an AR(1) process around mean a¯D, aDt  a¯D  ρpaD,t1




, we can express the demand shock in period t  k in terms
of the demand shock in period t l, where l denotes the information delay between
Liverpool and New York, and the sum of demand innovations between t l and t  k:




We can use the lagged demand function to control for the lagged demand shock,




. This results in an equation where all of the
regressors except change in stock4sLIVt k are uncorrelated with the unobserved demand
shocks. However, current imports xt can be used as an instrument for xt 4sLIVt k . Data
on stock in Liverpool is available only at weekly intervals, so I distribute the the weekly
change equally across the day of the week, which introduces a measurement error,
which is also addressed by the instrumental variables strategy. Table 1.C.9 shows the
results of estimating the following equation:












Column (1) shows the OLS results and column (2) shows the IV results. The first
stage is strong, as indicated by the F-statistics of 125. The instrument addresses both the
correlation of stock changes and demand shocks in the error as well as measurement
error in the stock changes. The latter seems to dominate as the OLS estimate is biased
towards zero. The sign of the lagged Liverpool price is positive and less than 1 as
expected. According to the model β1β2  β3  0, which cannot be rejected. Column (3)
uses a more efficient estimation method by imposing this restriction, applying nonlinear
least squares estimation. Column (4) implements the instrumental variable estimation
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using a control function approach, which again corrects for the measurement error
in stock changes. In column (5) and (6) the non-linear IV specification are estimated
separately for the period before and after telegraph, but this makes little difference to
the estimates.
The last row in Table 1.C.9 computes the demand elasticity at mean values of prices
and quantities. The resulting demand elasticities seem rather high when comparing
them to estimates of demand elasticity of cotton in 19th century in the literature (Irwin
2003), which range between 1.7 and 2.3. Note however, that the estimates in the
literature are based on yearly instead of daily data. Daily demand elasticities are much
higher because they take into account the willingness of consumers (or cotton millers)
to substitute consumption across time, which is easier across short periods compared
to long periods. To empirically validate this argument, I run the demand estimation on
different aggregation periods of my data. Aggregating the data reduces the demand
elasticity strongly. For example, for 3-monthly data the demand elasticity is as low as
6 (see online appendix for details on aggregation patterns).
Estimation of the supply curve
The slope of the supply function is estimated in a similar way. In order to better match
the data, the supply function given by equation 1.5.1 is extended by allowing both for






Again, the problems in estimating this equation are two-fold: First, New York stock
data is only available at weekly intervals, so I distribute the weekly change equally
across days, introducing measurement error. Second, exports and stock changes are
correlated with current supply shocks. I add a dummy for the harvest year and
include a quadratic in the day of the harvest year to model supply fluctuations, but
as this cannot fully address endogeneity concerns, I pursue an instrumental variables
approach for the estimation. In column (2) of Table 1.C.10 I use known prices from
Liverpool pLIVtl as instrument for the sum of export and stock changes,4sNYt   xt. The
first stage is strong, as information about the latest prices from Liverpool influence
exports and stock changes positively. If supply shocks are correlated, however, lagged
Liverpool prices might reflect lagged supply shocks, and not be exogenous. Therefore I





slope of the demand function from the previous section as instrument for exports and
stock changes in column (3). In column (4) lagged Liverpool prices are again used
as instrument, but here xtkl 4sLIVtl is added as a control, leaving only demand
variations in the instrument.
The estimates yield a estimate of around 1.7 in all specifications after eliminating
measurement error in the OLS estimation, also when I estimate the equation separately
for the periods before and after the telegraph. Again, the equivalent supply elasticities
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are larger than the estimates based on yearly data mentioned in the literature which
are between 1 and 2 (see Irwin 2003 for a review), as is expected when considering
the substitution of supply across short time periods. When repeating the analysis of
the supply estimation across data with an increasing aggregation horizon, the supply
elasticity falls considerably and converges towards the estimates in the literature (see
online appendix for details).
Delayed information as counterfactual
With the estimates of the slopes of the demand and supply functions I reconstruct the
demand and supply processes from the data of the post-telegraph period and estimate
the remaining supply and demand parameters. Table 1.C.11 gives an overview of all
estimated parameters. The estimated AR(1) processes fit the data quite well, as it is
not possible to reject white noise of the innovations in the supply and demand process
(using a Portmanteau white noise test). The demand shocks are more autocorrelated
than the supply shocks, while the supply shocks have a higher volatility than the
demand shocks.
Together with an estimate for transport and storage cost I numerically solve for both
the instantaneous (to which the parameters are calibrated) and delayed information
regime (counterfactual analysis).
I use the counterfactual delayed information regime on the calibrated model to
predict the effect of the telegraph on the data. Table 1.C.12 shows that the qualitative
predictions of the model match the empirical section: The model predicts a fall in the
average price difference between Liverpool and New York, and an increase in average
exports. Similarly, the model predicts a fall in the variance of the price difference,
and an increase in the variance of exports. This finding is robust to wide ranges of
the parameter space. For example, the different columns vary storage cost from zero
to prohibitively high storage cost. The panels below use the lower and upper 95%
confidence interval for estimates of the slope of the supply and the demand functions.
Quantitatively, the model predicts the largest change for the fall in the standard
deviation of the price difference, which is also the largest drop in the data. My preferred
estimates with storage cost as given by Boyle (1934) are shaded in gray and predict a
drop in the standard deviation of the price difference of around 40-60%, which is close
to the drop in the data of 70%. The second largest change in the model is the increase
in the standard deviation of exports, which again is also the second largest change
in the data. Here, however, the model cannot fully predict the change. A possible
explanation could be that storage cost are underestimated. Since storage and exports
are complements in balancing out information frictions, higher storage costs imply that
exports react more strongly. However, even with prohibitively high storage cost the
model can only predict a increase in the standard deviation of exports of 6%.
The changes in the average price difference and in average exports are also larger in
the data than in the model. A potential reason for this could be that in reality merchants
were risk averse rather than risk neutral. An extension of the model with risk averse
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merchants is likely to predict larger changes in average exports and price difference,
because the higher uncertainty in the delayed information regime should lead risk
averse merchants to export less due to higher uncertainty.
1.6 Welfare Gains from the Telegraph
What are the welfare gains from reduced information frictions? This section shows that
a lower bound of the deadweight loss (DWL) from information frictions is a function
of only three parameters: the squared observed price difference across markets, and
the slopes of the supply and demand functions presented in Section 1.5. This is an
analytical result and does not rely on the numerical solutions obtained in the previous
section, nor on assuming a specific time series process for the demand and supply
shocks.
For intuition, consider a specific export transaction. The welfare arising from this
transaction is the sum of immediate producer surplus, immediate consumer surplus,
immediate merchant surplus, as well as the present value of future social surplus from
the part of exports that is stored and not immediately consumed.65 The red area in
Figure 1.B.10 corresponds to the immediate producer surplus of exports. If a part of
exports is stored, immediate consumer surplus corresponds to the blue area. The net
present value of the social surplus from the quantity stored is given by the green area
between the market demand curve and the price. The social surplus from storage is the
sum of positive future consumer and negative future producer surplus, the expected
surplus of storers is zero.
Note that Figure 1.B.10 ignores stock stored from the previous period (current stock
on hand is equal to current imports only). This is because I measure welfare for each
specific export transaction at the time when exporting occurs with the net present value
(NPV) of social surplus. The stock in storage has been exported in previous periods
and its welfare has already been accounted for by the net social surplus from storage
then.
Figure 1.B.10 shows the perfect foresight equilibrium (PF), which I use as reference
case to measure deadweight loss. In PF, merchants choose exports at the intersection of
the lagged supply curve and the market demand curve, the price in Liverpool is equal
to the lagged price in New York, and merchants make no profits.
In contrast, Figure 1.B.11 illustrates the case when there are information frictions66
65This discussion of welfare follows Williams and Wright (1991, p. 350). The current consumer surplus
understates total consumer surplus, because positive stock raises current prices for consumers and reduces
current consumption. However, eventually the stock is going to be consumed, and in that period prices
for consumers will fall and consumption will increase. Similarly, current producer surplus overstates total
producer surplus, because positive stock increases the current selling prices for producers and increases
current production, whereas upon consumption it reduces prices and production.
66The term “information frictions” in this paper is used both for delayed information (equivalent to
before the telegraph) and instantaneous information (equivalent to after the telegraph), but in the former
case information frictions are larger. In order to measure deadweight loss from reduced information
frictions, I compare the deadweight loss of having delayed information (as opposed to having perfect
foresight) to the deadweight loss of having instantaneous information (as opposed to having perfect
foresight).
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and merchants overestimate demand in Liverpool. In this case, exports are larger than
PF exports, and prices are not equalized across markets. Merchants make a loss, and
some of the inefficiently high export is stored for the future. However, optimal storage
is not large enough to raise the Liverpool price to the level of the undistorted price
in Figure 1.B.10. The size of the deadweight loss is given by the orange area. An
equivalent deadweight loss triangle arises from an underestimation of demand.
Theorem. The deadweight loss from information frictions for a specific export transaction









That is, the spatial price difference pLIVt  p
NY
t1, the slope of the demand curve bD and the
slope of the supply curve bS are sufficient statistics for the lower bound of the deadweight loss
from information frictions.
Proof. In appendix.
It is not surprising that the welfare loss from information frictions is a function of
the price difference. The Law of One Price states that any spatial price difference gets
arbitraged away if agents are fully informed (due to the shipping lag, full information
in this case would require foresight of market conditions upon arrival of shipments).
The literature on the LOP therefore interprets observed price difference as a measure of
the underlying market frictions and its associated deadweight loss. The theorem makes
the relationship between deviations from the Law of One Price and welfare explicit.









Figure 1.B.12 illustrates the observed price distortion pLIVt  p
NY
tk  τtk, where k
denotes the actual shipping time in days. The spatial price difference falls dramatically
after the telegraph gets introduced. The fall in the price distortion after the telegraph is
equivalent on average to a roughly 6% ad valorem tariff.67 The largest price distortions
during the pre-telegraph period were equivalent up to a 50% ad valorem tariff. For
comparison, note that the average US tariff that was abolished during NAFTA in 1994
was 3%, while the highest abolished tariff was 12%, for textile trading with Mexico
(Caliendo and Parro 2012).
In order to translate these price distortions into welfare effects, I use estimates
of the slope of the supply and demand curves as described previously. Combining
67The equivalent ad valorem tariff of the distortion is calculated for each day as the absolute price
difference minus transport cost in percent of the lagged New York price pNYtk. The average tariff equivalent
of 6% is equal to the difference in the average of this measure between the pre- and post-telegraph period.
Days with no trade are excluded from this calculation.
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the estimates for the slope of the supply and the demand function with the observed
price difference, Table 1.C.13 reports the welfare loss due to delayed or instantaneous
information as compared to perfect foresight. The difference in welfare loss can be
attributed to the telegraph, and corresponds to 8% of the annual export value of
American cotton from New York to Great Britain in the data which is around 10 million
pounds in 1866.68 I construct a confidence interval for the welfare loss based on the
confidence intervals for the estimates of the slopes of the supply and demand functions.
The confidence interval of the welfare gains from the telegraph ranges from 5% to 22%.
The 8% welfare gain can be divided into a 6.7% efficiency gain from reducing the
variance of the price difference (due to within year reallocation), and 1.7% of efficiency
gain from reducing the average price difference (due to increased average trade). If I
exclude the anecdotal episode with the especially large demand shock described earlier
from the welfare calculation, the efficiency gain is 6.6%.
This is somewhat larger than previous estimates in Ejrnaes and Persson (2010) who
estimate the welfare gains from the transatlantic telegraph to be around 0.5-3% of
trade value. Their estimate is based on weekly data which averages out some of the
variation in the data. Furthermore, they rely on demand and supply elasticities from
the literature which are estimated over yearly and not weekly time horizons because
they do not observe trade flows to estimate the reaction of exports directly.
How is the welfare gain distributed across producers, consumers and merchants?
The surplus of merchants is zero under all information regimes, as unexpected gains
and losses average out. The distribution of the additional surplus across consumers
and producers depends on the slopes of the supply and demand functions. Since the
estimated slope of the supply function is larger than the estimated slope of the demand
function, producers gain more from the telegraph than consumers.
1.7 Conclusions
This paper exploits a clean historical experiment to understand the impact of informa-
tion frictions on the Law Of Once Price and trade: the establishment of the transatlantic
telegraph cable, connecting the United States and Great Britain in 1866. This episode
provides a unique setting for studying information frictions. On one hand, it provides
a dramatic and exogenous reduction in information frictions, as the information trans-
mission times between these two countries fell unexpectedly from around ten days
to only one day. On the other hand, a rich data set based on historical newspapers
includes high-frequency data not only on prices, but also on trade and information
flows.
This setting allows me to contribute to the literature in several ways. First of all, it is
possible to identify and measure the impact of information, which is usually endogenous,
complex and unobserved. This paper shows that a fall in information frictions causes
68Note that the total exports from the United States to Europe is around three times as much. In reality,
the welfare benefit of the transatlantic telegraph applies to all of transatlantic cotton trade (and potentially
other goods as well).
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better adherence to the Law of One Price. The average price difference between New
York and Liverpool falls by 35%, and its standard deviation falls by 73%. This reduction
in price distortions is equivalent to abolishing a roughly 6% ad valorem trade tariff.
Second, this paper shows that information frictions have real effects and are not
just a reallocation of profits across market participants, because exports respond to
information. After the telegraph, average trade flows increase and become more
volatile. The model explains that this is the case because exports follow expected
demand, conditional on information. More information makes expected demand more
volatile, which explains why we observe more volatile exports after the telegraph.
However, this effect is asymmetric, as there is a cutoff when it is not profitable to export
at all. More information increases average exports because there are more incidents
with high expected demand and therefore large exports.
The third contribution of the paper lies in estimating the welfare gains from reducing
information frictions. Better information helps merchants to better forecast future
demand, resulting in a more efficient alignment of supply and demand across countries.
This is reflected in the better adherence to the Law of One Price. In order to translate
the reduced price distortions into welfare, one needs to estimate supply and demand
elasticities, which is usually difficult due to simultaneously determined prices and
quantities. This paper uses a novel identification strategy that exploits the fact that
exports are predetermined once they arrive in Liverpool (since shipping takes time)
and controls adequately for the possibility of storage. Overall, the welfare gains from
the telegraph are estimated to be around 8% of the annual export value.
The historical example of the transatlantic telegraph can be generalized to any set-
ting in which exporters or producers have to make ex-ante decisions about production
and/or exporting and face uncertainty about demand. In this setting, information
technologies can improve the ability of firms to forecast demand. The forecast error
of exporters becomes smaller and less volatile the better the available information is.
This leads firms to decide on production or export quantities that are better matched
with consumer demand, and therefore reduces deadweight loss. The model also points
out that the benefits from information technology are larger, the larger the underlying
volatility of demand, and the larger storage cost.
Identifying and reacting to demand changes is still critical in today’s world. De-
mand fluctuates more rapidly and widely than it used to as new trends appear and
disseminate via social media networks. Global supply chains and outsourced stages of
production make it more difficult to communicate demand changes across the different
firms involved in the production process. Newly emerging information technologies
such as the real-time analysis of “Big Data” have the potential to impact trade in a
similar, but probably even more drastic, way as the telegraph. The smart phone era
has generated an enormous amount of real-time data on consumer behavior. The
technologies for analyzing these large amounts of data are still being developed, but
they have the potential to provide firms with much more accurate demand forecasts.
The model in this paper can be used in this context. For example, it would predict
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that industries with a more volatile demand or higher storage cost should adopt and
develop these technologies earlier than other industries. The model can also be used to




Exports are given by equation 1.5.5. Assume first that exports are always positive,




point 2 of the Lemma). Exports in both regimes differ only in the way how expectations
about future demand shocks are formed. In the instantaneous information regime the
information set II I includes everything up to period t, while the information set in the
delayed information regime IDI includes only information up to period t 1: IDI  II I .























The variance of exports is a function of the variance of expected demand shocks,




































The variance of the conditional expectations are:





























Combining the last three equations shows that the variance of a conditional expected
value increases if the information set increases: Var rEt1 raD,t 1ss ¤ Var rEt raD,t 1ss.








, which proves the second point of the
Lemma. Note that this part of the proof is more general as it does not assume any
specific process or distributional assumptions about the demand shocks.
Now assume that exports have to be positive. From the above analysis we know
that uncensored exports have the same mean in both information regimes, but the
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A change from DI to II increases the variance of censored exports σ˜2, and this increases
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From the variance decomposition property it follows that the variance of the price
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Proof of Theorem
Current welfare is composed of immediate consumer surplus CSt, social surplus from
storage SSt, immediate producer surplus PSt1 (lagged because shipping takes one
period time), and immediate merchant surplus MSt.
The market demand curve pMt as a function of exports xt1 is given by
pMt  aDt  bD pxt1  st paDt, xt1qq
Immediate consumer surplus and net future social surplus of storage is the area
underneath the market demand curve, minus the price paid by consumers and storers
(Williams and Wright 1991):
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Immediate producer surplus is the area between the price received by producers
and the supply curve pSt :






















In the perfect foresight equilibrium (PFE) export and storage are chosen such that










I define deadweight loss due to information frictions as the difference of welfare
between a case with information frictions and the perfect foresight model.










The storage function has a time-dependent slope (dependent on aDt) and can there-
fore not be estimated empirically, which precludes direct estimation of the deadweight
loss (except in the numerical exercises). But I can estimate a lower bound for the
deadweight loss as follows: Note that the value of the integrand equals pLIVt  p
NY
t at
the lower bound xt1, and 0 at the upper bound xt1. The integrand is monotonically
decreasing, and its slope is smaller than bD   bS in absolute values. To see this, note that
the slope of the market demand function is in absolute value less than or equal to the
slope of the consumption demand function, as the storage function is non-decreasing











I denote q˜ where pLIVt  bD pq˜ xt1q  p
S




such that lpqq ¤ pMt pqq  p
S
t pqq in that intervall:
69I ignore transport cost in this proof to avoid cluttered notation, but account for it in the empirical part.
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l pqq :
$&%pLIVt  bD pq xt1q  pSt pqq for xt1 ¤ q ¤ q˜0 for q˜ ¤ q   xt1






















Figure 1.B.1: Price series
Figure 1.B.2: Herfindahl index of market structure of cotton merchants
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Figure 1.B.3: Information delay between New York and Liverpool over time
Figure 1.B.4: Distribution of information lags between New York and Liverpool (work
days), before and after the telegraph
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Figure 1.B.5: Price difference and freight cost
Figure 1.B.6: Cotton receipts at the New York exchange
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Demand shock in Liverpool 
• 29 Sep: “Actual stock of cotton in Liverpool was 
declared this morning, and was found to be 
only 8785 bales in excess of the estimate. On 
the announcement, the market […] showed 
renewed activity. […] Prices have made 
considerable advance” 
• 30 Sep: “Stimulated by the increasing firmness 
of the Manchester market”, “Supply on the 
market is seriously contracted, and today a 
further advance of fully 1d per lb. has been 
established”  
Arrival of news in New York 
• 9 Oct “Cotton has been in decidedly more 
request, and, under the favorable advices from 
England by the China, prices have advanced 
materially” 
New York New York 
9 Oct 1865: 
• News about higher price arrive in New York 
• Exports increase: “unusually large quantity” 
• Price immediately jumps up: “under the favorable advices 
from England” 
30 Sep 1865: 
• Increased demand from cotton millers: “stimulated by the 




































Figure 1.B.7: Reaction of New York prices to news from Liverpool
Figure 1.B.8: Impact of Liverpool price on New York price
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Figure 1.B.9: Contemporaneous price difference and price difference to the known,
delayed Liverpool price
Welfare with storage, no distortions 




Market demand  








Net future  
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from storage 





𝑝𝑡𝐿𝐼𝑉 = 𝑝𝑡−1NY 
Figure 1.B.10: Surplus from export transaction, perfect foresight equilibrium
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Welfare with storage, distortions 
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Net future  
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DWL Current merchant loss 
Figure 1.B.11: Surplus from export transaction when demand is overestimated
Figure 1.B.12: Price distortions: Difference between Liverpool price and lagged New
York price plus transport costs
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1.C Tables
Table 1.C.1: Summary statistics
Before telegraph After telegraph Difference
Information lag 10.03 1.31 -8.72***
(0.13) (0.06) (0.15)
Liverpool price 18.11 13.16 -4.95***
(0.33) (0.15) (0.36)










Sail ship freight cost 0.28 0.24 -0.04***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Steam ship freight cost 0.51 0.39 -0.12***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Exports 459.88 631.80 171.90**
(37.64) (61.80) (72.37)
Notes: Information lag is in work days. Prices and freight cost are in pence per pound of
cotton. Exports from New York to Liverpool are given in bales. Newey West standard errors
in parentheses. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
Table 1.C.2: Average price difference
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
pLIV  pNY  τ
Constant 2.56*** 2.27*** 2.05*** 2.17*** 1.52*** 1.84*** 1.43*** 1.27*** 0.004 1.67***
(0.18) (0.18) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.15) (0.16) (0.21) (0.040) (0.13)
Telegraph dummy -0.91*** -0.86*** -0.78*** -0.83*** -0.71*** -1.03*** -0.90*** -0.74*** -0.022** -0.71***
(0.19) (0.18) (0.17) (0.18) (0.18) (0.16) (0.15) (0.21) (0.011) (0.12)
Cotton supply 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.006** 0.06***
(0.03) (0.04) (0.003) (0.02)
Transport costs τ:
Freight cost none sail steam avg avg avg avg avg avg avg
Other transport costs yes yes yes yes yes yes
Excluding no trade periods yes yes yes yes yes
Accounting for shipping time yes yes yes
Observations 604 604 604 604 604 575 575 575 575 575
Notes: Newey West standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. As freight cost are not available for
all the periods, they are interpolated when missing. The average freight cost is calculated as the average of sail and
steam freight rate if both are available, or the freight rate that is available (assuming freight cost are not printed in
newspapers if the freight type was not used). Total transport costs include the average freight cost, additional 0.17
pence/pound unit freight cost, and 3.1% ad valorem transport costs (on the New York price). In (6) the period of
around four weeks during May 1866 (when exporters were inactive because the price in New York exceeded the price
in Liverpool) is excluded. In (7) the price difference daily cotton supply (receipts, in thousand bales) is used to control
for potential disruptions in cotton production after the American Civil War. In (8) the price in Liverpool at the time
of the arrival of the shipment (around 10 days in the future) is used to control for transport time of shipment. In (9) I
use the difference in log prices instead of levels, and log cotton supply. In (10) the last known Liverpool price is used
to calculate the price difference.
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Table 1.C.3: Variance of price difference
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)yVar ppdiffq
Constant 3.36*** 3.26*** 3.00*** 3.17*** 3.09*** 2.19*** 2.07*** 3.79*** 0.007 1.37***
(0.59) (0.57) (0.53) (0.56) (0.56) (0.46) (0.37) (0.76) (0.004) (0.22)
Telegraph dummy -3.11*** -3.03*** -2.82*** -2.96*** -2.89*** -1.99*** -1.95*** -3.91*** -0.010*** -0.43**
(0.59) (0.57) (0.53) (0.56) (0.56) (0.46) (0.42) (0.85) (0.002) (0.20)
Cotton supply 0.04 0.15 0.000 -0.10***
(0.08) (0.13) (0.000) (0.04)
Transport costs τ:
Freight cost none sail steam avg avg avg avg avg avg avg
Other transport costs yes yes yes yes yes yes
Excluding no trade periods yes yes yes yes yes
Accounting for shipping time yes yes yes
Observations 604 604 604 604 604 575 575 575 575 575










pdifft  pdiffa f ter
	2
, so that the coefficient on the constant yields
the sample variance on the period before the telegraph, and the coefficient on the telegraph dummy yields the change
in the sample variance before versus after the telegraph. The different columns repeat the different specifications from
Table 1.C.2.
Table 1.C.4: Variance of price difference using within period variation
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3)
ln yVar ppdiffq
Telegraph dummy -2.21*** -0.97
(0.24) (0.78)
Information lag l, work days 0.24*** 0.14*
(0.03) (0.08)
Supply -0.05 -0.04 -0.05
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Observations 585 585 585
Notes: Newey West standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01,










pdifft  pdiffa f ter
	2
. No
trade periods are excluded as in Table 1.C.3.
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Table 1.C.5: Impact of telegraphed vs. steam shipped Liverpool price on New York
price
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(New York price) Before telegraph After telegraph
ln(“telegraphed” 0.00193 0.734*** 0.710***
Liverpool price) (0.0661) (0.0612) (0.0651)
ln(“steam shipped” 0.434*** 0.433*** 0.0685
Liverpool price) (0.0319) (0.0321) (0.0635)
Observations 301 300 303 303
Notes: Counterfactual “telegraphed” price before telegraph is the Liv-
erpool price in t  1. Counterfactual “steam shipped” price after tele-
graph is Liverpool price in t10. Prices are measured in pence/pound.
Estimation of an AR(3) model with maximum likelihood. Standard er-
rors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 1.C.6: Impact of known Liverpool price on exports
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(exports) Before telegraph After telegraph
ln(“telegraphed” -0.559 -0.313 1.497 1.608 2.285
Liverpool price) (1.080) (1.174) (1.856) (2.352) (2.460)
ln(“steam shipped” 2.482*** 2.940*** 3.137*** -0.164 0.827
Liverpool price) (0.682) (1.103) (1.111) (2.478) (2.449)
Linear time trend yes yes
Observations 216 215 215 234 234 234
Notes: Columns (1) to (3) use data from the sample before the telegraph got established,
columns (4) to (6) use data from the sample after the telegraph got established. Counterfactual
“telegraphed” price before telegraph is the Liverpool price in t  1. Counterfactual “steam
shipped” price after telegraph is the Liverpool price in t  10. Exports are measured in bales,
Liverpool price is measured in pence/pound. Columns (3) and (6) include a linear time trend.
Estimation of an AR(14) model with maximum likelihood. Standard errors in parentheses. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.C.7: Average exports from New York to Liverpool
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Exports
Constant 0.46*** -0.39*** -0.26*** -0.34*** -1.10*** -1.08*** -1.06*** -1.25***
(0.04) (0.10) (0.08) (0.10) (0.19) (0.23) (0.23) (0.24)
Telegraph dummy 0.17** 0.30*** 0.35*** 0.33*** 0.48*** 0.47*** 0.47*** 0.27***
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10)
Transport costs 3.02*** 1.42*** 2.10*** 1.50*** 1.49*** 1.43*** 1.43***
(0.38) (0.16) (0.27) (0.20) (0.22) (0.23) (0.23)
Cotton supply 0.01 0.01
(0.02) (0.02)
Transport costs τ:
Freight cost sail steam avg avg avg avg avg
Other transport costs yes yes yes yes
Excluding no trade periods yes yes yes
Harvest year dummy yes
Observations 604 604 604 604 604 575 575 575
Notes: Newey West standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. Exports are in thousand bales.
Table 1.C.8: Variance of exports from New York to Liverpool
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)yVar pexportsq
Constant 0.29*** -0.51** -0.20 -0.38* -0.94** -1.03** -1.03** -1.12**
(0.04) (0.24) (0.18) (0.22) (0.39) (0.47) (0.47) (0.47)
Telegraph dummy 0.33*** 0.45*** 0.45*** 0.46*** 0.57*** 0.61*** 0.61*** 0.21*
(0.12) (0.14) (0.15) (0.14) (0.17) (0.19) (0.20) (0.12)
Transport costs 2.85*** 0.96*** 1.77*** 1.18*** 1.25*** 1.24*** 1.26***
(0.87) (0.35) (0.58) (0.39) (0.44) (0.48) (0.48)
Cotton supply 0.00 -0.00
(0.03) (0.03)
Transport costs τ:
Freight cost sail steam avg avg avg avg avg
Other transport costs yes yes yes yes
Excluding no trade periods yes yes yes
Harvest year dummy yes
Observations 604 604 604 604 604 575 575 575










expt  expa f ter
	2
, so that the
coefficient on the constant yields the sample variance on the period before the telegraph, and the coefficient on the
telegraph dummy yields the change in the sample variance before versus after the telegraph. Exports are in thousand
bales. Newey West standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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Table 1.C.9: Estimation of the slope of the demand function
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
pLIVt k OLS IV NL NL-IV NL-IV NL-IV
Constant 1.735* 2.043** 1.775*** 2.010*** 2.992** 1.415
(0.903) (0.794) (0.642) (0.537) (1.256) (1.134)
xt 4sLIVt k -0.045* -0.073** -0.036* -0.049*** -0.050* -0.033***
(0.027) (0.037) (0.019) (0.015) (0.026) (0.012)
pLIVtl 0.884*** 0.871*** 0.881*** 0.870*** 0.822*** 0.897***
(0.056) (0.051) (0.032) (0.027) (0.049) (0.070)
xtkl 4sLIVtl -0.020 -0.023 n/a n/a n/a n/a
(0.039) (0.038)
Observations 402 402 402 402 206 196
R squared 0.827 0.826 0.827 0.827 0.687 0.736
First stage F stat 125.8 125.8 65.3 171.3
First stage coefficient 0.647*** 0.647*** 0.676*** 0.614***
(0.058) (0.058) (0.084) (0.047)
Test: β1β2  β3  0 -0.020 -0.041
(0.046) (0.058)
Demand elasticity -104.7 -64.8 -130.9 -97.7 -149.5 -90.7
Sample before telegraph after telegraph
Notes: Prices are denoted in pence/pound. The quantities in the regressor are given in 1,000 bales (1 bale400
pounds). HAC standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
Table 1.C.10: Estimation of the slope of the supply function












4sNYt   xt 0.071*** 1.862*** 1.715*** 1.715*** 1.574*** 1.608***
(0.026) (0.338) (0.286) (0.287) (0.300) (0.518)
Observations 554 554 469 469 227 242
Harvest year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Harvest cycle yes yes yes yes yes yes
Regression OLS IV IV IV IV IV
Instrument known Liv price known demand shock known Liv price known Liv price known Liv price
First stage F-stat 46.95 57.81 57.54 46.85 10.49
First stage coefficient 0.27*** 0.30*** 0.30*** 0.33*** 0.49**
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.15)
Supply elasticity 368.4 14.1 15.3 15.3 24.9 11.5
Sample before telegraph after telegraph
Notes: Prices are denoted in pence/pound. The quantities in the regressor are given in 1,000 bales (1 bale400
pounds). Index k denotes shipping time from New York to Liverpool, and index l denotes information delay between
Liverpool and New York. Harvest cycle controls for day of the harvest season, and the square of it. HAC standard
errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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Table 1.C.11: Parameters for calibration
Parameter Value Method
Supply side (New York):
bS 1.608 Instrumental variables estimation
a¯S 13.03 Constant from estimation of AR(1) process on a¯S
ρS 0.24 AR(1) coefficient from estimation of AR(1) process on a¯S
σ2S 2.25 From estimation of AR(1) process on a¯S
Demand side (Liverpool):
bD -0.033 Instrumental variables estimation
a¯D 17.15 Constant from estimation of AR(1) process on a¯D
ρD 0.91 AR(1) coefficient from estimation of AR(1) process on a¯D
σ2D 0.40 From estimation of AR(1) process on a¯D
Other parameters:
Transport cost τ 0.81 Total transport cost as estimated in empirical section
Storage cost θ 0.004-0.01 From Boyle (1934)
Table 1.C.12: Change from delayed to instantaneous information regime, in percent
Data Model
Storage cost: 0 0.004 0.1 1 8
Main estimates for bD and bS:
Mean
LIV price - NY price -35.9*** -1.36 -1.32 -1.04 -2.82 -2.79
Exports 35.7 0.33 0.32 0.25 0.63 0.63
Standard deviation
LIV price - NY price -72.3*** -41.84 -42.15 -57.40 -51.86 -52.62
Exports 65.7*** 2.87 2.92 4.82 6.25 6.37
Lower CI for bD and bS:
Mean
LIV price - NY price -35.9*** -0.49 -0.48 -0.98 -1.14 -1.13
Exports 35.7 0.23 0.23 0.43 0.50 0.50
Standard deviation
LIV price - NY price -72.3*** -30.85 -31.31 -41.28 -42.02 -42.01
Exports 65.7*** 1.50 1.58 3.07 3.36 3.35
Upper CI for bD and bS:
Mean
LIV price - NY price -35.9*** 0 0 -0.68 -0.76 -0.49
Exports 35.7 0 0 0.08 0.09 0.06
Standard deviation
LIV price - NY price -72.3*** -1.10 -1.20 -7.14 -9.00 -9.21
Exports 65.7*** 0.04 0.04 0.32 0.48 0.26
Notes: Change is from delayed (=before telegraph) to instantaneous (=after telegraph) infor-
mation regime, in percent of the underlying variables. Model predictions are based on a simu-
lation of the model over 10,000 periods. Summary statistics are based on weekly data. Storage
cost of infinity mean prohibitively high storage cost. Preferred estimates are shaded in light
gray.
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Table 1.C.13: Estimation of welfare gain from telegraph
Annual welfare loss,
thousand pounds [95% Conf. Interval]
Before telegraph 988 608 2,667
After telegraph 125 77 342
Change -863 -531 -2,325
Change in percent -87% -87% -87%
In % of annual export value -8.4% -5.2% -22.7%
Notes: Confidence interval of welfare loss is based on confidence intervals for the slopes of the
demand and supply functions. Annual export value in the data is 10.2 million pounds.
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Chapter 2
Survive another day: Using changes
in the composition of investments
to measure the cost of credit
constraints
We introduce a novel empirical strategy to measure the size of credit shocks. Theoreti-
cally, we show that credit shocks reduce the value of long term investments relative
to short term ones. If demand shocks affect short and long run investments similarly,
credit shocks can be measured within firms by the shift in the investment vector away
from long run investments and towards short term ones. This within-firm strategy
makes it possible to use firm-times-year fixed effects to capture unobserved between
firm heterogeneity as well as idiosyncratic demand shocks. We implement this strategy
using a rich panel data set of Spanish manufacturing firms before and after the credit
crisis in 2008. This allows us to quantify the effect of the credit crunch: our theory sug-
gests that credit constraints are equivalent to an additional tax rate of around 11% on
the longest lived capital. To pin down credit constraints as the cause for this investment
pattern we use two triple differences strategies where we show (i) that only Spanish
owned firms became credit constrained during the financial crisis, and that the drop in
long term investments after the crisis is indeed driven by credit constrained Spanish
firms; and that (ii) the impact on long term investment is mostly noticeable in firms
that started the crisis with more mature debt to roll over.
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2.1 Introduction
Studying the impact of credit shocks on investment empirically requires solving an
identification problem: separating the impact of the supply of credit from the impact of
the aggregate demand shock that usually takes place concurrently. To do this, the more
recent literature has proposed a within-firm estimator which holds the firm constant
and compares the effect of different lenders on the same firm.1 Here, we propose
an alternative within-firm estimator, using variation in different investment duration
classes within a firm.
Our strategy exploits the differential impact of demand shocks and liquidity con-
straints on the composition of investments. As we show formally in a simplified version
of Aghion et al. (2010), absent liquidity constraints, firms equalize the value of the
marginal dollar on short term and long term investments. However, under liquidity
constraints, long term investments involve a risk, since the firm may have to liquidate
before the payoff period. This creates a wedge between the value of short and long
term investments: Firms are willing to give up some future expected payoffs in order
to increase the probability of surviving another day.
Based on this result we propose an identification strategy that allows us to place
a lower bound on the impact of credit shocks. Assuming that demand shocks affect
short term and long term investments within firms similarly, the difference between
the longer term and the shorter term investment, if positive, is a lower bound on a first
order approximation of the impact of the credit shock. The assumption that demand
shocks have no differential impact on the composition of investment by duration is
likely to be a conservative assumption, since the recession itself, if anything, would shift
investments towards the future. That the driving force for the changes is liquidity and
not demand is also consistent with the differential impact on foreign versus domestic
firms as well as on constrained versus unconstrained firms, as we explain below.
A crucial advantage of our strategy is that it allows us to examine the shift in the
composition of investment within firms before and after a financial shock, including
firm-times-year fixed effects to make sure that neither demand shocks nor unobserved
heterogeneity between firms (different firms react differently to the crisis, but this is
absorbed by the year-firm fixed effects) bias the estimated impact of credit constraints.
Our estimate thus has, as we shall show, a clear economic interpretation.
Our identification strategy requires formulating a taxonomy of investments by
their time to payoff, or durability. We rely on an extensive existing literature (which
we survey) to determine the relative durability of different investment categories.
According to this literature the shortest lived investment is advertising, followed by IT,
R&D, with fixed capital investment like equipment and machinery being, on average,
the longest lived.
To conduct our empirical analysis we need two things: a credit crisis, and detailed
data about different investment types. Luckily for the case of Spain both are available:
1See for example Gan (2007), Khwaja and Mian (2008), Paravisini (2008), Iyer et al. (2014), Jiménez et al.
(2010), Iyer and Peydró (2011), Schnabl (2012), Jiménez et al. (2012), Paravisini et al. (2011).
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Spain suffered from a particular severe credit crisis in the wake of the financial crisis
in 2008, and at the same time there exists detailed firm level data with investment
information.
We use the financial crisis in 2008 as an exogenous shock to credit supply. This
is possible because the 2008 crisis was at its core a banking crisis. Previous research
has established that the reduced bank liquidity translated into a reduction of credit
supply to firms (e.g. Iyer et al. 2014, Paravisini et al. 2011, Ivashina and Scharfstein
2010, Adrian et al. 2012, Santos 2011 for the financial crisis in 2008; and Chava and
Purnanandam 2011 for the Russian crisis in 1998). This is particularly true for the case
of Spain, where the liquidity crisis was exceptionally severe. Jiménez et al. (2012) show
that weaker banks deny more loans, even when the loans are identical (which allows
them to identify the supply rather than demand channel) and that firms can usually
not substitute the weak bank with another bank. Bentolila et al. (2013) show that firms
who borrowed more from weak financial institutions that were later bailed out (the old
“Cajas”) reduced employment by an additional 3.5 to 5 percentage points relative to
firms who borrowed from healthier ones.
We use Spanish firm-level data from the Encuesta Sobre Estrategias Empresariales
(ESEE, Survey of business strategies); a rich, high quality, long-term panel data set
of Spanish manufacturing firms that breaks up investment information into a total
of eight different investment categories: Advertising, IT, R&D, vehicles, machinery,
furniture, buildings, and land. Since the Spanish financial crisis was based on a real
estate bubble, we do not use land and buildings investment in our analysis, as it might
bias our results towards finding the hypothesized effect.
Applying our estimation strategy to the Spanish data we find that after the financial
crisis the longest term investments were reduced by 17 percentage points more than
shortest term investments. This finding is robust to different classifications of short
versus long term investment. For example, it does not matter whether we use depre-
ciation rates from the literature directly as a measure for time-to-payoff, or if we just
use the ranking of investment types based on their depreciation rates. Similarly, the
finding holds for several ways of grouping some investment types with similar depre-
ciation rates into one category. Also, we conduct placebo tests estimating the effects
of the financial crisis in 2008 year by year and find reassuringly that the difference in
investment behavior only appears in the crisis years. We conclude therefore that the
17 percentage point difference is our estimate of the impact of the financial crisis on
investment. We show that, given our theory, this is equivalent to an 11% incremental
tax rate on the longest term investment.
The second part of our empirical analysis aims to more precisely pin down credit
constraints as the mechanism leading to the change in investment patterns (as in
Bernanke and Gertler 1989), as opposed to other mechanisms which could lead to
similar effects, such as an increase in uncertainty (Bloom 2009, Bernanke 1983), which
could increase the option value of waiting. If credit constraints were indeed the cause
of the change, we should see a stronger effect for firms that were more affected by
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credit constraints. We use two ways, suggested by the literature, to identify firms that
were particularly affected by the financial crisis: domestic firms (as opposed to foreign
ones), and firms with a lot of mature debt that needs to be rolled over at the beginning
of the crisis.
Foreign firms are typically less affected by a credit squeeze since they have access
to external finance via their parent companies (Desai et al. 2004, Kalemli-Ozcan et al.
2010). Indeed, this is the case in our data: the credit drop is only observed for Spanish
firms. Thus under our hypothesis, the shift in the composition of investment (if linked
to credit) should only occur in Spanish firms. Our analysis exploits that and amounts
to a triple differences estimation: We compare long-term versus short-term investments
before and after the financial crisis in 2008 for Spanish versus foreign firms. Our triple
differences analysis confirms our initial analysis, and reassures us that credit constraints
are indeed at play.
This robustness check may still fail to convince us, since domestic and foreign
owned firms differ among a variety of other dimensions besides their access to external
funding. For example, Spanish owned firms in our data are typically smaller and
less likely to export, and might therefore show a different investment behavior. We
address this concern by conducting a variety of robustness checks. First, we use only
multinational firms for our comparison. These firms are all large, have subsidiaries in
many countries and are heavily export oriented, the only difference between them being
the nationality of their majority shareholder. Second, we use an inverse propensity score
reweighting scheme based on the size, growth, export status and export development
of firms before the financial crisis. This strategy basically matches foreign owned firms
to comparable Spanish ones. Third, we make sure that firm size is not driving the
results. Spanish firms are smaller, so this could be just a size effect. However, the
magnitude of our estimated result does not vary at all when we control for firm size,
so size is not driving the change in investment pattern. Overall, the results are very
similar in magnitude across all alternative specifications, which gives us additional
confidence that we are picking up the right effect. Fourth, the exit rates of Spanish and
foreign firms are not statistically significantly different (consistent with our mechanism,
as firms manage to avoid bankruptcy due to their changing investment behavior), so
compositional effects are not driving our results either. A final alternative hypothesis
could be that the the liability side of Spanish firms’ balance sheets could be responsible
for our results: If firms cannot raise long term funding, then maturity matching could
lead them to reduce the maturity of their asset side. However, we can rule out this
explanation as well, as the data shows not difference between Spanish and foreign
firms in the maturities of liabilities after the crisis.
A second way to investigate whether the mechanism we suggest — credit con-
straints — is at the root of the shift in the investment vector towards shorter time-to-
payoff relies on the observation that firms with a lot of mature debt at the beginning of
a financial crisis also tend to be more affected by it because they experience difficulty in
rolling their debt over under a credit crunch (Almeida et al. 2012). Therefore we use the
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ratio of short term debt over total debt to identify more affected firms in another triple
difference estimation. Our estimates are again consistent with the evidence from before:
these firms reduce long term investment relatively more than shorter term investments
compared to other firms.
Another nice feature of both of our triple differences specifications is that they allow
us to include category-year fixed effects to control for the cyclical behavior of different
investment types. For example, it has been shown that R&D exhibits a pro-cyclical
pattern (Barlevy 2007). However, this does not affect our results. Furthermore, the
firms which are more credit constrained do not exhibit a difference in their output or
exports compared to less credit constrained firms. This reassures us that we are not
seeing a demand-driven shift towards short term investments caused by the recession,
but rather a change in composition that only takes place for credit constrained firms.
Our finding that credit constraints are eating the long term future profits of firms
in order to guarantee survival for another day complements a large literature that
has established that financially constrained firms invest less,2 and recent studies that
use the world wide financial crisis in 2007/2008 as an exogenous shock to the credit
supplied by banks.3 A smaller literature has studied how credit rationing affects the
composition of firm investments. For example, see Eisfeldt and Rampini (2007) for
the allocation of investment between new and used capital, as well as Campello et al.
(2010), who point out that firms cut technology and marketing investment by more
than capital investment, but do not offer an explanation why certain investment types
might be more affected than others.
Beyond these findings we believe that our paper points a way forward in learning
about credit shocks. We show how the rotation in the investment vector towards the
present and away from the future informs us about the existence and the size of the
credit crunch. Furthermore, we believe that this shift in the investment vector could
have a macroeconomic impact: reducing long-term investment is likely to have a long
term impact on the Spanish economy, impeding recovery after the financial crisis, and
reducing long-term economic growth.
2.2 Theoretical Framework and Identification
2.2.1 Theory: Investment Duration and Liquidity Risk
Most theoretical analysis of liquidity constraints aggregates all investment into one
single decision (e.g. Kiyotaki and Moore 1997). Instead, we assume that a profit
maximizing firm can choose between two types of investment: short-term investments
kt yield an immediate payoff of f pktq, while long-term investments zt yield a higher
payoff p1  ρq f pztq which is paid out at a later period. To capture this trade-off we rely
on a model that is a simplified version of Aghion et al. (2010). The key difficulty of firms
2For example, Whited (1992), Carpenter et al. (1994), Hubbard et al. (1995), Bernanke et al. (1996),
Bernanke et al. (1999), Kaplan and Zingales (1997), Lamont (1997), Cleary (1999), Klein et al. (2002), Amiti
and Weinstein (2013), Fazzari et al. (1988).
3Campello et al. (2010), Duchin et al. (2010), Almeida et al. (2012), Kuppuswamy and Villalonga (2012).
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is that with probability 1 λt 1 a liquidity crisis in the interim period before the payoff
of the long term investment is realized, which may simply force the firm to liquidate.
Thus the probability of survival λt 1 measures the probability that the entrepreneur
will have enough funds to cover the liquidity shock and is allowed to depend on the
levels of short and long term investments. Specifically, reallocating investments from







¡ 0. The choice
of how much short run and long run investment to undertake is then given by:
max
kt,zt
Et r f pktq   βλt 1p1  ρq f pztq  qtkt  qtzts (2.2.1)
where λt 1 measures the probability that the entrepreneur will have enough funds to
cover the liquidity shock, ρ is the additional productivity of long term investment, and
the rest of terms have their usual meanings.
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This contrasts with the first best, absent liquidity shocks, when it should be the case







p1  ρq f 1pztq

. (2.2.5)
Thus the risk that the firm will run out of cash in period t   1 works exactly like
a tax on investment τt 1 and reduces the value of the (a priori more profitable) long
term investments relative to the first best. The first term of this wedge, p1 λt 1q,
captures the probability of failure. The second term captures the marginal change
in this probability as we reallocate investment from long term to short term. Given
that reallocating investments from long term to short term increases the probability
of survival, the tax wedge τt 1 ¡ 0. Hence the reallocation away from long term
investment opportunities to short term ones is higher the higher the probability of
avoiding bankruptcy by doing this, the higher the probability of not having enough
liquidity next period, and the lower the marginal productivity of long run investments.
The model predicts that credit constrained firms will reduce long term investment
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by more than short term investment in order to secure survival. In the next section we
discuss how we implement this idea empirically.
2.2.2 Identification
Our theoretical framework suggests a new empirical strategy, closely linked to the
theory, that can help us to identify credit shocks. To get exact expressions, we assume
that the function f is Cobb Douglas, that is y  kα (as usual everything goes through as
a log linear approximation otherwise).
Suppose that there are good ex-ante reasons to expect liquidity to be plentiful before
the shock to credit supply (denoted by subscript b), and to expect liquidity to be scarce
after the credit shock (denoted by subscript a). Then we have from equation (2.2.5) that,
for a given firm i,




where we assume ε i is an i.i.d. log normal error term with mean 1. Thus, in logs, and
using the Cobb-Douglas specification
pα 1q ln kib  ln pβp1  ρqq   pα 1q ln z
i
b   ln ε
i
b.
While after the liquidity crunch we have, from equation (2.2.4):




  pα 1q ln zia   ln ε
i
a.
This immediately suggests a difference in differences estimator as the way to
identify the wedge introduced by the liquidity shock in firm i. Specifically, the difference
in difference estimator is:
p1 αq




















ln εia  ln εib

 0.
Now consider the following difference-in-differences specification using investment I
in investment category c  k, z as dependent variable:
ln Iict  β0   β1  crisist  longtermc   crisist   longtermc   νict
where crisist is a dummy variable that turns 1 in the years of a financial crisis, and
longtermc is a dummy variable indicating a long term investment (i.e. it equals 1 if
investment type c  z). In this specification the coefficient on the interaction term
equals:
β1  E ppln Iiza  ln Iizbq  pln Iika  ln Iikbqq
However, this last expression equals, up to a factor, the wedge between long term
70
and short term investments, which has a clear economic interpretation in the theory:
β1 
E pln p1 τt 1qq
p1 αq
In reality and in our data we have more than two investment categories, thus
we generalize our formula above to multiple investment types. Furthermore we can
include firm times year fixed effects as well as investment category fixed effects to
make sure that the structural equation above is identified. This leads to our estimated
regression equation:
ln Iict  β0   β1  crisist  duration-of-investmentc
 firm  year FEit   category FEc   νict (2.2.7)
2.3 Data
2.3.1 Identifying Long and Short Term Investments
The theory allows us to make predictions about the behavior of different investment
categories depending on the horizon over which they pay off. For the model to guide
our empirical work, we need a taxonomy of tangible and intangible investments by
their durability. While accountants and growth accountants have produced a large
body of work aiming to estimate the durability of tangible investments, the literature
on intangible investment lifespan is somewhat less extensive.
The shortest lived investment category is brand equity and advertising. Landes and
Rosenfield (1994) estimate the annual rates of decay of advertising to be more than 50%
for most industries, using 20 two-digit SIC manufacturing and service industries. For a
number of industries they even find that the effect of advertising does not persist until
the following year. A more recent literature review by Corrado et al. (2009) concludes
that the depreciation rate for advertising is 60%. They also note that 40% of advertising
expenditure is spent on advertisements that last less than a year, e.g. on “this week’s
sale”, which partly explains the short-lived impact of advertising.
The literature reports a depreciation rate of around 30% for software investments.
The Bureau of Economic Analysis (1994) estimated a depreciation rate of 33% for a
5 year service life, according to Corrado et al. (2009). Tamai and Torimitsu (1992)
report a 9 years average life span for software (between 2 and 20 years), relying on
industry estimates based on survey evidence. The Spanish accounting rules give a
depreciation rate of 26% for IT equipment and software, so we use a value of around
30% as summarizing the evidence in our main specification.
The evidence on the average depreciation rates and average lifespans of R&D capital
is extensive, and estimates range from 10-30%. Pakes and Schankerman (1984) and
Schankerman and Pakes (1986) propose 25% based on 5 European countries, and 11-
26% in a later study for Germany, UK and France. Nadiri and Prucha (1996) estimated
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a rate of 12% for R&D, while Bernstein and Mamuneas (2006) estimate the depreciation
rate at 18-29%. Corrado et al. (2009) review the literature and settle on a value of 20%
for R&D, which is the value we are using for our main analysis.
Longer lived investments include fixed tangible assets like machinery, vehicles and
other equipment. Both the Spanish4 and the BEA’s5 accounting rules yield similar
values for these types of investment, with vehicles having a depreciation rate of around
16%, machinery around 12% and furniture and office equipment around 10%.
The longest lived investments are investments into real estate, i.e. land and build-
ings. According to the BEA’s estimates, industrial and office buildings have a deprecia-
tion rate between 2-3%. Spanish accounting rules specify a very similar depreciation
rate for buildings of 3%. It’s harder to make a general statement about the depreciation
of land. While land clearly is long-lived, many factors determine the price of land and
therefore the implicit depreciation rate. In any case, since the Spanish financial crisis
affected real estate prices strongly, we exclude this category from our analysis.
Our summary of the literature to classify investment types into time-to-payoff is
presented in Table 2.B.1, ranked from the shortest to the longest time-to-payoff. We use
our summarized depreciation rates as well as the ranks for our estimation and regroup
some categories when there is some ambiguity as robustness checks. However, our
results are robust to these checks.
2.3.2 Description of Data Set
We rely on the Encuesta Sobre Estrategias Empresariales (ESEE), a panel of Spanish
manufacturing firms. This data has been collected by the Spanish government and
the SEPI foundation every year since 1990.6 The survey covers around 1,800 Spanish
manufacturing firms per year, which include all firms with more than 200 employees
and a stratified sample of smaller firms. The coverage is about 50-60% of large firms,
and 5-25% of small firms. The sample started out as a representative sample of the
population of Spanish manufacturing firms. In order to reduce the deterioration of
representativeness due to non-responding firms, every year new companies are re-
sampled in order to replace exiting ones.
In contrast to balance sheet firm level data bases, which usually report only a sin-
gle investment number for each firm, the Spanish data covers a number of different
investment choices made by firms. A number of variables can be linked to our invest-
ment categories based on time-to-payoff: advertising expenditure, IT expenses, R&D
expenses, investment into vehicles, machinery, and furniture & office equipment, as
well as investment into land and buildings.
Besides these main investment variables, we also have data on the credit ratio of
firms, and other complementary variables such as sales, exports and foreign ownership,




6For more information see http://www.fundacionsepi.es/esee/sp/spresentacion.asp
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Table 2.B.2 presents summary statistics for the main variables that are the object
of our analysis, before and after the crisis. The data shows that investment in all
categories fell after the financial crisis in 2008. However, ex ante it is not clear whether
this investment drop is triggered by the credit squeeze or the adverse demand shock.
Our empirical strategy aims to disentangle these effects.
It is notable that investment into buildings show the largest statistically significant
drop in investment. Land and buildings are also the longest lived investment categories.
However, since the financial crisis in Spain was based on a real estate bubble which
led to falling real estate prices, it seems safer to exclude land and building from our
analysis as it would bias our results towards finding our hypothesized effect: The fall
in building and land investment might reflect a fall in prices due to the burst of the real
estate bubble rather than be caused by the credit squeeze.
The credit crunch triggered by the financial crisis is also reflected in the Spanish
credit data: total credit as a percentage of total assets (the credit ratio) fell by 3 per-
centage points after the crisis, from 57% to 54%. At the same time, observed average
credit cost increased by 0.22 percentage points, from 4.06% to 4.28%. This is obviously
a lower bound on the increased cost, as firms often simply could not get access to
credit. Together with the observed immediate drop in the credit ratio this suggests that
we observe a credit supply rather than a credit demand shock immediately after the
financial crisis hit.
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Differential Effect across Investment Types
Table 2.B.3 presents our main results from estimating regression equation 2.2.7. The
dependent variable is the log of investment of firm i in year t in investment category
c, where investment categories include the six investment types specified above: ad-
vertising, IT, R&D, vehicles, machinery, and furniture & office equipment. The main
regressor is an interaction term of the inverse of the depreciation rate of an invest-
ment category as a measure of the time-to-payoff of an investment type as given by
Table 2.B.1 and a time dummy variable that indicates the financial crisis (=1 in and
after 2008). Standard errors are clustered at the firm level, allowing for autocorrelation
across time and across investment categories within the firm.7 Column (1) implements
the regression equation with just category and firm fixed effects. The coefficient on the
interaction term is negative, implying that investments with a longer time-to-payoff
fell more after the financial crisis than investments with a shorter time-to-payoff. The
coefficient on the crisis dummy is also significant and strong, showing that most short
7Bertrand et al. (2004) point out that serially correlated outcomes in differences-in-differences estima-
tions produce serially correlated residuals, and standard errors need to be adjusted accordingly. They
recommend clustering errors at the group level, if the number of groups is large enough (e.g. 50). For
our regression this would mean clustering at the investment category level, unfortunately our number
of categories is too small for clustering (6 categories). We decided to correct for autocorrelation of the
residuals by clustering at the firm level instead, which allows for arbitrary serial correlation over time as
well as across investment categories within a firm.
73
run investment fell by 17 percentage points after the crisis. In column (2) we replace
the crisis dummy with year fixed effects, which doesn’t change the coefficient on the
interaction term.
It is possible that the demand shock rather than the credit squeeze drives our result.
In column (3) we control for firm times year fixed effects. If demand shocks don’t
have a differential effect across investment types, we manage to control for them in
column (3). The magnitude of the effect increases somewhat and stays significant after
introducing the firm year fixed effects. Note that in contrast to other papers on the
effect of credit squeezes on investment this is likely to be a lower bound of the true
estimate, because if demand shocks affect investment types differentially, they are
likely to affect investments with a shorter time-to-payoff by more than investments
with a longer time-to-payoff (the recession will, after all, finish at some point in the
future). It is common that investment observations are often 0 and thus excluded from
the analysis (in logs). Column (4) codes the 0’s as 1 euro and thus includes all those
observations. The results are substantially stronger, suggesting our baseline analysis is
very conservative.
Table 2.B.4 uses alternative measures for time-to-payoff instead of the inverse of the
depreciation rate. For example, column (2) uses the rank of investment types according
to depreciation rates, using the highest rank for investment with the longest time-to-
payoff. Since the estimated depreciation rates in the literature vary within investment
types and sometimes overlap, we regroup the investment categories in columns (2) to
(5) of the table. For example, the depreciation rates of R&D and IT are not that different
in the literature, so we group them together. Also machinery and furniture have quite
similar depreciation rates, justifying a similar treatment. However, our finding is robust
across all these alternative measures for time-to-payoff. The magnitudes of the effect
differ, but this is because the different measures use different units. In column (6)
we check whether our result is sensitive to the non-linearity implicit in measuring
time-to-payoff as the inverse of the depreciation rate, and use the depreciation rate
instead. The sign reverses, as a higher depreciation rate now means less time to payoff,
but the result remains again robust to this specification.
How can we interpret the economic significance of our effect? Our preferred
specification in column (3) in Table 2.B.3 tells us that investment falls by 2 percentage
points for a unit increase in the inverse depreciation rate. When we compare advertising,
the investment category with the highest depreciation rate, to furniture and office
equipment, the category with the lowest depreciation rate, the inverse depreciation rate
increases by 8.3, so we need to multiply the regression coefficient by this value. This
leads to our main result: Investment in office equipment gets reduced by 17 percentage
points more than advertising expenditure. This is quite a sizable difference across
investment categories.






Given that the investment gap between capital with the shortest and longest time-to-
payoff (β1 in the theory) is 17% and using α  1{3 (the capital share), this means that
the credit crunch is equivalent to an 11% tax on the long run investments relative to the
shortest run one (τt 1  1 exp p0.17  2{3q  10.6%q.
2.4.2 Placebo Test
So far we have pooled the estimated effect across all years before and after the crisis,
respectively. In order to make sure we are capturing the effect of the credit squeeze
instead of something else, we check whether the timing of the effect really coincides
with the credit squeeze. Therefore we allow the interaction term to vary with each
year of the sample, the results are given in Table 2.B.5. The change in coefficients
over time supports our story: In column (1) the coefficient becomes negative (but still
insignificant) in the year 2008, and becomes even more negative and highly significant
thereafter. This timing is consistent with the development of the credit squeeze: After
the failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, conditions tightened severely. 2009
was the first full year in which the effects of the credit crunch were fully spread.
The effect is even more visible in Figure 2.A.1, where we plot the coefficients of the
regression estimated in column (1) in Table 2.B.5 over time. While there was not much
going on before the crisis, from 2008 on the reduction in long term investment became
apparent.
2.4.3 Mechanism: Credit Crunch
In this section we aim to further pin down credit constraints as cause for the observed
change in the investment behavior, as opposed to, for example, the effect of an increase
in uncertainty. If our hypothesis is true, we should expect to see a differential effect
on firms that are more affected by the credit crunch compared to firms that are less
affected.
The literature suggests two types of firms that are typically affected more by credit
constraints than others. First, domestic firms are typically more affected by a credit
squeeze on domestic banks, since foreign firms have access to external finance in
other countries that are less affected via their parent companies (Desai et al. 2004,
Kalemli-Ozcan et al. 2010).
Second, firms that happen to have a lot of mature debt at the beginning of a financial
crisis also tend to be more affected by it because they experience difficulty in rolling
their debt over under a credit crunch (Almeida et al. 2012).
In the following we test whether we see a differential effect of the credit crisis across
these two types of firms.
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Foreign versus Domestic Firms
We start our analysis by looking at foreign versus domestic firms. If it is true that
foreign firms are less affected by a credit squeeze, then we should observe a fall in the
credit ratio only for domestic firms. Table 2.B.6 tests this. In column (1) we find that the
credit ratio, defined by total credit divided by assets, on average fell after the crisis, a
result that was already visible from the summary statistics in Table 2.B.2. Column (2)
controls for industry specific demand conditions using the industry’s exports and size
as a time varying control. Also, firm level fixed effects allow us to control for any other
time invariant unobserved firm heterogeneity.
Column (3) compares the drop between Spanish and foreign owned firms and
answers the question: comparing two firms of the same size that are facing the same
demand conditions, does the firm that happens to be Spanish suffer a significant drop
in credit after the crisis? The answer is unambiguous and highly significant: Spanish
firms suffer a drop in credit of around 2.5 percentage points after the crisis compared
to non-Spanish firms. In column (4) we add time fixed effects to capture any common,
time varying aspects of the crisis that are not yet captured by industry exports or size,
and the effect remains the same. Column (5) is our most demanding specification,
which allows for industry specific time effects (and thus absorbs our previous industry
specific controls), and the result is again stronger, with Spanish firms facing a credit
drop of 3.5 percentage points. This is equivalent to a 6.1% drop in credit relative to the
2007 baseline of 57.8% credit to assets for Spanish firms before the crisis.
Thus under our hypothesis, the shift in the composition of investment (if linked
to credit) should only occur in Spanish firms. In Table 2.B.7 we start the analysis by
running the main regression separately for domestic and foreign firms. Only the effect
in column (1) is negative and statistically significant, suggesting that only domestic
firms cut their long term investment relatively more than their short term investment.
There is no significant difference across investment types for foreign owned firms.
In columns (3) and (4) we again conduct the placebo tests by allowing the interaction
term to vary by year. Again we see that the effect is driven by domestic firms, in line
with our hypothesis. Figure 2.A.2 shows this visually, we see the strong drop in long
term investments only for domestic firms after 2008.
We can test this more formally by extending our analysis therefore to a triple
difference estimation, comparing long-term versus short-term investments before and
after the financial crisis in 2008 for Spanish versus foreign firms. This allows us to
further challenge our results by including category times year fixed effects to control
for the possibility that firms might reduce or increase investment in certain categories
during recessions. The resulting estimating equation is:
ln Iict  β0   β1  crisist  duration-of-investmentc  domesticfirmi
  β2  duration-of-investmentc  domesticfirmi
  firm  year FEit   category  year FEct   νict. (2.4.1)
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Table 8 shows the results of the triple difference specification. It shows a significant
differential negative effect for long term investments after the crisis undertaken by
Spanish firms. As in our baseline case, column (4) codes the 0’s as 1 euro and thus
includes all the 0 investments. Again the results are substantially stronger, suggesting
our baseline analysis is very conservative.
The differential effects for domestic firms by investment category and over time
are visualized in Figure 2.A.3. Darker lines depict investment types with a longer
time-to-payoff, i.e. for which we would expect a larger drop. The visual evidence is
broadly in line with our hypothesis, as lighter lines show a smaller, and darker lines
show a larger drop after 2008. It is also notable that until 2007 there is no differential
effect by investment types, the lines are all parallel and very close. The differential
effect only starts to come in after 2007, when the credit crunch hits.
A worry is that domestic and foreign owned firms differ among a variety of other
dimensions besides access to external funding. For example, Spanish owned firms in
our data are typically smaller and less likely to export and might therefore show a
different investment behavior. To address this concern, Table 2.B.9 conducts a variety of
robustness checks. One dimension of time-varying, unobserved heterogeneity might be
differences between companies that operate across countries and those that operate in a
single country. Companies that operate in many countries belong to a corporate group,
and this could provide companies with advantages that go beyond their access to
capital. For example they might face a more diversified demand. Column (2) conducts
our analysis only for companies that belong to a corporate group, presumably most of
them are multinationals. The results are pretty remarkable. Even though the sample
size drops very substantially (by more than half), the effect remains remarkably similar
and highly significant. Column (3) restricts the sample to firms that have non-industrial
plants in foreign countries. The drop in the sample size is now enormous, yet the effect
remains. The finding is similar in column (4), in which we restrict the sample to firms
that have share holdings in foreign countries.
Column (5) uses another way to make the control group of foreign firms a more
suitable counterfactual for the treatment group of domestic firms by applying inverse
propensity score weights. This type of matching estimator reweights each observation
by its (inverse) propensity score (the “likelihood”that a firm belongs to the treatment
group, i.e. is under Spanish ownership) in order to generate the same distribution
of (observed) characteristics of treatment and control group, and therefore hopefully
also match the unobserved time varying heterogeneity better. We construct propensity
scores based on sales and export status (as these observables seem to be the major
differences between Spanish and foreign owned firms) of all pre-treatment years based
on probit regression of the treatment (i.e. Spanish ownership) on sales and export
status in all years between 2003 and 2007. The predicted values of these regressions,ztreat, are then used to calculate inverse propensity score weights psw  ztreat
1ztreat , which
we use as weights for all firms in the control group in our regression (for more details
on the method, see DiNardo et al. 1996 and Nichols 2007 and Nichols 2008).
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Our results from the inverse propensity score reweighing in column (5) are also
robust to this test. Most of the results are numerically very close to the baseline
specification, suggesting that selection is not a major concern in our analysis.
The last two columns in Table 2.B.9 analyze whether firm size or productivity
differences are driving the results by including interaction terms with ln(sales) and
ln(TFP) besides the interaction term with domestic firms.8 However, both size and
productivity fail to explain the differential drop in investment, the ownership inter-
action remains significant and its magnitude is unchanged in spite of including this
competing explanation.
A separate concern is the extent to which differential exit rates of Spanish and
foreign owned firms could explain these results. Suppose simply that “worse” firms
are exiting. If “worse” firms are those that feature more long term investments, then
we shall see more short term investment and less long term ones in the surviving data.
This seems unlikely a priori, as we tend to think of better firms as the ones doing more
long term investment. In any case, the exit rates among Spanish versus foreign firms
behave very similarly, as Figure 2.A.4 shows: Exit rates are not statistically significantly
different, which in fact suggests that our mechanism is operating: Firms reduce their
long run investments to generate liquidity, and manage to survive another day.
A final concern is the mechanism through which this process takes place. Specifi-
cally, while we postulate in the theory that it takes place through the asset side of the
balance sheet (firms have less access to credit in general and decide to cut long-term
investments), an alternative hypothesis is that it takes place through the liability side:
firms have less access to long-term credit, and therefore cut long-term investment
because otherwise they cannot match the liabilities and investments by debt maturity.
To test this, in Table 2.B.10 we check whether domestic firms suffered a differential
drop in long term credit (as a ratio of total credit) compared to foreign firms, using the
same specification as in Table 2.B.6. However, while Spanish firms suffer from access to
credit in general as shown in Table 2.B.6, there is no differential effect with respect to
long-term credit as opposed to short term credit. So a differential liability matching
does not explain our results.
Firms with Maturing Debt just before the Crisis
An alternative approach to studying the mechanism that does not rely on using na-
tionality of ownership as the driver of credit constraints is to use firms whose debt
is maturing just before the crisis as a treatment group. These firms are likely to be
more severely affected by the credit squeeze as they have to roll over their debt when
the crisis starts. We use short term credit with financial institutions divided by total
credit in 2007, the year before the crisis, as measure for more credit constrained firms
in Table 2.B.11. Column (1) repeats our main specification from before using domestic
8TFP is estimated by the Levinsohn-Petrin method with separate regressions by industry and further-
more includes a correction for both changes in input or output prices (input and output price changes are
asked in the survey).
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firms as treatment. Column (2) uses a dummy variable if this short term credit ratio
is larger than average, and column (3) uses the ratio itself as a continuous measure.
Both columns show a very similar effect than our comparisons of domestic to foreign
firms, and the magnitude is also similar: More credit constrained firms cut long-term
investment relatively more.
Credit Constraints or Demand Shock?
A concern for identification might be that the credit squeeze in Spain went hand in
hand with a recession. Are we picking up the effects of credit constraints as opposed to
a pure demand shock without financial frictions? We do not think so, for the following
reasons. First of all, theoretically we should expect the effects of a demand shock to
go into the opposite direction, which means that our estimates are a lower rather than
an upper bound for estimating credit shocks. Second, our empirical evidence is not
consistent with a purely recession-driven explanation.
To see why in theory demand shocks should decrease short-term rather than long-
term investments, consider that a demand shock means that consumers want to con-
sume less now and save for the future instead. The increased demand for savings
reduces interest rates. Firms will also invest less because demand is lower, but falling
interest rates also reduce the opportunity cost of investment in general. The pres-
ence of the (temporary) demand shock provides a differential effect depending on the
time-to-payoff of the investment: It is optimal to invest more in long-term investment
(which increase output later when the demand shock is over) rather than short-term
investment (which increase output now when demand is low). Overall long-term
investment should fall less than short term investment (or even increase), which is the
opposite of what we find.
We can adjust our model to illustrate this differential effect of a demand shock.
Consider that a demand shock lowers the output in the current period, i.e. the output
of short-term investments, by factor γ   1. The maximization problem becomes:
max
kt,zt
Et rγ f pktq   βλt 1p1  ρq f pztq  qtkt  qtzts (2.4.2)







p1 τt 1q p1  sqp1  ρq f 1pztq

(2.4.3)
with τt 1 as before and s  1γ  1 ¡ 0 acting as a subsidy rather than a tax on
long-term investment. The recession might be longer lived than just one period, but
as long as we expect the recession to end at some point, it will differentially reduce
short-term investment by more.
While this is reassuring, Bernanke (1983) suggests a different way how a recessions
can influence investment behavior: He argues uncertainty increases during a reces-
sion, which decreases investment. If uncertainty about expected returns on long-run
investments increases by more than uncertainty about expected returns on short-run
79
investments, we might expect to see a differential effect in line with our results, i.e. a fall
in long-term investments during the recent recession. Also, some empirical evidence in
the literature points out that certain investment types exhibit a cyclical behavior. For
example, R&D has been found to be pro-cyclical, see Barlevy (2007). However, our
triple differences specifications allow us to include category-year fixed effects (which
is impossible in the simple difference in differences analysis as it is collinear with the
interaction term) to control for recession driven changes in the composition of long
and short term investments, and our results are robust to this inclusion, so we do not
believe a differential impact of the recession on different investment types are driving
the results.
Furthermore, we would not expect to see a differential effect of the crisis on long-
term investments only for more credit constrained firms, unless our measures for credit
constraints (i.e. foreign ownership and share of short-term debt just before the crisis) are
correlated with a larger exposure to the demand shocks. This concern might be true for
our measure of foreign ownership (which might be correlated with export behavior and
therefore differential exposure to other markets), but our matching estimates control for
exporting and size and therefore compare companies with similar exposure to demand
shocks. Our measure of short term credit is driven by debt maturity which seems
unlikely to be correlated with different exposure to demand shocks. In any case, a
negative demand shock should be reflected in the output of the firms. So in Table 2.B.12
we compare the output of credit constrained firms to the output of unconstrained
firms. The results are in line with our claim. Column (1) shows that more credit
constrained firms (panel A measures credit constraints by ownership, panel B by the
share of short term credit) reduce total investment by more than unconstrained firms.
Column (2) reflects our earlier results and shows that credit constrained firms reduce
long term investments by even more (using the share of the two investment types with
the highest durability, machinery and furniture) in total investment as measure of long
term investment - a cruder measure as the one we used before). However, there is
no differential impact on sales: Column (3) uses the log of total sales as dependent
variable, which has a very small and statistically insignificant coefficient. There is also
no differential effect on exports in column (4) or the propensity to export in column
(5). There is also no sign of a differential creditworthiness or quality of the firms, as
both pay the same credit cost, as shown in column (6).9 There is also no significant
difference in the underlying quality of firms, as measured by TFP in column (7).
All this together we read as evidence that our empirical specifications are indeed
measuring the effect of credit constraints, as opposed to demand shocks.
2.5 Conclusions
We have shown how to measure the extent of a credit crunch by analyzing changes in
the composition of investment within firms. Intuitively, the extent to which firms are
9Note that the magnitude of the coefficients are very small; e.g. the coefficient of 0.096 would mean
that Spanish firms after the crisis pay 0.09% higher credit cost, but it is insignificant.
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altering the composition of investment away from longer time-to-payoff towards more
immediate payoff is a measure of the risk that the firms perceive of facing liquidation
due to lack of access to cash over the relevant period. In this sense, our measure
of the credit crunch yields a clearly identified economic parameter which is readily
interpretable: the credit shock is equivalent to a 11% additional tax on the investment
with the longest payoff horizon.
We have tested the hypothesis underlying our methodology by conducting a wide
range of robustness and alternative specification tests. Our results have proven re-
markably resilient to quite demanding alternatives, such as including firm size times
investment duration, category year fixed effects, etc. in addition to the firm times
year fixed effects which we include already in the baseline specification. We have also
studied the linkage we proposed by analyzing whether the effects are particularly
strong for firms that are a priori expected to suffer stronger from the credit crunch:
domestic firms, and firms with more maturing debt. Indeed, the effects are stronger for
these sets of firms.
Our results suggest that the breakdown of the single European capital market is
likely to have long term effects on Spanish firms. Spanish firms which are affected by
the credit squeeze cut investments with a medium to long term payoff, such as R&D,
innovation and capital investment, by more than investment with a short-term payoff
such as advertising. Credit constraints force Spanish firms to eat up their future and
act as if only the immediate future, tomorrow, mattered. This is likely to have a long
term impact on the Spanish economy, impeding recovery after the financial crisis, and
reducing long-term economic growth.
Methodologically, our analysis yields estimates of the impact of the crunch that can
serve as input for other models. The analysis can be easily extended to other locations,
crises and other capital choices, for example by comparing changes in the ratio of used
versus new capital equipment, which are induced by the financial crisis to measure the
cost of the crunch.
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2.A Figures
Notes: This figure shows the coefficients of the regression in column (1) in Table 2.B.5
over time.
Figure 2.A.1: Change in composition of investment towards short term investments
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Notes: This figure shows the coefficients of the regressions in columns (3)
and (4) in Table 2.B.7 over time.
Figure 2.A.2: Investment change of long term investments by nationality of firm owner
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Notes: Darker lines depict investment types with a longer time-to-payoff, for which
we would expect a larger drop.
Figure 2.A.3: Investment change by investment type, triple diff
Note: The solid line shows the exit rate (firms that went bankrupt over active firms)
separately for foreign and domestic firms. The dashed lines show the 95% confidence
interval of the rates.
Figure 2.A.4: Exit rates by domestic and foreign firms
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2.B Tables
Table 2.B.1: Depreciation rates of different investment types






 Landes/Rosenfield (1994): >50% for most 
industries; up to 100% for some industries 
 Corrado/Hulten/Sichel (2009) conclude on 60% 
from literature review, with some studies having 
larger and smaller depreciation rates (lower 
bound: Ayanian (1938) with 7 years) 
60% 1 
Software/IT  Corrado/Hulten/Sichel (2009): 33% for own-
account software based on BEA (1994) 
 Tamai/Torimitsu (1992): 9 year average 
lifespan, ranging from 2 to 20 years 
 Spain accounting rules: 26% (IT equipment and 
software) 
30% 2 
R&D   Corrado/Hulten/Sichel (2009): 20% based on 
literature review 
 Pakes/Schankerman (1984): 25% based on 5 
European countries 
 Pakes/Schankerman (1986): 11-12% for 
Germany, 17-26% for UK, 11% for France 
 Nadiri/Prucha (1996): 12%  
 Bernstein/Mamuneas (2006): 18%-29% for 
different US industries  
20% 3 
Vehicles  Spain accounting rules: 16%  16% 4 
Machinery  Spain accounting rules: 12% 




 Spain accounting rules: 10% 
 BEA accounting rules: 11.79% 
10% 6 
Buildings  Spain accounting rules: 3% 
 BEA: 2-3% (industrial and office buildings) 
n/a* n/a* 
Land   Spain accounting rules: depends on land prices 
 BEA: depends on land prices 
n/a* n/a* 
 
Notes: Spanish accounting rules are given in Table 2, “Tabla simplificada” of
http://www.individual.efl.es/ActumPublic/ActumG/MementoDoc/MF2012_Coeficientes% 20an-
uales%20de%20amortizacion_Anexos.pdf
* As the real estate crisis coincided with the credit crunch and resulted in large price drops in rest estate
(e.g. of up to 90% in land), we have chosen conservatively not to include this in our analysis, see the text.
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Table 2.B.2: Summary statistics
Mean
(Standard error)
Before crisis After crisis Change
(2003-2007) (2008-2010) Change in %
Investment categories, mn EUR
(ordered by depreciation rate)
Advertising 150.99 118.78 -32.21** 21.3%**
(9.86) (12.79)
IT 6.20 3.86 -2.34** -37.7%**
(0.52) (0.53)
R&D 1.12 1.05 -0.07 -6.3%
(0.13) (0.16)
Vehicles 4.20 6.10 1.90 45.2%
(0.60) (2.33)
Machinery 198.57 141.78 -56.79*** -28.6%***
(13.86) (13.50)
Furniture and office equipment 37.73 33.98 -3.75 -9.9%
(4.70) (5.35)
Buildings 40.18 23.17 -17.01*** -42.3%***
(4.71) (2.42)
Land 7.47 5.57 -1.90 -25.4%
(0.75) (1.29)
Credit
Credit ratio (total credit/ 0.57 0.54 -0.03*** -4.4%***
total assets) (0.00) (0.00)
Credit cost*, % 4.06 4.28 0.22*** 5.4%***
(0.02) (0.03)
* Total cost of a credit (including interest rates, but also other fees) as a percentage of obtained credit.
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Table 2.B.3: Main results
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: (1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(investment value)
(1/depreciation rate)* -0.012** -0.012** -0.020*** -0.072***
after 2008 dummy (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.016)
After 2008 dummy -0.170***
(0.031)
Observations 43,900 43,900 43,900 88,331
Partial R-squared 0.710 0.711 0.582 0.153
Category FEs YES YES YES YES
Firm FEs YES YES
Year FEs YES
Firm*year FEs YES YES
Including 0’s YES
Notes: The dependent variable is log of investment of firm i in year t in investment category c, where investment
categories include 6 investment types: advertising, IT, R&D, vehicles, machinery, and furniture & office equipment.
The main regressor is an interaction term of the inverse of the depreciation rate (a measure for time-to-payoff) of a
investment category as a measure of the time-to-payoff of an investment type as given by Table 1 and a time dummy
variable that indicates the financial crisis (=1 in and after 2008). All standard errors are clustered at the firm level,
allowing for autocorrelation across time and across investment categories within the firm. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1. Observations are between 2003 and 2010. Column (4) codes the 0 euro observations as 1 euro in order to use
the 0s as well, and shows our estimates are conservative without the 0s.
Table 2.B.4: Robustness checks: different measures for time-to-payoff
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(investment value)
(Time-to-payoff measure)* -0.020*** -0.028*** -0.062*** -0.089*** -0.097*** 0.264***
after 2008 dummy (0.006) (0.008) (0.014) (0.022) (0.022) (0.089)
Observations 43,900 43,900 43,900 43,900 43,900 43,900
R-squared 0.582 0.582 0.582 0.582 0.582 0.582
Notes: This table replicates the final specification in the previous table, but uses different measures for time-to-payoff
(larger the more long-term an investment) across columns:
(1) 1/depreciation rate; as before
(2) Rank of investment type according to depreciation rate (higher rank for more long term investments)
(3) 4 categories: short term (advertising; value 1), short/mid term (R&D, IT; value 2), long/mid term (vehicles; value
3), long term (machinery, furniture; value 4)
(4) 3 categories: short term (advertising; value 1), mid term (R&D, IT; value 2), long term (vehicles, machinery, furni-
ture; value 3)
(5) 3 categories: short term (advertising; value 1), mid term (R&D, IT, vehicles; value 2), long term (machinery, furni-
ture; value 3)
(6) Depreciation rate (note that the sign reverses, as a higher depreciation rate means a shorter time-to-payoff)
All columns include a full set of firm*year fixed effects to capture any demand specific effects driven by the crisis, as
well as category fixed effects. All standard errors are clustered at the firm level, allowing for autocorrelation across
time and across investment categories within the firm. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Observations are between 2003
and 2010.
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Table 2.B.5: Placebo tests: treatment effect by year
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ln(investment value)
(year==2004)* -0.003 -0.005 -0.016 -0.021 -0.035
(Time-to-payoff measure) (0.008) (0.010) (0.019) (0.028) (0.030)
(year==2005)* -0.003 -0.006 -0.019 -0.013 -0.047
(Time-to-payoff measure) (0.009) (0.011) (0.021) (0.032) (0.034)
(year==2006)* 0.005 0.006 0.004 0.010 -0.007
(Time-to-payoff measure) (0.009) (0.012) (0.023) (0.034) (0.036)
(year==2007)* 0.004 0.005 -0.003 -0.009 -0.025
(Time-to-payoff measure) (0.009) (0.012) (0.023) (0.035) (0.036)
(year==2008)* -0.003 -0.004 -0.021 -0.034 -0.060
(Time-to-payoff measure) (0.010) (0.013) (0.024) (0.036) (0.038)
(year==2009)* -0.026** -0.037*** -0.088*** -0.123*** -0.149***
(Time-to-payoff measure) (0.010) (0.013) (0.025) (0.038) (0.040)
(year==2010)* -0.032*** -0.046*** -0.101*** -0.134*** -0.161***
(Time-to-payoff measure) (0.010) (0.014) (0.025) (0.039) (0.040)
Observations 43,900 43,900 43,900 43,900 43,900
R-squared 0.583 0.583 0.583 0.583 0.583
F tests on equality
of coefficients:
F-stat 2007=2008 0.752 0.751 0.888 0.752 1.476
p-val 0.386 0.386 0.346 0.386 0.224
F-stat 2007=2009 11.46 12.85 15.10 11.72 13.10
p-val 0.001 0 0 0.001 0
F-stat 2007=2010 15.86 17.86 18.99 13.34 14.80
p-val 0 0 0 0 0
Notes: This table replicates the specifications of Table 4, i.e. each column uses a different measure for time-to-payoff,
with the exception that it allows the interaction term to vary in each year. All columns include a full set of firm*year
fixed effects to capture any demand specific effects driven by the crisis, as well as category fixed effects. All standard
errors are clustered at the firm level, allowing for autocorrelation across time and across investment categories within
the firm. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Observations are between 2003 and 2010.
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Table 2.B.6: Mechanism: Credit squeeze
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Credit ratio (between 0 and 1)
Dummy if after crisis -0.015*** -0.016*** 0.006
(year>=2008) (0.004) (0.004) (0.010)
Interaction term (Spanish firms) * -0.025*** -0.025*** -0.035***
(after 2008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
ln(industry exports to EU) 0.021 0.024 0.058
(0.037) (0.037) (0.040)
ln(industry exports to World) -0.009 -0.013 -0.056
(0.037) (0.037) (0.041)
ln(industry output) 0.013 0.014 0.005
(0.013) (0.013) (0.015)
Observations 13,915 13,915 13,897 13,897 13,897
Partial R-squared 0.004 0.005 0.007 0.002 0.003
Number of firms 2,650 2,650 2,650 2,650 2,650
Firm FEs YES YES YES YES YES
Year FEs YES
Ind*year FEs YES
Notes: This table shows that the financial crisis in 2008 triggered a credit squeeze, which especially affected Spanish
owned firms. The dependent variable is credit ratio (total credit divided by total assets, ratio between 0 and 1). The
main regressors are a dummy variable that indicates the financial crisis (=1 in and after 2008), and an interaction
term of a Spanish ownership dummy (defined by <=50% foreign ownership in same year) and the crisis dummy
variable. All columns include firm fixed effects. Columns (2)-(4) also control for industry specific demand variables
(Spanish exports to EU, Spanish exports to the World, domestic value added per industry) to capture industry specific
demand shocks of the recession driven by the financial crisis. Export data is from the WITS database provided by the
Worldbank, and Spanish value added per industry is from National Accounts data provided by the Spanish National
Institute of Statistics (INE). Column (4) includes year fixed effects to capture common time effects (the crisis dummy
is absorbed by these fixed effects and therefore omitted). Column (5) includes a full set of industry*year specific fixed
effects to capture any demand specific effects driven by the crisis (our industry controls are absorbed by these fixed
effects and therefore omitted). All standard errors are two-way clustered at the firm and industry*year level. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Observations are between 2003 and 2010.
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Table 2.B.7: Foreign versus domestic firms
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: (1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(investment value) (domestic only) (foreign only) (domestic only) (foreign only)
Long term investment* -0.029*** 0.018
after 2008 dummy (0.006) (0.014)
(year==2004)* -0.004 -0.002
Long term investment (0.009) (0.015)
(year==2005)* -0.009 0.009
Long term investment (0.010) (0.018)
(year==2006)* 0.002 0.005
Long term investment (0.010) (0.020)
(year==2007)* 0.003 -0.003
Long term investment (0.010) (0.021)
(year==2008)* -0.016 0.045**
Long term investment (0.011) (0.022)
(year==2009)* -0.035*** 0.006
Long term investment (0.011) (0.023)
(year==2010)* -0.043*** 0.005
Long term investment (0.011) (0.024)
Observations 35,346 8,479 35,346 8,479
R-squared 0.566 0.661 0.566 0.661
Sample domestic firms foreign firms domestic firms foreign firms
F tests on equality
of coefficients:
F-stat 2007=2008 4.719 7.697
p-val 2008 0.030 0.006
F-stat 2007=2009 15.25 0.213
p-val 2009 0 0.644
F-stat 2007=2010 20.51 0.153
p-val 2010 0 0.696
Notes: This table conducts our preferred specification separately for domestic firms (<50% foreign owned) and for-
eign firms (>50% foreign owned). Columns (1) and (2) pool the effect across post crisis years, columns (3) and (4)
show the effect evolving over time. All columns include a full set of firm*year fixed effects to capture any demand
specific effects driven by the crisis, as well as category fixed effects. All standard errors are clustered at the firm level,
allowing for autocorrelation across time and across investment categories within the firm. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1. Observations are between 2003 and 2010.
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Table 2.B.8: Difference-in-difference-in-differences
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: (1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(investment value)
(Time-to-payoff measure)* -0.020* 0.020
(after 2008 dummy) (0.012) (0.019)
(Time-to-payoff measure)* -0.049*** -0.052*** -0.152***
(after 2008 dummy)*(domestic firm dummy) (0.019) (0.020) (0.058)
(Time-to-payoff measure)* 0.033** 0.034** -0.314***
(domestic firm dummy) (0.017) (0.017) (0.048)
Observations 41,550 41,475 41,475 88,223
R-squared 0.582 0.583 0.585 0.005
Firm*year FEs YES YES YES YES
Category FEs YES YES
Category*year FEs YES YES
Including 0’s YES
Notes: This table implements a triple difference estimation using the interaction of time-to-payoff (here measured by
the inverse of the depreciation rate), after crisis dummy (=1 in 2008 and after) and a domestic firm dummy (defined
by <=50% foreign ownership in the same year). Note that the domestic firm dummy variable is not time invariant, as
it changes with ownership changes. However, there are very few of those in the data, and they are not driving our
results. All standard errors are two-way clustered at the firm and industry*year level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Observations are between 2003 and 2010. Column (4) codes the 0 euro observations as 1 euro in order to use the 0s as
well, and shows our estimates are conservative without including the 0s.
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Table 2.B.9: Robustness checks foreign versus domestic firms
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
ln(investment value)
(Time-to-payoff measure)* 0.034** 0.031* 0.005 0.003 0.063 0.007 0.008
(domestic firm dummy) (0.017) (0.017) (0.041) (0.023) (0.038) (0.015) (0.016)
(Time-to-payoff measure)* (after 2008 -0.052*** -0.049*** -0.066* -0.061** -0.074* -0.045*** -0.042**
dummy)*(domestic firm dummy) (0.020) (0.019) (0.039) (0.024) (0.039) (0.018) (0.018)
(Time-to-payoff measure)* -0.013***
ln(sales) (0.004)




(Time-to-payoff measure) * (after 2008 0.001
dummy)*ln(TFP) (0.007)
Observations 41,475 22,909 3,181 11,318 23,965 41,475 38,791
Partial R-squared 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.003 0.002
Number of firmyr 11,028 5,731 710 2,584 6,302 11,028 10,300
Firm*year FEs YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Category*year FEs YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: This table implements a triple difference estimation using the interaction of time-to-payoff (here measured by
the inverse of the depreciation rate), after crisis dummy (=1 in 2008 and after) and a domestic firm dummy (defined
by <=50% foreign ownership in the same year). The regressions in the columns are as follows:
(1) Baseline, all companies
(2) Only firms that belong to a corporate group
(3) Only firms that have foreign non-industrial plants
(4) Only firms that have foreign shareholdings
(5) Inverse propensity score reweighting based on sales and exports in all the years between 2003 and 2007 (before
crisis years)
(6) Uses the baseline specification, but adds another interaction term with size as measured by ln(sales)
(7) Uses the baseline specification, but adds another interaction term with size as measured by ln(TFP); with produc-
tivity estimation by industry with Levinsohn-Petrin method, corrected for input and output price changes
All standard errors are two-way clustered at the firm and industry*year level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Observa-
tions are between 2003 and 2010.
92
Table 2.B.10: Liabilities by maturity
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Long term credit/total credit (between 0 and 1)
Dummy if after crisis (year>=2008) 0.051*** 0.050*** 0.050***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.011)
Interaction term (Spanish firms) * 0.000 0.001 0.000
(after 2008) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013)
ln(industry exports to EU) -0.071 -0.073 -0.042
(0.046) (0.046) (0.044)
ln(industry exports to World) 0.060 0.061 0.037
(0.045) (0.045) (0.047)
ln(industry output) -0.050*** -0.050*** -0.029
(0.018) (0.018) (0.020)
Observations 14,410 14,410 14,392 14,392 14,392
Partial R-squared 0.029 0.032 0.033 0.002 0.001
Number of firmid 2,707 2,707 2,707 2,707 2,707
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES
Ind*Year FE YES
Notes: The dependent variable is long term credit divided by total credit (ratio between 0 and 1). The main regressors
are a dummy variable that indicates the financial crisis (=1 in and after 2008), and an interaction term of a Spanish
ownership dummy (defined by <=50% foreign ownership in same year) and the crisis dummy variable. All columns
include firm fixed effects. Columns (2)-(4) also control for industry specific demand variables (Spanish exports to
EU, Spanish exports to the World, domestic value added per industry) to capture industry specific demand shocks
of the recession driven by the financial crisis. Export data is from the WITS database provided by the Worldbank,
and Spanish value added per industry is from National Accounts data provided by the Spanish National Institute of
Statistics (INE). Column (4) includes year fixed effects to capture common time effects (the crisis dummy is absorbed
by these fixed effects and therefore omitted). Column (5) includes a full set of industry*year specific fixed effects to
capture any demand specific effects driven by the crisis (our industry controls are absorbed by these fixed effects and
therefore omitted). All standard errors are two-way clustered at the firm and industry*year level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1. Observations are between 2003 and 2010.
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Table 2.B.11: Short term credit before crisis
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: (1) (2) (3)
ln(investment value)
(Time-to-payoff measure)* -0.052*** -0.042*** -0.086***
(after 2008 dummy)*(treatment) (0.020) (0.011) (0.027)
(Time-to-payoff measure)* 0.034** 0.020* 0.019
(treatment) (0.017) (0.011) (0.029)
Observations 41,475 36,135 36,135
R-squared 0.585 0.584
Firm*year FEs YES YES YES
Category*year FEs YES YES YES
Notes: This table implements a triple difference estimation using the interaction of time-to-payoff (here measured
by the inverse of the depreciation rate), after crisis dummy (=1 in 2008 and after) and a treatment variable. This
specification is equivalent to the triple difference estimation conducted in column (3) in Table 8. Column (1) uses
domestic firms as treatment variable as in our baseline specification. Column (2) uses a dummy variable if short term
credit with financial institutions/total credit is larger than average in 2007. Column (3) uses the ratio of short term
credit with financial institutions/total credit in 2007 as treatment variable. All standard errors are two-way clustered





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The roles of import competition and
export opportunities for technical
change
A variety of empirical and theoretical trade papers have suggested and documented a
positive impact of trade on the productivity of firms. However, there is less consensus
about the underlying mechanism at work. While trade theory focuses on a market
access mechanism, other papers point out that import competition also matters. This
paper conducts a “horse race” between export opportunities and import competition,
focusing on the heterogeneity in firm responses. Using Spanish firm level data, instru-
menting for exports and imports with tariff changes, and applying quantile regressions
to account for selection, I find robust evidence that access to export markets leads to
productivity increases, but only for firms that were already highly productive before.
The evidence on import competition is weaker, with possibly some initially low-tech
firms managing to increase their productivity in response to increased competition
from abroad, but responses are very heterogeneous. Productivity upgrades are driven
by increased R&D, patenting, product innovation, and the adaptation of certain tech-
nologies like CAD. There is no evidence that either mechanism leads to increased




A variety of empirical and theoretical trade papers have established a positive impact
of trade on the productivity of firms (e.g. Bustos 2011; Pavcnik 2002; Bloom et al.
2011). However, there is less clarity about the underlying mechanism at work. Trade
theory focuses almost exclusively on a market access mechanism, i.e. the opportunity to
access new export markets increases firms’ revenues and makes productivity enhancing
investments more profitable. On the other hand, empirical and theoretical papers in
industrial organization point out that increased (import) competition induces firms to
increase their productivity. This paper wants to disentangle the potential productivity
enhancing effects of import competition and access to export markets.
There are several reasons why it is important to distinguish between the “import
competition” and the “export opportunities” mechanism: First, it is plausible to think
that each mechanism affects a different type of firm. For example, the market access
mechanism is only relevant for firms that are eventually able to export, or at least
think they might have the capacity to do so. It is widely known in the trade literature
that these are typically only the most productive firms in an industry. There is less
consensus about which firms might be induced by import competition to upgrade their
productivity. On one hand, import competition could be more relevant for firms with
low profits, which are close to the border of bankruptcy and want to avoid exit. On
the other hand, import competition could discourage already unproductive firms from
trying harder, whereas already productive firms might be induced to innovate in order
to escape competition. Second, each mechanism might have a different implication
on employment. Larger export markets give firms the opportunity to expand, while
increasing competition might force firms to contract.
This paper picks up the focus on firm heterogeneity prevalent in the trade litera-
ture since Melitz (2003) by highlighting the heterogeneous response of firms to trade
shocks, more specifically the response by initial level of productivity. Furthermore,
this paper also sheds some light on the way how firms are increasing their produc-
tivity, by exploiting a rich Spanish data set on a number of productivity enhancing
measures. Summarizing, this paper attempts to answer the following questions: Do
import competition and/or access to export opportunities induce firms to increase their
productivity? Is there a heterogeneity in the productivity response? And finally, how
do firms achieve productivity increases?
Several trade theory papers show that firms could be induced by export opportuni-
ties to update their productivity (e.g. Melitz and Costantini 2007; Bustos 2011; Atkeson
and Burstein 2010). In standard trade models with CES preferences markups are con-
stant and unaffected by import competition. With variable markups as in Melitz and
Ottaviano (2008), import competition decreases the incentive to innovate as profits fall.
However, there are a variety of (not necessarily trade) models that predict an increase in
innovation resulting from competition, for example relying on trapped factors (Bloom
et al. 2013), non-profit maximizing managers and X-inefficiency (Aghion et al. 1999;
Horn et al. 1995), a differential impact of competition on post- and pre-innovation rents
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(Aghion et al. 2005), or imitation based on a search model (Waugh et al. 2014). So, in
theory both export opportunities and import competition could lead to productivity
upgrades of firms.
The vast majority of empirical papers in this area focus on either the (import)
competition mechanism or the access to export market mechanism. Several papers in
empirical IO have shown that increased competition (from either domestic or foreign
entrants) increase the productivity of incumbent firms (e.g. Aghion et al. 2009; Blundell
et al. 1995; Bloom et al. 2011; Tybout 2004; also Aghion et al. 2014 in a lab experiment).
On the other hand, papers in empirical trade have shown that exporting leads to
increased productivity (e.g. Lileeva and Trefler 2010; De Loecker 2007).
However, increased export opportunities often coincide with increased competition
from abroad, as many trade liberalization episodes are bilateral and increase trade in
both directions (even within narrowly defined industries). Regressions focusing on
either the import or the export side omit an important variable, and might be picking
up the productivity effect coming from the other mechanism. This paper avoids this
problem and distinguishes empirically between the import competition and export
access effect. Only a few papers focus on the response of productivity to both increased
imports and exports. Pavcnik (2002) finds productivity increases among incumbents
in import-competing industries but not in exporting industries, but does not allow
for both forces to affect different firms within the same industry. In contrast, Trefler
(2004) incorporates both import and export tariffs of the US and Canada and finds in
firm level regressions that only the export effect is a significant driver of productivity
increases, but he is not able to control for a selection effect.
The literature also suggests heterogeneity in productivity responses for both export
access and import competition. For example, Aghion et al. (2005) provide evidence that
competition discourages firms with initially lower productivity from innovating but
encourages already productive firms to innovate more in order to escape competition.
In contrast, Waugh et al. (2014) show in a theory model that firms at the lower end of
the productivity distribution are more incentivized by import competition to update
productivity because they can gain more, but they do not provide empirical evidence
for this mechanism. Bustos (2011) and Lileeva and Trefler (2010) show that mostly
large firms increase productivity as response to export access. This paper allows for
heterogeneous responses to both the export access and import competition mechanism.
The main empirical specification in this paper is a regression of productivity on
both imports and exports of an industry as measures for import competition and export
opportunities to address the omitted variables bias, and interactions of those measures
with a firm’s initial productivity to allow for heterogeneous responses. I estimate
this regression in first differences to take out firm specific, time-invariant factors, and
add firm level fixed effect and year fixed effects to consider only deviations from firm
specific growth rates. Both import and export changes are then instrumented with
changes in domestic and foreign trade tariffs to address any remaining endogeneity
issue.
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The Spanish data set allows me to use firm specific input and output price changes
to obtain a measure of total factor productivity that is not driven by changes in markups.
In robustness checks I show that import competition is not picking up the effect of better
access to imported inputs, and that firms which increase their productivity because
they are exposed to export opportunities increase their exports at the extensive and
intensive margin, but not their output prices.
Empirical papers focusing on import competition face yet another problem, as they
might falsely pick up an effect on productivity, because firms that are hit very hard by a
negative productivity shock exit the sample. Without correcting for this selection effect,
the effect of trade on productivity might be overestimated. I propose a simple fix to
this problem using quantile instead of mean regressions. If exiting firms are assumed
to have been hit by very low productivity shocks, and there are not too many of them,
the median effect on productivity will be unaffected by exits, while the mean effect is
biased.
A final contribution of this paper lies in shedding light on the way how firms
increase their productivity. Most empirical papers focus on labor productivity or total
factor productivity, exceptions are Bloom et al. (2011) who include patents, IT spending
and R&D spending for subsets of their data, and Bustos (2011) who distinguishes
between process and product innovation. The rich Spanish firm level data used in this
paper includes most of these variables such as R&D investment, patenting, product
innovation, but also other variables such as adaptation of foreign technologies or
implementation of other technologies (e.g. computer-aided design CAD).
The results suggest that empirical papers focusing on import competition pick up
the effect of access to export markets by omitting this variable. There is robust evidence
that access to export markets leads to productivity increases, but only for firms that
were already highly productive to begin with. The evidence on import competition is
weaker and heterogeneous, with possibly some initially low-tech firms managing to
upgrade their productivity in response to increased competition from abroad.
Productivity upgrades are driven by increased R&D, patenting, and product inno-
vation, and the adaptation of certain technologies like CAD. There is no evidence that
either mechanism leads to increased full time employment, instead full time workers
seem to be replaced by part-time or temporary workers.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 3.2 contains a descrip-
tion of the used Spanish firm level data of manufacturing firms that allows for TFP
estimation and the analysis of firm exits, and provides a rich set of outcome variables.
Section 3.3 provides an overview of Spain’s trade flows, which have grown strongly
over the observed 15 years. Section 3.4 describes the empirical strategy and section 3.5
discusses and interprets the empirical results. Section 3.6 concludes.
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3.2 Description of Data
This paper uses panel data from a Spanish survey of manufacturing firms (ESEE;
Encuesta Sobre Estrategias Empresariales), that is collected by the Fundación SEPI, a
foundation affiliated with the Spanish Ministry of Finance and Public Administration.1
The survey is designed to cover a representative sample of Spanish Manufacturing
firms and includes around 1,800 firms per year. Participation of firms with more than
200 employees is required, while firms with more than 10 but less than 200 employees
are sampled via a stratified sampling approach. SEPI makes a great effort to replace
non-responding and exiting firms to ensure the continuing representativeness of the
sample, leading to a total number of around 4,000 observed firms between 1993 and
2007.
The most distinctive feature of this data set is the very rich information it provides
on several important dimensions: Detailed capital stock and investment needed for TFP
estimation; input and output price changes to distinguish TFP changes from markup
changes; information on exits (distinct from non-response) and entry to deal with
selection; and a wide variety of productivity related activities such as R&D, patenting,
and the adaptation of certain technologies (e.g. use of robots, computer aided design,
flexible manufacturing systems).
Total factor productivity. We need detailed data on capital stock, output, employ-
ment and intermediate inputs to estimate TFP at the firm level. In many firm level
data sets capital stock is not available and must be reconstructed using investment data
(often using only average depreciation rates). The problem of a missing initial capital
stock is only negligible if data over a long period of time is available and initial capital
stock is depreciated for much of the observed sample period. Fortunately, the Spanish
data set provides both gross and net capital stock together with firm level depreciation
and investment, which allows a precise construction of the capital stock at any point in
time.
Estimation of total factor productivity with OLS suffers from several problems: Em-
ployment and capital choices are endogenous, and TFP cannot easily be distinguished
from markup changes (Beveren 2012). I use the well-established Levinsohn-Petrin pro-
cedure to deal with the endogeneity problem, which uses intermediate inputs to control
for unobserved expected productivity changes. This is preferable to the Olley-Pakes
method which uses investment as control, because investment is often reported as zero,
which casts doubt on the validity of the assumed monotonicity condition requiring
that investment is strictly increasing in unobserved productivity. The monotonicity
condition is more likely to be satisfied for intermediate inputs, as firms usually report
positive numbers.
Beveren (2012) points out that policy evaluations are usually robust to the TFP
estimation method, with one exception: It is necessary to control for input and output
prices (Loecker 2011). Luckily, the Spanish firm level survey provides a remedy to this
omitted price bias as it also asks for input and output prices. Firms are asked by how
1For more information see http://www.fundacionsepi.es/esee/sp/spresentacion.asp
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much % the sales price of its products and the purchasing price of its intermediate
inputs and services has changed compared to the previous year. The price changes are a
weighted average across final products and markets (for output prices), and a weighted
average across intermediate inputs, energy consumption and purchased services (for
input prices), which I use to deflate output and intermediate inputs at the firm level
(instead of usually used industry-wide deflators).
The results in this paper are robust to using different productivity measures such as
labor productivity and simple TFP fixed effects estimation.
Other productivity related activities. In order to understand what firms do in
order to increase productivity, I use a variety of productivity related activities such as
R&D expenditure, number of filed patents, and product innovation. Every four years
the survey contains additional questions about the use of specific technologies. These
technologies are the use of robots, computer aided design (CAD), flexible manufactur-
ing systems, and whether firms make an effort to assimilate foreign technologies.
Trade and tariff data. This paper exploits the variation in industry-specific imports
and exports over time. I merge the firm-level data with industry level trade data from
COMTRADE using the NACECLIO industry classification of firms (20 NACECLIO
categories2). Section 3.3 provides an overview of Spain’s imports and exports over time
and by industry. I use the tariffs that the EU imposes on imports from the rest of the
world (“import tariffs”) and tariffs that other countries impose on imports from the
EU (“export tariffs”) as instrumental variable for trade flows. All trade and tariff data
used in the analysis is from COMTRADE (provided by UNSD) and TRAINS (provided
by UNCTAD); all data sets are accessed via the WITS software provided by the World
Bank.3
3.3 Trade Growth in Spain
This paper uses import and export growth in Spain between 1993 and 2007 as source
of variation in access to export markets and import competition. Trade has grown
substantially over this time period. Figure 3.A.1 shows that Spain’s world exports in
2007 (171 bn EUR) were almost four times larger than in 1993 (45 bn EUR). Spain’s
world imports grew even stronger, from 60 bn EUR in 1993 to 265 bn EUR in 2007.
The trade growth was not entirely linear (neither in levels nor in logs): It increased
strongly in the 90’s, slowed down in the early 2000’s, and picked up again around 2003
(especially imports). Spain incurred a trade deficit from goods trade in every single
year over the observed time period. The trade deficit increased from around 2% of
GDP to a staggering 10% of GDP at the end of the sample period.
Most of Spain’s trade is with the European Union: In 2007, 73% of Spain’s exports
2The 20 industries are: Meat related products; Food and tobacco; Beverage; Textiles and clothing;
Leather, fur and footwear; Timber; Paper; Printing and publishing; Chemicals; Plastic and rubber products;
Nonmetal mineral products; Basic metal products; Fabricated metal products; Industrial and agricultural
equipment; Office machinery, data processing, precision instruments and similar; Electric materials and
accessories; Vehicles and accessories; Other transportation materials; Furniture; Miscellaneous.
3http://wits.worldbank.org/wits/
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went to EU25 countries, compared to 60% of imports. Figure 3.A.2 graphs Spain’s
trade with its most important trading partners over time. A large share of exports are
destined for Spain’s neighboring countries in Europe: France, Germany, Italy, Portugal
and Great Britain. Among those, exports to France have increased the most over the
sample period. Most of Spain’s imports are also coming from EU countries: Germany
has the largest import share, followed by France and Italy. However, imports from
China have been skyrocketing: China’s share in Spain’s imports has increased from
2% in 1993 to 6% in 2007. Table 3.B.1 shows that the rise of China is most prevalent in
certain industries like leather/fur/footwear, textiles/clothing, and nonmetal mineral
products.
Table 3.B.2 lists the top 3 export destinations by industry. Portugal has become a
prominent destination for computer products and electronics; printing and publishing;
leather, fur and footwear; and nonmetal mineral products. But also United Kingdom
and the United States have increasingly become the destination for Spain’s exports.
Overall, the distribution of trade across industries has remained fairly stable over
time. Figure 3.A.3 shows that the most important export and import industry is vehicles
and accessories, covering a quarter of exports and one fifth of imports. Second is the
Chemicals sector, followed by industrial and agricultural equipment. The food industry
ranks fourth among Spanish exports. The dominant industries have only become more
dominant over time.
Researchers have attributed the increased trade with EU countries to European
integration such as the introduction of the euro, the European Single Market, and the
European Monetary Union (e.g. Berger and Nitsch 2008; Bergin and Lin 2012; Brouwer
et al. 2008). Another important trade liberalization episode that occurred during the
sample period was China’s accession to the WTO in 2001, which was accompanied by
a fall of tariff and non-tariff barriers between China and the European Union, among
others, and led to increased trade with China (e.g. Bloom et al. 2011).
3.4 Empirical Strategy
Import competition versus export opportunities. How do access to export markets
(“export opportunities”) and competition from foreign firms (“import competition”)
affect firm productivity? In order to test this, I estimate the following firm-level
equation that relates a firm’s productivity (TFP) to measures of export access (EXP)
and import competition (IMP):
TFPist  β0   β1 IMPst   β3EXPst   yearFE  firmFE  ε ist (3.4.1)
where i indicates the firm, s indicates one of 20 industries (NACECLIO classifica-
tion), and t is year (between 1993 and 2007). The main empirical measure for TFPist is
obtained via Levinsohn-Petrin estimation (using material inputs to control for unob-
served productivity) with an extra adjustment for changes in input and output prices,
as described above.
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Spain’s world imports at the industry level are used as proxy for competition from
foreign firms to domestic firms IMPst (instead of a firm’s actual imports, because firm
imports are inputs and not outputs, but I want to measure import competition at the
level of a firm’s end product). Similarly, access to export markets EXPst is proxied by
Spain’s world exports in industry s and year t (instead of actual firm level exports,
to proxy for potential export opportunities). Year fixed effects control for unobserved
common time trends, and firm level fixed effects control for unobserved, time-invariant
heterogeneity at the firm level. All variables are in logs.
I proceed by estimating this equation in first differences, which controls for unob-
served firm heterogeneity, as the firm level fixed effects cancel out. However, industries
might have both higher productivity growth and higher trade growth for reasons other
than export access or import competition. I add industry fixed effects to avoid using
the cross-sectional variation and exploit the time-variation in trade within industries
instead. In the main specifications I also add firm level fixed effects (which absorb
the industry fixed effects) to control for firm characteristics that affect the productivity
growth rate:
∆TFPist  β1∆IMPst   β3∆EXPst   yearFE  firmFE  νist (3.4.2)
All standard errors are clustered at the industry level, in the spirit of Bertrand et al.
(2004).
Heterogeneous effects. Since Melitz (2003) the trade literature has focused on firm
level heterogeneity, usually with respect to the initial productivity of firms. In models
with heterogeneous firms we do not expect all firms to be affected in the same way by
import competition and export opportunities. For example, import competition might
affect firms with initially lower productivity by more, because the threat of bankruptcy
is stronger for them. On the other hand, firms with already low productivity might be
discouraged by import competition, and only firms with a high enough productivity
level to start with might even try to push the productivity frontier further out to become
productivity leader. Similarly, we should expect a heterogeneous response to a better
access to export markets. For example, the trade literature finds that usually only the
most productive firms export.
In order to test for a heterogeneous response of firms depending on their initial
productivity level I interact changes in import competition and export access with TFP
in the first year of the analysis (in 1993, denoted as TFP93i):
∆TFPist  β1∆IMPst   β2 pTFP93i  ∆IMPstq
 β3∆EXPst   β4 pTFP93i  ∆EXPstq   yearFE  firmFE  ηit (3.4.3)
As robustness check I add industry*year specific fixed effects, which are collinear
with the main effects of import competition and export access, but still allow me to
estimate the sign on the interaction terms, β2 and β4.
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Endogenous trade flows. A potential threat to identification is the endogeneity
of industry level imports and exports. For example, there might be reverse causality:
If firm productivity in a sector is high, this might lead to fewer imports (e.g. due
to Ricardian comparative advantage of Spain) and more exports in that industry.
Industry (or firm) level fixed effects in regression 3.4.1 avoid such cross-sectional
comparisons across industries with different productivity levels and focus on within
industry comparisons. However, even within industries reverse causality might hold
over time: Imports are higher and exports lower when sectoral TFP is lower. Regression
3.4.2 addresses some of this endogeneity concern by using year fixed effects to absorb
common time trends and industry (or firm) level fixed effects to look only at deviations
from the industry (firm) specific TFP growth rate.
If these sets of fixed effects cannot address the endogeneity problem fully, this
would lead us to underestimate the effect of import competition and overestimate
the effect of access to export markets. Many empirical trade papers use exogenous
trade liberalization events and/or tariff reductions to instrument for trade. Very often
trade liberalization episodes lead to a bilateral reduction of tariffs, therefore own tariff
changes are usually highly correlated with tariff changes abroad. I will use the word
“import tariff” to refer to Spain’s tariffs, and “export tariff” to refer to import tariffs that
foreign countries impose on imports from Spain. The high correlation between import
and export tariffs means that using tariff changes as instruments will not solve the
omitted variable bias problem in papers studying the effect of only import competition
or export access, as import tariff changes are not uncorrelated with changes in exports
and vice versa. Any study focusing on the effects of export or imports on firms
needs two instruments, one for exports and one for imports that are not too highly
correlated. Econometrically, with multiple endogenous regressors it is not sufficient for
identification to have a significant first stage for each endogenous regressor, because
each first stage might use the same level of exogenous variation. Instead, the matrix
of first stages needs to be of full rank to ensure identification. The Kleibergen-Paap
statistics (Kleibergen and Paap 2006, implementation in Stata provided by Baum et al.
2010) provides a rank test to check this.
I use the tariffs that the EU imposes on imports from the rest of the world and the
tariffs that other countries impose on imports from the EU as instruments for trade.
More specifically, I use the maximum tariff4 for each product category (ISIC Rev. 3; 244
product categories) and aggregate them to NACECLIO industries using the import
shares of each product within an industry and across countries. Empirically, some tariff
changes are more relevant for trade patterns than others, i.e. some are “binding” and
inhibit trade, whereas other tariff changes do not seem to be as relevant for trade. In
order to use only binding tariff changes which have an impact on trade flows (and
therefore a strong first stage), I multiply the weighted tariffs with an “importance
weight” if tariff changes led to trade changes in the previous period. The lagged
importance weights are given by w  ∆tariff  ∆lnptradeq if w ¡ 0, and 0 otherwise.
4Changes in the maximum tariff were empirically the changes with the most relevant impact on trade.
104
It is not always clear whether tariff changes can be interpreted as exogenous to firms
and industries, as large companies often try to influence policy makers to negotiate
favorable tariffs. However, in the case of Spain tariffs are negotiated at the European
level, and it is less likely that Spanish firms are able to influence European decision
making. Furthermore, many tariff changes are a part of a larger political process, for
example, EU enlargement, or China’s WTO accession, and therefore likely out of control
for specific Spanish firms.
Selection. There is a potential selection bias in the estimation above because some
firms went bankrupt during the sample period. It is plausible to assume that these
firms exit because they have been hit hard by a negative productivity shock. Omitting
these firms from the sample and carrying out the estimation on the surviving firms
which experienced relatively more positive productivity shocks would lead to an
overestimation of the effect on productivity. This problem might be most severe for the
productivity estimation of the firms that have a very low productivity to begin with,
because negative productivity shocks are even more likely to cause bankruptcy for
them.
The threat from selection bias to estimation can be eliminated by estimating the
median instead of the mean effect. Identification of the median will then depend on
an assumption that seems reasonable: Exiting firms are assumed to have been hit
by a very negative productivity shock, resulting in a censored dependent variable.5
Censoring the dependent variable from below a certain point has no effect on the
estimating quantile regressions that are above this point. Therefore, as long as there are
not too many exiting firms, the median effect and other quantiles are still identified. In
our sample there are only between 0.1% and 2.5% exits per year. I pursue a censored
median regression approach as in Powell (1986) by assigning exiting firms the lowest
observed productivity change in the exit year. The median is only identified if censoring
is only on one side of the conditional median. Buchinsky (1994) proposes a estimation
algorithm to ensure this condition. The proposed estimation algorithm (which amounts
to checking that the predicted values for productivity changes for exiting firms are
above the censored values) converges already in the first round in all of my estimations.6
As in the mean regressions I would like to allow for firm and year fixed effects in
the quantile regressions. However, estimating quantile regressions with large number
of fixed effects is tricky. For example, it is not valid to transform variables to deviations
from means, as the conditional quantile function is not linear. Estimating a large
number of fixed effects is computationally very intensive. Furthermore, a large number
of fixed effects increases the variability of other estimates. In order to solve this problem,
5Note that while the data set allows me to distinguish between non responding and exiting firms,
exiting firms include closed firms, firms in liquidation, but also firms that are taken over by other firms.
The last category of firms might not necessarily have been hit by a negative productivity shock, if firms like
to take over only targets that are very productive (“cherry picking”). However, there is also evidence that
take over targets are very unproductive (“lemon grabbing”), because they have a potential of high returns
after a successful turnaround (Gelübcke 2012). In the cherry picking case, I might be underestimating the
true effect on productivity. In any case, note that the number of exiting firms is very small (between 0.1%
and 2.5% per year), and take overs are even rarer, so this should not affect the results very much.
6This approach is also proposed and discussed in Angrist and Pischke (2009), chapter 7.1.1.
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I follow an approach suggested by Koenker (2004) using penalized quantile regression
and sparse linear algebra.7
Besides being robust to selection, quantile regressions are also insightful as to the
heterogeneity in productivity responses to import competition and export access.
Robustness checks. In the remaining part of the paper I perform a variety of ro-
bustness checks. For example, I show that the results are not sensitive to the way of
measuring productivity. I also provide evidence that the import competition mecha-
nism is not capturing an increased access to imported inputs, and that increased export
opportunities indeed lead to larger exports and a higher propensity to exports at the
firm level, without affecting output prices.
Furthermore, I show what type of activities Spanish firms undertake to increase
productivity, by looking at a large number of other variables such as R&D investment,
patenting, product innovation, adaptation of foreign technologies or implementation
of other technologies. Finally, I use employment as a dependent variable to check
whether import competition and export opportunities have any or differing effects on
firm employment.
3.5 Main Empirical Results
Import competition versus export opportunities. Table 3.B.3 conducts a “horse race”
between import competition and access to export markets by estimating equation 3.4.2
to see whether either one affects firm level productivity. Columns (1) and (2) regress
productivity on import competition and export access separately, and both regressions
show a similar sized, significant effect of trade on productivity. However, if including
both measures in column (3), the coefficient on import competition falls and becomes
insignificant, showing that the regression in column (1) suffered from severe omitted
variable bias and captured the joint effect of both imports and exports. As imports
and exports are usually highly correlated, there is a substantial omitted variable bias
in empirical studies focusing only on import competition or export opportunities. A
similar argument holds when comparing columns (2) and (3), but the effect of export
opportunities on productivity remains significant.
Adding industry fixed effects in column (4) and firm fixed effects in column (5)
makes the difference between import competition and export access even more pro-
nounced. Access to export opportunities has a strong and significant positive effect
on firm level productivity. If exports increase by 10%, average firm level productivity
increases by 1.1%. On the other hand, import competition has a much smaller and in-
significant average effect. A regression focusing only on import competition is actually
7Ideally I would like to combine an IV approach with the quantile regression approach described before,
but it is not easy to implement IV quantile regression with more than one endogenous regressors and a
large number of fixed effects. Since the OLS and IV mean estimations showed qualitatively similar results,
I conduct simple quantile regressions without controlling for potential endogeneity of the regressors at
this point. In the future, a possible way to deal with this endogeneity could be to implement a control
function approach for censored quantile regressions, for example as described in Blundell and Powell
(2007).
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picking up the effect of export opportunities. However, this does not necessarily mean
that there is no economic role of import competition, as the average effect washes out
heterogeneity in the response of firms.
Heterogeneous effects. Not all firms might react in the same way to increased im-
port competition or increased export opportunities. It might even be that the insignifi-
cant coefficient on import competition hides a heterogeneous reaction that averages out.
Table 3.B.4 therefore checks for heterogeneous effects by adding interaction terms with
the firm’s initial productivity level (in year 1993) as in equation 3.4.3. An interesting
pattern emerges in column (1): While the overall average effect of import competition
is positive but insignificant, the firms with the lowest initial productivity levels actu-
ally do increase their productivity. This effect fades out as firms’ initial productivity
increases. At the same time, while the overall average effect of export opportunities is
positive and significant, it turns out that it is really only firms with an initially already
high level of productivity that are driving these results. This should not come as a
surprise, as the trade literature on heterogeneous firms (e.g. Melitz 2003) predicts
that only firms with high productivity are exporting, and the empirical literature (e.g.
Bernard et al. 2007) find that exporting firms are usually the most productive firms in
an industry.
This pattern is even more pronounced in column (2) which adds firm fixed effects.
Column (3) adds industry*year fixed effects that absorb imports and exports as well as
any difference across industries and over time. However, the interaction effects can
still be estimated and their coefficients are robust to this inclusion.
In order to interpret the coefficients in Table 3.B.4, I plot the predicted change in
productivity from import competition and export opportunities by initial productivity
for the observed sample of firms. Figure 3.A.4 uses my preferred specification in column
(2) of Table 3.B.4 and shows that the average annual increase in import competition
(11.1%) leads firms with the lowest productivity level to increase their productivity by
2.4%. The effect from export opportunities is even stronger, but only for the firms with
the highest productivity levels: The average annual increase in export opportunities
(10.9%) makes highly productive firms increase their productivity by 3.5%. Scaled
up to the overall observed increase in trade over the 15 years in the sample, import
competition could have been responsible for a 35% productivity increase for low-TFP
firms, and export opportunities could have been responsible for a 53% productivity
increase for high-TFP firms (Table 3.B.5).
Endogenous trade flows. If trade flows depend on the productivity growth in
an industry, our estimates might be biased. Therefore I use weighted import and
export tariff changes (constructed as described in section 3.4) as instruments for import
competition and export opportunities in Table 3.B.6, and the interaction of tariff changes
with initial TFP as instruments for the interaction terms. Column (1) repeats my
preferred OLS specification in column (2) in Table 3.B.4, including both firm and
year fixed effects. Column (2) in Table 3.B.6 shows the instrumented version of that
regression. The Kleibergen-Paap statistics reported in the last row is 22.10, confirming
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a strong joint first stage. Table 3.B.7 reports the four first stages associated with column
(2). Import tariffs have a negative impact on imports, and the same is true for exports,
as expected. This relationship also holds for the interaction terms.
The magnitudes of the IV estimates is larger compared to the OLS results, pointing
to measurement error in imports and exports in the OLS regression.8 The effect of
import competition is no longer significant, but the effect of access to export markets
remains significant. According to the IV estimates in column (2), the average annual
increase in export opportunities increased the productivity of high-TFP firms by 9.8%
(compared to 3.5% in the OLS estimation). Columns (3) and (4) add industry*year fixed
effects, omitting the main effects, but the findings in terms of the interaction terms are
very similar.
Measurement of productivity. The results are not sensitive to the way of measur-
ing productivity. For example, in Table 3.B.8 I use labor productivity or TFP estimates
obtained via simple fixed effects regression (of sales on employment and capital includ-
ing firm and year fixed effects) as dependent variable, and the results are very similar.
If anything, the Levinsohn-Petrin measure of TFP is more conservative than the other
measures, probably because it addresses the endogeneity of input use best, and also
corrects for input and output price changes.
Selection. As previously explained, we might still be overestimating the effect
of trade on productivity because there is a selection effect coming from the exits of
unproductive firms. As a first simple step I assign the lowest observed productivity
change to an exiting firm in a given industry and year, and include these firms in the
OLS and IV regressions in columns (5) and (6) of Table 3.B.6. As there are not very
many exiting firms, the sample increases by less than 2%. Figure 3.A.5 shows that
exiting firms tend to have a lower initial productivity as continuing firms, but there is
still quite a wide dispersion. Compared to the regressions without exiting firms, the
estimates remain largely unchanged. In the IV regressions, the import competition
effect becomes significant when including exiting firms. But of course this might still
overestimate the true effect of import competition or export access on productivity, if
exiting firms have a much lower productivity change than the lowest observed in the
sample.
Quantile regressions are robust to the precise value that is assigned to exiting firms,
as long as the share of exiting firms is smaller than the estimated quantile. But if the
dependent variable is skewed, as in the case with productivity changes, the mean
and the median will be different, and I start out with simple comparisons of mean
and quantile regressions on the sample without exiting firms in Table 3.B.9. Panel
A looks only at the main effects of import competition and export access. While the
mean effect of import competition on productivity is small and insignificant, the effect
at the median is positive and significant. Other quantiles show that there is large
heterogeneity in the observed responses. A similar picture emerges for the effect of
8It is not that surprising to find measurement error in export and imports. Other studies have found
that trade flows reported by the importing and exporting country often differ, and attribute this to
misreporting.
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export opportunities, but the effect is stronger at lower percentiles, and flattens out for
higher percentiles. The median effect of export access is smaller than the mean effect.
Panel B include all the interaction terms, and again it becomes apparent that the
effect of import competition on productivity is very dispersed. Only few low-TFP firms
manage to upgrade their productivity as a result of import competition, while others
end up with decreases in TFP. In fact, the effect of import competition at the median is
negative for low-TFP firms, and larger for high-TFP firms. The effect of export access
on productivity is also dispersed, but the direction of the effect is more similar across
the quantiles: The high-TFP firms always show the largest TFP gains resulting from an
increased access to export markets.
The quantile regressions reveal a large degree of heterogeneity in the productivity
response of firms to trade liberalization. I now show the results of censored quantile
regressions including exiting firms to check whether a selection effect drives these
results. Table 3.B.10 replicates the regressions performed in Table 3.B.9 but includes
exiting firms. Comparing the two tables, there is little change in the estimated effects, so
selection does not seem to be a major explanation for observed effects on productivity.
Overall, the regressions conducted so far have shown a very robust effect of access
to export markets on the productivity of firms, but only for firms that initially already
had a high productivity. The effect of import competition on productivity is very
dispersed and less robust, with some initially low productive firms increasing their
TFP by a lot.
Robustness checks. Are those firms who are induced by export opportunities to
update their productivity also the ones who actually increase their exports or start
to export? Otherwise I might be not be capturing the right mechanism. To check
this, column (1) in Table 3.B.11 uses firm level exports as dependent variable in the IV
regressions from before (IV specification as in column (2) of Table 3.B.6). It is reassuring
to see that the result is consistent with the export access mechanism and not picking
up any spurious correlation, as firm level exports increase in response to increased
export opportunities (driven by tariff changes), but only for the most productive firms.
Column (2) uses the change in exporter status as a dependent variable, and the pattern
is similar. Access to export markets increase exports at both the extensive and intensive
margin. Column (3) checks whether the increase in exports is related to prices or
quantities by using the change in output prices as a dependent variable.9 However,
there is no significant change in output prices related to access to export markets. Note
that the combined first stage is again strong enough in all three regressions, as indicated
by the large Kleibergen-Paap statistics.
Another concern is that increased imports might not be only a measure of import
competition, but also provide firms with the opportunity to use (potentially cheaper)
imported goods as intermediate goods which might be reflected in TFP. The used
instrumental variable captures tariff changes at the output level of an industry and
should therefore not pick up variation in imports driven by inputs. However, tariff
9This variable refers to all products produced by a firm, not only for exported goods, which is not
available in the survey.
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changes for inputs and outputs of an industry might be correlated, and therefore the
regression might still pick up a change in imported inputs. Table 3.B.12 uses firm level
imports as dependent variable in the IV regressions to check this. Column (1) shows no
significant change in firm level imports as response to import competition. Column (2)
uses the change in the probability to import as dependent variable, and these results
go into the opposite direction as the productivity results. Column (3) uses the change
in intermediate input prices as dependent variable.10 Again, the results go into the
opposite direction as the productivity results. Interestingly, these changes are also
observed for firms who get access to export markets. The most productive firms which
upgrade their productivity as response to export opportunities reduce imports and pay
higher input prices which is the opposite of what we would expect to happen if our
measures are picking up a better access to imported inputs.
Ways to increase productivity. What do firms actually do to increase their pro-
ductivity? Table 3.B.13 checks whether firms that are exposed to increased import
competition or get access to export markets engage in some activities that have the po-
tential to increase TFP. Columns (1) and (2) show that firms upgrade their productivity
by increasing R&D expenses and starting to engage in R&D. Firms also increase the
number of patents and start to engage in patenting (columns (3) and (4)).11 Column (5)
shows that the firms also engage in product innovation, as they increase their number
of products. For firms with access to export markets this could mean that they adapt
their products to foreign tastes or standards. Firms under competition from abroad
might be forced to develop new products in niches where they can still be competitive,
or to adapt their products to compete with foreign firms.
Every four years the survey contains additional questions about the use of specific
technologies. These technologies are the use of robots, computer aided design (CAD),
flexible manufacturing systems, and whether they make an effort to assimilate foreign
technologies in their production process. As these variables are only surveyed every
four years, the sample size drops significantly, and the first stage becomes too weak
to use IV regressions. In columns (6) and (7) I report therefore the OLS results of the
adaptation of those technologies that had significant coefficients in the regressions: the
use of CAD and the assimilation of foreign technologies. Interestingly, both of those
technologies are only used by productive firms that are exposed to export opportunities.
Implications for employment. There is strong evidence for the productivity en-
hancing effect of export opportunities, and weak and heterogeneous evidence of the
productivity enhancing effect of import competition. Both channels might have dif-
ferent implications for employment: Import competition might lead to labor-saving
productivity increases, while access to export markets might lead to employment
growth. Table 3.B.14 uses employment as the dependent variable in IV regressions.
Interestingly, neither import competition nor access to export opportunities lead to
significant employment changes. Note that although exports and sales increase for
10This variable refers to all inputs of a firm, not only imported goods, which is not available in the
survey.
11The results are unchanged if I normalize the number of filed patents by employment.
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high-TFP firms that are exposed to export opportunities, labor productivity increases
as well, leading to an insignificant net change in employment. However, when taking a
closer look by employment type, e.g. full-time and part-time employment as well as
temporary workers (who are not included in total employment), there is some evidence
that low-TFP firms induced by import competition to upgrade their productivity have
increased their temporary staff (potentially replacing full time workers, but the coeffi-
cient is not significant), whereas high-TFP firms induced by export opportunities to
increase their productivity increased their part time staff (again, potentially replacing
full time workers, but the coefficient is not significant). In any case, there is no evidence
that employment increased as a result of increased trade.
3.6 Conclusions
Trade liberalization affects firms in several ways: One the one hand, firms get access
to new export markets, providing them with an opportunity for growth. On the other
hand, foreign firms enter the home market and create more competition for domestic
firms. Both of these two “faces” of globalization might induce firms to upgrade their
productivity. Increased export opportunities can make it worthwhile for firms to invest
in new technology, while increased competitive pressure from foreign companies might
force firms to engage in innovation in order to avoid bankruptcy or retain monopoly
rents.
Existing papers have mostly focused on the productivity inducing effect of either
export access or import competition. However, usually imports and exports are highly
correlated (even within narrowly defined industries), and it is not clear whether empir-
ical papers are picking up the right mechanism, or whether they suffer from omitted
variable bias.
This paper disentangles the the two channels and finds strong productivity-enhancing
effects from export opportunities. However, the effect is heterogeneous and depends
on the initial productivity of firms: Only already very productive firms update their
productivity when subject to new export opportunities. The evidence on import com-
petition is weaker, with possibly some initially low-tech firms managing to increase
their productivity in response to increased competition from abroad, but responses are
very heterogeneous.
I use tariff changes as instruments for import and export changes to deal with the
potential endogeneity of trade flows, and conduct censored quantile regressions which
are robust to firm exits to control for selection. The result on export access is robust
across all specifications, but the evidence on import competition is more mixed across
different specifications. Most notably is the heterogeneous response of firms in quantile
regressions: It seems that only few initially unproductive firms respond with large
productivity increases to competition from abroad. Overall, productivity upgrades are
driven by increased R&D, patenting, product innovation, and the adaptation of certain
technologies like CAD.
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My results suggest that papers studying the effects of either import competition
or access to export markets need to control for the other channel in order to eliminate
omitted variable bias. Furthermore, in order to deal with the endogeneity of imports
and exports, it is necessary to find two instrumental variables, one for each trade
direction. Trade liberalization episodes usually affect tariffs of both the importing
and exporting country, making them highly correlated. It is therefore not sufficient to
instrument for only exports or imports. The two instruments need to be sufficiently
uncorrelated such that the matrix of first stages is full rank, which can be checked using
the Kleibergen-Paap statistics on top of checking the F-statistics on each first stage
separately.
Furthermore, the paper shows that median regressions can be a useful tool to deal
with the selection problem of firms coming from firm exits, if one is willing to assume
that the exiting firms are hit by the most unfavorable shock, an assumption that will
often be sensible.
Finally, the paper supports the focus on the heterogeneity of firms that has been
prevalent in the trade literature since Melitz (2003). The heterogeneity in firm responses
to trade is astonishing, and the heterogeneous firm focus should also be reflected in the
empirical trade literature.
There is no evidence that either mechanism leads to increased full time employment,
instead full time workers seem to be replaced by part-time or temporary workers, which
is probably disappointing for policy makers. Growth in firm size seems to be offset by
increase in (labor saving) productivity, leveling out the effect on employment.
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3.A Figures
Figure 3.A.1: Spain’s world trade over time
Source: United Nations COMTRADE database, accessed by World Integrated Trade
Solution (WITS), wits.worldbank.org
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Figure 3.A.4: Estimated effect of import competition and export access on productivity



















Effect of average annual increase in trade on TFP 
import competition export access
Notes: The average annual increase in trade is 11.1% for imports and 10.9%
for exports over the observed sample period between 1993 and 2007.
Figure 3.A.5: TFP distribution of all firms and exiting firms
Notes: The graph shows the kernel density of ln(TFP) in 1993 for all firms that exist
in 1993 and separately for the subset of firms that exit at some later point in time.














Total trade France 17% Germany 16%
Germany 15% France 13%
Italy 8% Italy 8%
Meat related products France 24% France 21% Nonmetal mineral products France 20% China 21%
Netherlands 15% Germany 15% Germany 13% Portugal 15%
United Kingdom 10% Netherlands 15% Italy 13% Italy 13%
Food and tobacco France 21% France 16% Basic metal products France 27% France 17%
Netherlands 9% Germany 11% Germany 17% Germany 10%
Germany 7% Argentina 8% United Kingdom 14% China 9%
Beverage United Kingdom 53% United Kingdom 32% Fabricated metal products Germany 25% Germany 22%
Netherlands 11% France 12% Italy 20% Italy 17%
France 10% Italy 8% France 19% France 14%
Textiles and clothing Italy 19% China 22% Industrial and agricultural equipment Germany 24% Germany 22%
France 11% Italy 13% Italy 21% Italy 19%
China 9% Turkey 8% France 14% France 11%
Leather, fur and footwear Italy 22% China 35% Computer products, electronics and opticalUnited States 17% Netherlands 16%
China 15% Italy 15% Germany 14% Germany 16%
Korea, Rep. 7% Vietnam 8% France 13% China 12%
Timber United States 17% Portugal 13% Electric materials and accessories Germany 19% Germany 19%
Portugal 16% France 10% France 14% China 15%
France 12% China 10% Japan 12% France 9%
Paper Finland 20% France 20% Vehicles and accessories France 31% Germany 34%
France 16% Finland 14% Germany 30% France 24%
Germany 13% Germany 14% United Kingdom 8% Italy 7%
Printing and publishing United Kingdom 19% United Kingdom 20% Other transportation materials United States 47% France 21%
Germany 17% Germany 16% Italy 10% United States 20%
Italy 12% China 11% Japan 8% United Kingdom 12%
Chemicals Germany 20% Germany 17% Furniture Italy 22% China 20%
France 17% France 14% France 20% Italy 14%
United Kingdom 9% United States 8% Germany 18% Germany 14%
Plastic and rubber products France 27% Germany 20% Games & toys, sports instr China 20% China 22%
Germany 23% Italy 16% Italy 14% Germany 16%
Italy 14% France 16% Japan 12% United Kingdom 15%
Note: Countries with the largest change are shaded.










Total trade France 19% France 20%
Germany 15% Germany 11%
Italy 9% Italy 9%
Meat related products France 32% France 29% Nonmetal mineral products France 16% France 19%
Portugal 19% Portugal 20% Germany 12% Portugal 10%
Germany 12% Germany 10% United States 11% United Kingdom 8%
Food and tobacco Italy 16% France 19% Basic metal products France 12% France 15%
France 14% Italy 18% Germany 10% Italy 15%
Portugal 10% Portugal 15% China 8% Germany 15%
Beverage Germany 17% United Kingdom 14% Fabricated metal products France 17% France 21%
United Kingdom 14% Germany 14% Germany 13% Germany 13%
France 10% France 9% Portugal 8% Portugal 12%
Textiles and clothing France 15% Portugal 15% Industrial and agricultural equipment France 15% France 12%
Portugal 14% France 13% Germany 12% Germany 11%
Italy 11% Italy 9% Portugal 7% Portugal 8%
Leather, fur and footwear Germany 19% France 20% Computer products, electronics and opticalGermany 23% Portugal 20%
United States 17% Portugal 10% France 12% France 10%
France 15% Italy 9% Italy 9% Germany 9%
Timber France 21% France 20% Electric materials and accessories Germany 19% France 14%
Portugal 15% Portugal 20% France 15% Germany 13%
United Kingdom 10% United States 9% Portugal 6% Italy 9%
Paper France 21% France 22% Vehicles and accessories France 31% France 32%
Portugal 16% Portugal 18% Germany 21% Germany 14%
Germany 12% Italy 9% Italy 14% United Kingdom 11%
Printing and publishing Argentina 14% France 23% Other transportation materials France 12% France 14%
Mexico 13% Portugal 12% Liberia 11% United Kingdom 10%
France 12% Mexico 11% Norway 11% United States 9%
Chemicals France 13% Italy 13% Furniture France 26% France 30%
Germany 12% France 12% Germany 15% Portugal 13%
Italy 10% Germany 11% Portugal 11% United Kingdom 6%
Plastic and rubber products France 23% France 23% Games & toys, sports instr France 20% France 19%
Germany 15% Germany 13% Germany 9% Portugal 17%
Portugal 9% Portugal 11% Portugal 9% United States 8%
Note: Countries with the largest change are shaded.
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Table 3.B.3: Import competition versus access to export markets
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES ∆ ln pTFPq ∆ ln pTFPq ∆ ln pTFPq ∆ ln pTFPq ∆ ln pTFPq
∆ ln pIMPq 0.094* 0.065 0.035 0.015
(0.049) (0.047) (0.052) (0.053)
∆ ln pEXPq 0.096*** 0.065** 0.085*** 0.106***
(0.034) (0.025) (0.024) (0.028)
Observations 14,027 14,027 14,027 14,027 13,892
R-squared 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES
Industry fixed effects YES
Firm fixed effects YES
Notes: The dependent variable ∆ ln pTFPq denotes the change in log TFP (estimated by
Levinsohn-Petrin method, adjusted for changes in input and output prices). The main re-
gressors are ∆ ln pIMPq measuring the change in log of Spain’s world imports, and ∆ ln pEXPq
measuring the change in log of Spain’s world exports, both at the NACECLIO industry level. *
p 0.05, ** p 0.01, *** p 0.001. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by NACECLIO
industries.
Table 3.B.4: Heterogeneous effects
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES ∆ ln pTFPq ∆ ln pTFPq ∆ ln pTFPq
∆ ln IMP 0.385** 0.572**
(0.195) (0.238)
p∆ ln IMPq  ln pTFP93q -0.026 -0.040** -0.026*
(0.016) (0.017) (0.014)
∆ ln EXP -0.521*** -0.493***
(0.198) (0.188)
p∆ ln EXPq  ln pTFP93q 0.043*** 0.043*** 0.026*
(0.014) (0.014) (0.015)
Observations 14,027 13,892 13,892
Partial R-squared 0.003 0.003 0.001
Year fixed effects YES YES
Industry fixed effects YES
Firm fixed effects YES YES
Industry*year fixed effects YES
Notes: The dependent variable ∆ ln pTFPq denotes the change in log TFP
(estimated by Levinsohn-Petrin method, adjusted for changes in input and
output prices). The main regressors are ∆ ln IMP measuring the change
in log of Spain’s world imports, and ∆ ln EXP measuring the change in
log of Spain’s world exports, both at the NACECLIO industry level. Both
main effects are interacted with the log of a firm’s initial productivity in
year 1993, ln pTFP93q. * p 0.05, ** p 0.01, *** p 0.001. Standard errors in
parentheses are clustered by NACECLIO industries.
118
Table 3.B.5: Estimated effect of import competition and export opportunities on pro-
ductivity growth of firms, by firms’ initial productivity
% increase in trade
11% 160%
% change in TFP 1% (average annual) (1993-2007)
Import competition:
Firms with lowest observed TFP 0.21% 2.36% 35.46%
Firms with highest observed TFP -0.19% -2.10% -31.4%
Export opportunities:
Firms with lowest observed TFP -0.11% -1.16% -17.36%
Firms with highest observed TFP 0.32% 3.54% 53.05%
Notes: The predicted changes are calculated based on column (2) of Table 3.B.4.
Table 3.B.6: Tariff changes as instrumental variables
DEPENDENT (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLE: ∆ ln pTFPq OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
∆ ln IMP 0.572** 1.448 0.564** 1.634*
(0.238) (1.007) (0.253) (0.846)
p∆ ln IMPq  ln pTFP93q -0.040** -0.106 -0.026* -0.0947 -0.0399** -0.130**
(0.017) (0.068) (0.014) (0.0616) (0.0184) (0.0602)
∆ ln EXP -0.493*** -2.711*** -0.376 -2.973***
(0.188) (0.753) (0.247) (0.699)
p∆ ln EXPq  ln pTFP93q 0.043*** 0.190*** 0.026* 0.179*** 0.0367** 0.215***
(0.014) (0.049) (0.015) (0.0512) (0.0176) (0.0436)
Observations 13,892 13,892 13,892 13,892 14,178 14,178
Firm fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Industry*year fixed effects YES YES
Including exiting firms YES YES
First stage Kleibergen-Paap statistics 22.10 22.24 20.45
Notes: The dependent variable ∆ ln pTFPq denotes the change in log TFP (estimated by Levinsohn-Petrin
method, adjusted for changes in input and output prices). The main regressors are ∆ ln IMP measuring the
change in log of Spain’s world imports, and ∆ ln EXP measuring the change in log of Spain’s world exports,
both at the NACECLIO industry level. Both main effects are interacted with the log of a firm’s initial
productivity in year 1993, ln pTFP93q. Columns (2), (4) and (6) use weighted tariff changes (multiplied by
importance weights) as described in the text as instrumental variables for import competition and export
access, and their interactions with initial productivity as instrumental variables for the interaction terms.
Columns (5) and (6) include exiting firms and assigns them the lowest observed productivity change in
their exiting year in their industry. * p 0.05, ** p 0.01, *** p 0.001. Standard errors in parentheses are
clustered by NACECLIO industries.
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Table 3.B.7: First stages
(1) (2) (3) (4)
p∆ ln IMPq  p∆ ln EXPq 
VARIABLES ∆ ln IMP ln pTFP93q ∆ ln EXP ln pTFP93q
∆IMPTAR -2.733 4.563 -1.538 18.457
(1.693) (32.088) (1.188) (24.868)
p∆IMPTARq  ln pTFP93q 0.044 -2.386 -0.010 -2.948
(0.098) (2.155) (0.072) (1.899)
∆EXPTAR -0.000 0.013 -0.006* 0.025
(0.003) (0.033) (0.003) (0.038)
p∆EXPTARq  ln pTFP93q -0.000 -0.003* -0.000 -0.009***
(0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002)
Observations 13,892 13,892 13,892 13,892
Firm fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Notes: This Table shows the four first stages of the IV regression in column (2) in Table 3.B.6.
∆IMPTAR and ∆EXPTAR are weighted tariff changes (multiplied by importance weights) as
described in the text and used as instrumental variables for import competition and export
access, and their interactions with initial productivity are used as instrumental variables for the
interaction terms. * p 0.05, ** p 0.01, *** p 0.001. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered
by NACECLIO industries.
Table 3.B.8: Alternative measures for productivity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Levinsohn-Petrin Labor productivity Fixed effects
VARIABLES OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
∆ ln IMP 0.572** 1.448 -0.0374 4.937** 0.283 6.683**
(0.238) (1.007) (0.661) (2.342) (0.482) (2.855)
p∆ ln IMPq  ln pTFP93q -0.040** -0.106 0.00495 -0.448** -0.0205 -0.579**
(0.017) (0.068) (0.0566) (0.210) (0.0400) (0.249)
∆ ln EXP -0.493*** -2.711*** -0.781** -3.652* -1.006*** -6.922***
(0.188) (0.753) (0.376) (2.023) (0.263) (2.432)
p∆ ln EXPq  ln pTFP93q 0.043*** 0.190*** 0.0830** 0.334* 0.0989*** 0.595***
(0.014) (0.049) (0.0339) (0.172) (0.0239) (0.203)
Observations 13,892 13,892 15,100 15,100 14,134 14,134
Firm fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
First stage Kleibergen-Paap statistics 22.10 23.11 26.26
Notes: Columns (1) and (2) replicate the specifications in columns (1) and (2) in Table 3.B.6, using the
change in log TFP estimated by Levinsohn-Petrin method, adjusted for changes in input and output prices
as dependent variable. Columns (3) and (4) use changes in log of labor productivity as dependent variable,
where labor productivity is defined as total sales divided by total employment. Columns (5) and (6) use
changes in log of TFP estimated by an OLS regression of sales on employment and capital, including firm
and year fixed effects.
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Table 3.B.9: Comparing mean and quantile regressions
DEPENDENT (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLE: Quantile regressions
∆ ln pTFPq Mean 0.1 0.25 Median 0.75 0.9
PANEL A. No interaction effects
∆ ln IMP 0.015 -0.116*** 0.031*** 0.082*** 0.139*** 0.231***
(0.053) (0.058) (0.031) (0.018) (0.031) (0.055)
∆ ln EXP 0.106*** 0.196*** 0.099*** 0.043*** 0.018*** 0.0002***
(0.028) (0.066) (0.023) (0.018) (0.029) (0.057)
PANEL B. Interaction effects
∆ ln IMP 0.572** -1.081*** -0.419*** -0.194*** 0.318*** 0.942***
(0.238) (0.296) (0.196) (0.144) (0.191) (0.236)
p∆ ln IMPq  ln pTFP93q -0.040** 0.066*** 0.031*** 0.020*** -0.012*** -0.053***
(0.017) (0.019) (0.014) (0.010) (0.013) (0.018)
∆ ln EXP -0.493*** -0.773*** -0.571*** -0.229*** -0.023*** -0.052***
(0.188) (0.319) (0.163) (0.111) (0.158) (0.317)
p∆ ln EXPq  ln pTFP93q 0.043*** 0.067*** 0.045*** 0.017*** 0.003*** 0.004***
(0.014) (0.021) (0.011) (0.008) (0.011) (0.022)
Observations 13,892 13,892 13,892 13,892 13,892 13,892
Notes: The dependent variable ∆ ln pTFPq denotes the change in log TFP (estimated by Levinsohn-Petrin
method, adjusted for changes in input and output prices). The main regressors are ∆ ln IMP measuring
the change in log of Spain’s world imports, and ∆ ln EXP measuring the change in log of Spain’s world
exports, both at the NACECLIO industry level. Both main effects are interacted with the log of a firm’s
initial productivity in year 1993, ln pTFP93q. Panel A and Panel B show separate sets of regressions, with
and without interaction terms. Exiting firms are not included in the sample in their exiting year, as
productivity in the exiting year is unobserved. All regressions include full sets of firm level and year fixed
effects. * p 0.05, ** p 0.01, *** p 0.001. Bootstrapped standard errors by firm in parentheses.
121
Table 3.B.10: Comparing mean and quantile regressions, including exiting firms
DEPENDENT (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLE: Quantile regressions
∆ ln pTFPq Mean 0.1 0.25 Median 0.75 0.9
PANEL A. No interaction effects
∆ ln IMP 0.006 -0.196*** 0.023*** 0.079*** 0.146*** 0.226***
(0.043) (0.060) (0.024) (0.019) (0.032) (0.046)
∆ ln EXP 0.135*** 0.282*** 0.110*** 0.050*** 0.016*** 0.006***
(0.025) (0.058) (0.029) (0.022) (0.030) (0.055)
PANEL B. Interaction effects
∆ ln IMP 0.564** -1.208*** -0.458*** -0.214*** 0.329*** 0.985***
(0.253) (0.390) (0.217) (0.140) (0.222) (0.411)
p∆ ln IMPq  ln pTFP93q -0.040** 0.074*** 0.033*** 0.021*** -0.013*** -0.056***
(0.018) (0.029) (0.015) (0.010) (0.015) (0.028)
∆ ln EXP -0.376 1.319*** -0.752*** -0.307*** -0.101*** -0.170***
(0.247) (0.303) (0.162) (0.122) (0.173) (0.344)
p∆ ln EXPq  ln pTFP93q 0.037** 0.109*** 0.058*** 0.024*** 0.008*** 0.013***
(0.018) (0.022) (0.011) (0.008) (0.013) (0.024)
Observations 14,178 14,178 14,178 14,178 14,178 14,178
Notes: The dependent variable ∆ ln pTFPq denotes the change in log TFP (estimated by Levinsohn-Petrin
method, adjusted for changes in input and output prices). The main regressors are ∆ ln IMP measuring
the change in log of Spain’s world imports, and ∆ ln EXP measuring the change in log of Spain’s world
exports, both at the NACECLIO industry level. Both main effects are interacted with the log of a firm’s
initial productivity in year 1993, ln pTFP93q. Panel A and Panel B show separate sets of regressions, with
and without interaction terms. Exiting firms are included in the sample; they are assigned the lowest
observed productivity change in their exiting year in their industry. All regressions include full sets of
firm level and year fixed effects. * p 0.05, ** p 0.01, *** p 0.001. Bootstrapped standard errors by firm in
parentheses.
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Table 3.B.11: Firm level exports
(1) (2) (3)
Change in Change in Change in
VARIABLES ln(firm level exports) exporter status output price
∆ ln IMP 13.76 0.815 180.2
(12.76) (1.440) (163.8)
p∆ ln IMPq  ln pTFP93q -0.915 -0.0209 -9.775
(0.778) (0.113) (10.93)
∆ ln EXP -6.220 -2.864*** -30.35
(3.790) (0.642) (48.71)
p∆ ln EXPq  ln pTFP93q 0.463** 0.163*** 1.380
(0.216) (0.0400) (3.124)
Observations 7,809 12,578 23,329
Firm fixed effects YES YES YES
Year fixed effects YES YES YES
First stage Kleibergen-Paap statistics 12.12 34.44 19.16
Notes: The dependent variables are the change in log of firm level exports in column (1), change in
exporter dummy variable in column (2) and percentage change in output prices (weighted average across
all outputs) in column (3). The main regressors are ∆ ln IMP measuring the change in log of Spain’s world
imports, and ∆ ln EXP measuring the change in log of Spain’s world exports, both at the NACECLIO
industry level. Both main effects are interacted with the log of a firm’s initial productivity in year 1993,
ln pTFP93q. All regressions use tariff changes (multiplied by importance weights) as described in the text
as instrumental variables for import competition and export access, and their interactions with initial
productivity as instrumental variables for the interaction terms. * p 0.05, ** p 0.01, *** p 0.001. Standard
errors in parentheses are clustered by NACECLIO industries.
123
Table 3.B.12: Imported inputs versus import competition
(1) (2) (3)
Change in Change in Change in
VARIABLES ln(firm level imports) importer status input price
∆ ln IMP -31.61 -4.353** 199.6*
(27.99) (1.692) (109.4)
p∆ ln IMPq  ln pTFP93q 2.255 0.282** -13.30*
(1.936) (0.120) (7.236)
∆ ln EXP 34.48*** 6.101*** -41.27
(9.857) (0.982) (28.22)
p∆ ln EXPq  ln pTFP93q -2.349*** -0.389*** 3.135*
(0.678) (0.0641) (1.801)
Observations 7,646 12,502 23,291
Firm fixed effects YES YES YES
Year fixed effects YES YES YES
First stage Kleibergen-Paap statistics 36.38 33.17 19.01
Notes: The dependent variables are the change in log of firm level imports in column (1), change in
importer dummy variable in column (2) and percentage change in input prices (weighted average across
all inputs) in column (3). The main regressors are ∆ ln IMP measuring the change in log of Spain’s world
imports, and ∆ ln EXP measuring the change in log of Spain’s world exports, both at the NACECLIO
industry level. Both main effects are interacted with the log of a firm’s initial productivity in year 1993,
ln pTFP93q. All regressions use tariff changes (multiplied by importance weights) as described in the text
as instrumental variables for import competition and export access, and their interactions with initial
productivity as instrumental variables for the interaction terms. * p 0.05, ** p 0.01, *** p 0.001. Standard
errors in parentheses are clustered by NACECLIO industries.
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Table 3.B.13: Ways to increase productivity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Change in Change in Change in Assimilate
R&D patenting CAD imported
VARIABLES ∆ ln R&D dummy ∆#patents dummy ∆#products dummy technology
∆ ln IMP 20.08** 3.822** 233.1* -2.675** 5.918* 0.444 0.680
(10.14) (1.847) (134.7) (1.162) (3.434) (0.355) (0.497)
p∆ ln IMPq  ln pTFP93q -1.167* -0.207** -17.78* 2.035*** -0.397* -0.0298 -0.0550
(0.685) (0.0995) (9.916) (0.290) (0.233) (0.0250) (0.0371)
∆ ln EXP -9.625*** -4.812*** -347.4*** -0.127*** -7.505*** -0.880*** -0.774*
(3.528) (1.005) (57.45) (0.0210) (1.412) (0.338) (0.439)
p∆ ln EXPq  ln pTFP93q 0.468** 0.284*** 26.06*** 0.174** 0.486*** 0.0635** 0.0594*
(0.235) (0.0631) (4.242) (0.0844) (0.0909) (0.0248) (0.0340)
Observations 4,292 12,491 12,582 21,797 12,523 2,516 2,562
Firm fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
First stage Kleibergen- 17.58 33.34 34.92 21.05 33.07
Paap statistics
Notes: The dependent variables are the change in log of total R&D expenditures (internal and external) in
column (1), change in R&D dummy variable in column (2), change in number of patents in column (3),
change in patenting dummy in column (4), change in number of products in column (5), change in dummy
variable indicating whether the firm used computer aided design (CAD) in column (6), and change in a
dummy variable to indicate whether a firm spent effort to assimilate imported technologies in column
(7). The latter two variables are only asked every 4 years in the survey. The main regressors are ∆ ln IMP
measuring the change in log of Spain’s world imports, and ∆ ln EXP measuring the change in log of
Spain’s world exports, both at the NACECLIO industry level. Both main effects are interacted with the log
of a firm’s initial productivity in year 1993, ln pTFP93q. Regressions (1) to (5) use tariff changes (multiplied
by importance weights) as described in the text as instrumental variables for import competition and
export access, and their interactions with initial productivity as instrumental variables for the interaction
terms. Columns (6) and (7) are estimated via OLS (the first stage was too weak for IV estimation because
of the reduced number of observations). * p 0.05, ** p 0.01, *** p 0.001. Standard errors in parentheses
are clustered by NACECLIO industries.
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Table 3.B.14: Implications for employment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES ∆ ln EMPL ∆ ln FULLTIME ∆ ln PARTTIME ∆ ln TEMP
∆ ln IMP -1.789 -4.416 0.229 11.19*
(2.514) (2.728) (8.186) (6.309)
p∆ ln IMPq  ln pTFP93q 0.144 0.302 0.0377 -0.678
(0.189) (0.194) (0.609) (0.458)
∆ ln EXP -1.372 1.641 -11.09** -13.28
(1.070) (1.215) (4.619) (10.83)
p∆ ln EXPq  ln pTFP93q 0.0891 -0.106 0.768** 0.814
(0.0755) (0.0824) (0.312) (0.754)
Observations 12,635 12,555 2,548 8,931
Firm fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES
First stage Kleibergen-Paap statistics 34.98 34.95 28.73 36.86
Notes: The dependent variables are the change in log of firm level employment (excluding temporary
workers) in column (1), change in log of firm level full time employment (excluding temporary workers)
in column (2), change in log of firm level part time employment (excluding temporary workers) in column
(3), and change in log of firm level temporary workers in column (4). The main regressors are ∆ ln IMP
measuring the change in log of Spain’s world imports, and ∆ ln EXP measuring the change in log of
Spain’s world exports, both at the NACECLIO industry level. Both main effects are interacted with the log
of a firm’s initial productivity in year 1993, ln pTFP93q. All regressions use tariff changes (multiplied by
importance weights) as described in the text as instrumental variables for import competition and export
access, and their interactions with initial productivity as instrumental variables for the interaction terms. *
p 0.05, ** p 0.01, *** p 0.001. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by NACECLIO industries.
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